PSYCHODYNAMIC STRUCTURE

AND

TRINITARIAN FOUNDATIONS

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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Psychology and the Trinity have always enjoyed close relations. Their intimate connection goes back to St. Augustine's De Trinitate, a book which not only gave the first classical expression of the Doctrine of the Trinity, but also laid the foundations of introspective psychology. In recent times, many writers on the Trinity have employed a psychological theory of personality as their basis for understanding the deity. Most of these, however, have relied on the older type of functional psychology and have employed it in an analogical manner; seldom have they ventured to take account of the psychodynamic theories of personality structure as developed by Freud and his followers.

The present enquiry undertakes to relate the more recent theories of psychodynamics to the foundation of the doctrine, rather than to the doctrine itself. Our reason for this procedure is that we claim that psychodynamics were involved in both the foundations and the developments if the doctrine; to consider both of these would involve covering too much ground, so we have confined our study to the foundations with few references to the actual doctrine.

Although the inter-relation of the two disciplines is not new, our method is new, in that psychodynamics are regarded as participating within what has been postulated by theol-ogy as "Revelation", as a component part. Psychodynamics is a more difficult discipline to handle than the older psychology, largely because of its claim to reduce theology and religious practices to psychological categories. Theology's position has been equally defensive as psychodyanmics has been threatening and offensive, by its claim that Revelation is immune from such criticism as psychodynamics would make. Much work has had to be done , therefore, to prepare the two disciplines for encounter. We have also sought to take into account the more recent developments in New Testament studies emanating largely from Bultmann, and Ramsey's concept of models has been found to be of great service throughout the enquiry.

The contents of the enquiry are as follows. An Introduction indicates the problems relating to bringing the two disciplines into an encounter. Part One is concerned with detailing the various psychodynamic theories which will be employed in the central study.

Use other side if necessary.

Freud's position is indicated largely without comment. We then follow with the development of Freud's work by Melanie Klein; the position of modern Freudians (Winnicott, Anna Freud, Erik H. Erikson and Edith Jacobson), and the restructuring of Freud's theories by Fairbairn, as developed by Guntrip, are considered; the Existentialist protest over against the Freudian position is stated; finally we present the standpoint of Jung. These chapters include specific comments and criticisms. A final chapter which deals with psychodynamic theories in relation to their logical status, particularly Freudian formulations, ends Part One.

The second Part of the Enquiry, which is the central section, is divided into three sections. The first relates the ideas of superego and monotheism; it examines Freudian claims; it outlines contemporary Old Testament studies, which in turn leads to a detailed consideration of Revelation, followed by one on reduction. It ends with a study of key passages in the Old Testament.

The Second Section of Part Two considers the relation of the concept of the Spirit in Scripture to that of the id or unconscious in psychodynamics. A study of the Spirit in the Bible is included; a detailed examination of the id or Unconscious and its implications follows; a fresh study of relevant passages in the New Testament, with special reference to St. Paul, ends this section.

The Third Section considers the fact of Jesus the Son and Psychodynamics. Much attention is given here to contemporary studies of the Gospels, including the "new quest" of the historical Jesus, Bultmann's demythologizing programme and subsequent studies. Psychodynamic critiques of Jesus Christ are also considered. The part played by psychodynamics in Christological developments clears the way for a fresh consideration of the historical Jesus, in which key gospel passages are examined.

The Third Part of the enquiry is very much in the nature of a Coda. After considering four representative theories of the Trinity (Barth, Augustine, Wren Lewis and Jung) we give a summary of our own enquiry, which leads to suggestions being offered as to the psychodynamics operating in the doctrine itself, and we suggested how it could be employed in a functional manner as a psychotherapeutic concept. We concluded that Trinitarian experience is fundamental and that psychodynamics afford the principal clue to this fact. Theologians who may not express their adherence to the doctrine may nevertheless exhibit in their writing true Trinitarian faith, as the doctrine is based on experience, (e.g. Schleiermacher) and that in the "empirical fit" of the experience, we find the principle clue to the doctrine.

C O N T E N T S

PART THREE

FOUNDATIONS RELATED TO DOCTRINE AND EXPERIENCE

P R E F A C E

The following enquiry has been undertaken while I have been employed as a Parish Minister in a down-town city church, and part of the time I was undergoing training as a psychotherapist at the Davidson Clinic, Edinburgh. Without the stimulus provided by these two situations this study would never have been written.

It had its origin in fact at a psychotherapeutic group of which the writer was a member, in which I expressed the contention that the relationship between the psychic structure and the Doctrine of the Trinity was very close indeed. One of the group, the late Rev. Ian Ireland, suggested that this might form the basis of a Ph.D. thesis.

In the early stages I was much encouraged to undertake this work by both Professor J.A. Whyte of St Andrews and Professor Ian T. Ramsey of Oxford, who is now The Lord Bishop of Durham, the latter having continued to help and encourage throughout. Edinburgh University in accepting my application to undertake the writing of a thesis on the subject of the Trinity provided me with a trinity of supervisors, Professor John McIntyre, Professor Ronald Hepburn and Dr. Boris Semeonoff. Each one has spent time and given me every attention throughout the writing of the work. I would also like to thank others who have assisted me. The late Dr. Jean Biggar, my analyst, and Dr. Winifred Rushforth, my supervisor at the Davidson Clinic, both gave me

tremendous help in understanding the schools of psychodynamics and myself as well! Dr. R.S. Lee of Oxford and Dr. Winnicott both set me on to enquiries which have proved most fruitful, and my psychiatrist friends, Dr. Eric Wood and Dr. Douglas Haldane have both been willing to spend time and discuss certain difficulties with me, which has helped to clear my mind on many matters.

I would also wish to thank Mr Indrasen Indulkar for the diagrams included in the text; for Dr. G.W. Spink, the organist of my church, for reading the copies and correcting not only the proofs but removing many infelicities of style, and for Mrs Bakker who has brought order and coherence out of the palimpsest which I presented to her for typing. Finally, I must thank my wife and family who have had to do without me so much.

St Bride's Manse, Edinburgh.

March 1968 J.R.W.

INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF THE ENQUIRY

> "It is..the duty of theologians in every age to soak themselves as far as they can in the thought of their own times and thus imbued to approach again the record of those events, seeking whatever fresh light God wills to break forth upon them and has been training them to see."[1]

To "soak oneself" in all the thought of one's times is an impossibility. There is so much thought that one has to be selective. The writer of this enquiry, however, has endeavoured to "soak himself" in one specific aspect of contemporary thought, namely psychodynamics with its corresponding practice of psychotherapy.

"Psychotherapy" is a branch of psychology. This term is preferred to the more usual one of psychoanalysis, which refers more exclusively to the Freudian school. The word "psychoanalysis" is used, however, by Freudians both for the practice of their form of psychotherapy, and for the various dogmas which have been produced from that practice, particularly those first set out by Freud. We shall use the term "psychotherapy" for the practice or treatment; we shall, however, employ the term "psychodynamics" not only to refer to assumed or inferred dynamic processes in

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1. Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, p.36

the mind, but also as a term to cover the various dogmas and structural hypotheses which have arisen from the various schools of "depth psychology". We realise that to some the use of the term involves an extension to its normal functioning; we prefer it, however, to "depth psychology" or any other term.

To those trained in academic or experimental psychology, this branch of study is not considered as "scientific". In fact, modern psychology is a "house divided" in a way similar to modern philosophy. The condition of the latter has been described by John Macmurray[1] where he notes that the two main forms of philosophizing which have emerged after the breakdown of the traditional systems are Logical Empiricism and Existentialism; the former discards the problems in order to retain the method, while the latter relinquishes the method in wrestling with the problems. A similar state exists in psychology today. Academic psychology and experimental psychology are wedded to the scientific system, concentrating on behaviour; psychodynamics has departed from that system in order to cope with the human problem. It uses various sets of concepts, sometimes scientifically unproved, and sometimes even scientifically unprovable, as sustaining facts behind the practice of psychotherapy, in order to bring some measure of understanding to the phenomena, imparting intuitions and insights which academic and experimental psychology could not and would never claim to give.

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1. John Macmurray, The Self as Agent, p. 27-8

This enquiry, however, is concerned with theology, or rather with the foundations of one doctrine of the Christian Faith, namely the Doctrine of the Trinity. It is intended as a radical enquiry. By "radical" I would adopt the definition given to the word by Bishop J.A.T. Robinson[1] where the word is defined in relation to one who is "concerned to go to the roots of the creed or code than merely to restate them (like the reformer) or to abolish them (like the revolutionary.)" Dr. Robinson goes on to say that radical theology asks how far the projection of a supernatural God is really necessary. However, he does state that radical theology is not concerned with reducing or changing the reality, but with re-locating it "so that it can come to men again in and through the vital connections of life rather than over and above them."[2] It is our belief that there is no discipline better qualified to undertake this task than that of psychodynamics, for it is concerned with understanding and describing man's psyche, "the vital connections of life."

Why then is re-location necessary? Simply because the doctrines of the Church, and in particular, that of Christ's person and the Trinity, were worked out in an age which was dominated by ontology and metaphysics, and they no longer form categories in which contemporary thought is cast.

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1. J.A.T. Robinson, Correspondence Column, The Observer, Sunday, December 4, 1966
2. ibid.

A popular exposition of this new point is that of Cornelius van Peursen who divides man's understanding of the nature of reality into three basic stages.[1] The first stage is the period of myth in which man and reality, subject and object are fused. In the "mythical" stage, man is merged into the world of things. The second stage is the "ontological" one, where man places himself in relation to the world: the two are distanced and separated. Natural is set over against the supernatural; the profane over against the sacred. God and ethical values are given ontological status as isolated substances, and "things in themselves", existing outside of reality and over against it. There is, however, a third stage, to which van Peursen gives the name of "functional", where the metaphysical, ontological understanding of the world is no longer necessary, for man controls and understands the world functionally. This is the stage in which, he claims, we are at present.

All such categorizations are wide open to criticism. Even if their aim is to abolish metaphysics, they are themselves a form of metaphysics! It is to be noted, however, that before van Peursen, Freud himself, in Totem and Taboo, (p. 93) divided man's way of thinking into three stages: animistic, religious and scientific, which are not unlike those of van Peursen. It is also possible to see in this categorization of van Peursen a parallel with the various stages in human development, from

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1. Cornelius van Peursen, Man and Reality - the History of Human Thought in The Student World, No. i. p. 13

that of symbiosis of mother and child, to the stage in which subject and object are differentiated and set over one against the other, to the final stage of mature interdependence.

If, however, we deal only with the second and third stages, we could say that the second one was a period to which the word "projectionist" could be applied; the third period is one in which man has no need of his projections and has recalled them, re-introjecting them and putting them back to where they belong, in the Unconscious mind.

This is, however, anticipating our arguments in the enquiry where the above and other similar statements will be spelled out. At the moment, we would draw attention to the fact that not only from popular writers like Robinson and van Peursen, but from many quarters there have been calls to re-interpret the faith. Even such a careful, middle-of-the-road theologian as John Baillie, in his Gifford Lectures explains how the use of Greek metaphysics helped to interpret the Christian faith and its implications for the age in which the interpretation was undertaken; but that it made the faith appear to be too much an affair of the intellect, as if it were in its own essence a metaphysical system. Baillie regards the Trinity as a doctrine much needing interpretation, as the thought forms in which it was expressed were satisfactory and indeed assimilable for that age, but useless today.[1] He also added that metaphysics form no part of man's thinking, except in

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1. John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p. 154-5

Christian preaching![1] Baillie therefore saw the continuing use of metaphysics as the reason why a good many Christians in the last century renounced the Christian faith for truth's sake. It is quite clear that Baillie's protest is a valid one, for this procedure meant that one must first understand and embrace metaphysics before one can understand theology.

Before Baillie, however, Schleiermacher prophesied concerning the doctrine of the Trinity: "There must still be in store for it a transformation which will go back to its very beginnings..."[2] Perhaps this enquiry may contribute towards the fulfilment of Schleiermacher's prophecy, for we shall be concerned not so much with the doctrine of the Trinity itself, but with the foundations of that doctrine, "its very beginnings".

Our study will barely consider the contribution of Greek metaphysics to the dogma, for our primary concern is with the foundations of the dogma in the Bible itself; we would, however, draw attention to the fact that the Bible also bears witness to that ontological outlook to which van Peursen draws our attention. I believe that before the Bible can be used in our times as a basis for theologizing, as it must be, some prior adjustments need to be undertaken. All the various forms of criticism have to be undertaken including Bultmann's demythologizing programme. In addition to these I would add other adjustments, such as a

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1. John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p. 154-5
2. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 172

change in orientation from the projectionist outlook of scripture to a more introjected way of understanding the material, which may help to bring about that change of location, of which J.A.T. Robinson wrote. The Bible, we find, seldom speaks of the mind of man and its activities: this cannot be regarded as a God-given precedent for all time, but rather as an indication of the dominant ways of thinking of the ages and cultural thought-forms in which it was produced. It does not follow that because the Bible has little or no concern for psychological matters, neither should we, in our age, exhibit these tendencies. Our failure to find in the Bible the kind of psychological material which we in our age take for granted is due to the particular slanting or orientation of the culture of the ages, and is perhaps also due to the existence of one single omnibus concept which covered much of the phenomena which we would separate out and give individual significance to - namely "God". It is possible to produce from the Bible an objective theology of an utterly transcendent God, but such an outlook may have arisen because of the practices of those times to describe phenomena in either a projectionist way or to include them under a universal concept. In this case the so-called objectivity of God rests on the outlook of the times and on the way in which men then described experienced relationships. The Biblical categories cannot be applied "holus-bolus" without psychological re-adjustment being included along with the other forms of criticism. This re-orientation or re-location is indispensable for there is no

direct line from the actual text of the Bible, the "revelation" as it is sometimes called, to a dogmatic doctrine of God. To continue with the metaphor of electricity, transformers of many kinds must first perform their work before the current is usable.

Bultmann, as we shall see, transformed the message of the New Testament into existentialist categories, claiming that these were pre-theological; prior to all the standpoints is the nature of being itself, which theology assumes. We would make a similar claim for psychodynamics. We do not read psychodynamics into the text of the Bible, or by applying it superimpose foreign ideas upon the scriptures. Therefore we accept and shall use the first part of Bultmann's demythologizing programme, but not the second part, of re-mythologizing the Biblical material into existentialist categories. We shall be content to point to the psychodynamics in the vital experiences of the Bible, before proceeding to make theological claims.

The assertion that the Biblical material can be investigated and comprehended under psychodynamic categories is one which may be resisted by theologians who regard the subject matter of theology as outside the sphere of an enquiry such as this. Even some psychologists work within very limited spheres of enquiry:

> "Psychology is concerned with the psychic effect of a belief, not with its truth or falsehood, and this is a limitation which must be accepted if religion is to be compared to psychotherapy."[1]

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1. David Cox, Jung and St. Paul, p. 13

There is a truth in the above, if one limits one's study to psychotherapy on the one hand, and a transcendent God on the other. I believe, however, that psychodynamics can be employed to investigate the foundations of doctrine as in the Scriptures; moreover, it can say something about origins, because it was present at the origins! To put the matter another way, the origins can be investigated in terms of the psychodynamic model as well as in terms of the theological model.

Such brash confidence, however, must not blind us to the danger and pitfalls inherent in such an inter-disciplinarian study as this one. We may, in this connection, cite the following:

1. The first warning is from those who are concerned with language. Writing of this problem, David Cox, in the study mentioned above, stated:

> "A mistake which is too often made is to think that one may take a psychological statement and relate it directly to a theological statement, and it is even possible for people to string together theological and psychological phrases and imagine that they have produced a meaningful sentence. In fact, psychology and theology use two quite different languages, and no comparison can be made between statements in the different languages until one has been 'translated' into the other, or both have been translated into a third language."[1]

Cox speaks of the wholly different sets of terms which the two disciplines use and declares that nothing but harm can be done by those who unthinkingly compare psychological and religious formulae as though they belonged to the same language.[2]

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1. ibid., p.X intro
2. ibid., p. 4

Cox is careful not to mix the two at any point, even to the extent of separating the subjects of each discipline into alternate chapters, with the results that we have the two set side by side, with points of contact few and far between and so that an encounter is almost non-existent. This, however, is to be preferred to the study of H.L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, in which a disastrous mixing of terms takes place. For example, "...the whole of the available energy on the part of the Christian should not be directed towards individuation...but to sanctification." (p.106); and again, "The shadow is not simply to be 'assimilated' but sanctified." (ibid., p.111). One is reminded here of words of David Jenkins about syntheses of this kind: they begin with a mixture, go on in a muddle and end in a mess!

Neither position, of Cox or Philp, quoted above is wholly satisfactory. One writer who has brought the two fields together with considerable success is Victor White, who writes as follows:

> "The worker on the boundaries of religion and psychology must be bi-lingual, and there is no dictionary which will supply the exact equivalents of the two languages he must employ. His work will bring him into contact with two peoples who know remarkably little about one another, who have seldom shared one another's experiences, whose respective upbringing and ways of thought render mutual understanding extremely difficult."[1]

White also writes later on:

> "Each speaks a different language; each describes an observed occurrence from a different viewpoint."[2]

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1. Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p. 8
2. ibid., p. 203

That is to say: the same observed occurrence, the same phenomenon is seen in two different ways, according to whichever model is being applied and in whose terms it is being described. The use of Ramsey's concept of models enables us to undertake the work as suggested by White.

2. Throughout the history of Christianity, there have always been scholars and writers who have sought to relate the faith in some way to the trends of thought current at their time, usually as an apologetic for the faith in some form of re-interpretation. The influence of secular philosophy has seldom been absent from theology and even in the New Testament there are obvious borrowings.

> "It has been the fate or fortune of theological study to have been forced to absorb into its system the assured results of the other branches of learning."[1]

John Macquarrie describes these efforts of re-interpretation by theologians, as an attempt to find a point of entry into "the contemporary mind in order that they may be able to present the Christian faith in terms intelligible to their own age. They therefore make use of current philosophical conceptions when these were drawn from systems of thought quite alien to Christianity."[2] Macquarrie goes on to speak of three difficulties or dangers inherent in such an encounter. (i) Preoccupation with the secular philosophy and over-emphasis of parts of it may distort

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1. H.A. Williams, 'Theology and Self-Awareness', Soundings, p.69
2. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.3

the faith. (ii) Ideas quite alien to the faith may slip into its theology while masquerading under the guise of traditional Christian terminology. (iii) A plain accommodation of the Christian faith to the prevailing philosophical fashion of the day, i.e., a capitulation of the faith to the "philosophy", as in "reductionism", in which theology is transformed into anthropology or psychology, which was the aim of Feuerbach. This study therefore is no new procedure as all the way through its history the Christian Church has made use of secular concepts and thereby risked the charge of being reductionist or of diluting the pure faith.

3. Whilst these warnings are no doubt necessary, we nevertheless wish to note that if one states in advance how far one discipline is to be allowed to illuminate another, honest enquiry can be inhibited.

> "The philosopher's job is to inquire. The philosophical theologian has only pretended to inquire. His conclusions are prescribed from the outset."[1]

As we have already indicated, an even worse state can result when each discipline claims autonomy for itself, sets up boundaries, with the result that the "encounter" is limited to drawing parallels between the two. If one states in advance how far psychology, for example, can examine the sacred precincts of theology, the "charmed circle" of revealed religion which

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1. Howard Root, 'Beginning all over again', Soundings, p.4

possesses unchallengeable authority, as Hepburn has wittily called it[1], then no worthwhile conclusions may result. In this enquiry we will subscribe to no prior "gentleman's agreement" which will inhibit true encounter.

There is a fundamental difficulty in that theology has always been regarded as being concerned about the being of God, whereas psychology is concerned with the being of man; they work in different fields, the former in categories of revelation, the latter in empirical data, concerning human behaviour, or mental inferences. As Father Copleston has said, speaking of Existentialism: "The problem of God cannot be raised on the plane of the phenomenological analysis of man."[2] This challenge will be taken up at length during the enquiry, particularly when we face the whole Barthian edifice which rests exclusively on Revelation. We assert that even in this concept of the wholly-other the mind of man has played its part. It is our contention that the foundation of the Trinitarian formulation of the concept of God has been built out of human experiences, which can be understood and interrogated from a psychodynamic, as well as from a theological, viewpoint or model. We cannot possibly conceive of any "revealed" material which has by-passed the human psyche.

We deprecate therefore the preservation of a "sacred area"

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1. R.W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2. F.C. Copleston, Existentialism and Modern Man, p. 18

which purports to form the basis of theology, and into which nothing secular is permitted. Bultmann, in spite of his usual radical approach to scripture, has surrounded the kerygma with a protective "fence". Hodgson has done this, not with the kerygma, but with the revelation itself.[1] We cannot subscribe to those who would keep certain theological areas absolutely immune from secular enquiry. Had the Church done this in the last century - some Christians did and their followers are still with us - Christianity would still be committed to a pre-scientific view of Creation based on Genesis regarded as a scientific text-book; the newer insights resulting from the critical attitude to the scriptures would not have been available for use in the Church.

All these attempts we would explain as the desire to keep a "gap" for God, an area which is screened off as sacrosanct, autonomous, free from the erosion of human criticisms and scientific enquiry. But faith, we hope to show, dictates that we must no longer preserve gaps as anchorage for belief in God.[2]

Writing in 1939, John Macmurray[3] claimed that the physical sciences came first because the material world is less highly

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1. L. Hodgson, For Faith and Freedom, p. 86
2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer gets the credit these days for the "gap for God" notion. However, it appears in J.B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p.455 f.; and is also found in Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p.262 f.
3. J. Macmurray, The Boundaries of Science, p.56, 62

charged with emotion than the field of organic and personal life. He goes on to say: "A society which can develop a scientific psychology is a society which has overcome its fear of examining its own motives." Would it be fair to indicate that a fear of examining the phenomena which form the basis of doctrine under the terms of a psychological model, lies at the ground of preserving a "gap" for God? This is imputing motives; and logically it is not necessarily true, as there may be logical reasons which can be deduced for this procedure. Nevertheless, we hope to be able to examine without fears of any kind the material upon which Revelation has been founded, and to see how far the participation of man himself has been employed in it.

It is our belief that the Trinity as a dogma began as the Trinity of experience; "God-as-He-is-in-Himself" was first of all "God-as-He-is-for-us". We will therefore examine the experiences of the Christians and the Hebrews before them, applying to these the models of psychodynamic structure; we do this because we contend that such phenomena can be understood under psychodynamic as well as under religious models.[1] Ramsey's models, as we have said, will be the means of providing us with a new method of enquiry along these lines.

If it could be said of this enquiry that it is written in any tradition, one would wish to point to that of Anglican

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1. I.T. Ramsey, Religious Language, p. 27-8

scholars of the last hundred or so years (with some reservations) from F.W. Robertson of Brighton to J.A.T. Robinson of Woolwich. There are certain features to be noted in this tradition. For example: (i) A certain openness is apparent. F.W. Robertson regarded the Doctrine of the Trinity as "the sum of all that knowledge which has as yet been gained by man." He emphasises the "as yet", because in the future this knowledge may be superseded by higher knowledge.[1] (ii) There is also an emphasis on human participation. Illingworth[2] asserts that personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass. Bethune-Baker[3] allows an important place to experience and argues from the observed facts of human experience of Christian revelation that led to the formulation of the Doctrine of the Trinity. (iii) There is also an analogical argument frequently employed, moving from the personality of man to the personality of God, as in Stuart McDowell who, using the old functional psychology, connects conation with the Father, intellect with Sonship and affection with the Holy Spirit.[4] "The Trinity within us is more than suggestive of the truth that in God, personality is also truine."[5]

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1. F.W. Robertson, Sermons on Christian Doctrine, pp.149-163
2. J.R. Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, p. 225
3. J.F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, p. 239
4. S. McDowell, Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity, p.96-7
5. ibid.,p.62. McDowell's is the earliest theological work I have met which mentions the name of Freud, but he does not use Freud's findings.

The most recent full treatment of the Trinity in this tradition is that of Leonard Hodgson.[1] However, whilst I would claim to be writing in this tradition, I find myself unable to use the work of Hodgson to any great extent. This is largely because this enquiry aims at understanding the foundations of the Trinity in a post-Freudian, post-Bultmann and post-Ramsey situation, and Hodgson is decidedly prior to the work of all these thinkers. It is pre-Freudian in that whilst relying on a psychological assessment of human personality for the background thinking on his presentation of the doctrine, Hodgson employs Laird's Problems of the Self (1917) where the three functions of the older psychology - thinking, feeling and willing - are regarded by Laird as on the one hand distinct, yet are able to interpenetrate one another in a dynamic unity of continuous being.[2] Having read carefully Laird's analysis of the self, in his Shaw Lectures[3], I found that none of his contributions could be usefully incorporated into this enquiry, as the model employed is so different from ours. Hodgson's work is also pre-Bultmann in that he seldom allows radical criticism to enter into his discussion of scripture upon which he bases the doctrine (the revelatum, as he calls it) and towards which he takes a protective attitude. He virtually regards scripture in the same fixed way as did St Augustine. Hodgson is naturally pre-Ramsey, but

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1. L. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity
2. ibid., p. 85
3. J. Laird, Problems of the Self

one notes that he speaks twice of "projecting into eternity" essential relationships.[1]

The tradition, however, is from Robertson to Robinson, and I would quote from the latter to complete the brief survey; this is from a criticism he makes of the work of Paul van Buren:

> "In the past Christians have tended to make many statements which have appeared to characterize a Person in himself rather than a personal relationship. But what lies outside or beyond this relationship, we can never say... God is known through his effects. And what theology analyses and describes is the existential relationship in which these effects are known...."
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> "The Doctrine of the Trinity is not, as it has often been represented, a model of the divine life as it is in itself. It is a formula or definition describing the distinctively Christian encounter with God. Hence all the features in the Trinitarian formula are in the last analysis representations of the existential relationship."[2]

Another contemporary Anglican from the other side of the Atlantic writes:

> "Actually, however, the 'threeness' with which we are really concerned is not in the nature of God as an object of thought, but in the Church's experience of the divine; and here the ground for the trinitarian confession is firmly laid...."[3]

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1. L. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, pp.68, 121
   There are other objections to Hodgson, e.g., his claim to employ the psychological model is vitiated by his moving into the social model (p.190) although he denies this; his analogy of adoption is overworked, and his idea of internally constitutive unity is contrived. In a similar class we would place the book of Franks, The Doctrine of the Trinity. It is a mine of information; throughout he uses as a criterion of judgement the triad of authority, reason and experience. We could not incorporate it in our study.
2. J.M. Robinson, The Honest to God Debate, p. 255-6
3. John Knox, The Church and the Reality of Christ, p.73

We shall focus our attention therefore on "the distinctively Christian encounter with God" (Robinson) or "the Church's experience of the divine." (Knox). Unashamedly, we shall use the word "experience", ambiguous though it is. We cannot regard experiences as "merely subjective", for they are always experiences of something, even if the content is one's own mental states. To think otherwise would be to fall prey to the "Cartesian Faux-Pas", the name given by Archbishop Temple to Descartes' major premiss, Cogito ergo sum.

The tradition which we have appealed to, has its origins far back in the great treatise on the Trinity by St Augustine, De Trinitate. In the 1930s this tradition was abruptly halted when Karl Barth began his Dogmatics with an exposition of the Trinity based solely on Revelation, this concept taking over completely the work previously done by metaphysics. Whereas Augustine had worked from Genesis 1. 26, that man was made by God in his image, and that therefore a theory of human personality could be used to understand the being of God, Barth set God and man on either side of the Kierkegaardian infinite abyss; all analogies were dismissed as being too weak and tainted with human sinfulness. Some theologians have capitulated to Barth's views, e.g., Claude Welch. I hope to demonstrate in this enquiry why I find myself unable to accept Barth's position, and that the Anglican tradition, based on Augustine, is a sounder one, and a better starting point for our undertaking.

In one sense, there is nothing new in applying psychology to this doctrine; but the method of application can be new. Previously, it has been used as a support to the doctrine; we believe, however, that the situation is altered, as psychodynamics underlie the experiences upon which the dogma is based. We hope therefore to penetrate into the very foundations of the dogma, realizing that this may involve some radical modification to received belief, some re-location, and possibly, some reduction may result; but this is not our object. Our views will be modified as we are persuaded by the insights made available through the interrogation by the various models. The parallels to the Church's need to accommodate its teachings to the new knowledge of Copernicus and Darwin are often quoted in this connection.[1]

On the one hand, therefore, we believe that psychodynamics can be a valuable apologetic tool for the Christian faith in our times; it does not provide the whole truth and cannot displace all other models, nor can it take over the whole content of the faith without remainder. We believe, however, that the human mind, like truth itself, is multi-dimensional; theology is one of the products of that mind; therefore a study which concerns the mind cannot be irrelevant to theology, even although the subject matter is claimed by some to be non-psychological. We cannot accept this; anything claiming to be an encounter or an experience cannot

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1. H.A. Williams, 'Theology and Self-Awareness', Soundings, p.69
   C. Edward Barker, Psychology's Impact on the Christian Faith, p.13

exclude psychodynamics.

There is, of course, a natural resistance on the part of theologians to admit Freud and his work owing to the anti-religious bias which he displayed. In spite of this fact, which we shall discuss, we think that Christian theology would be immeasurably poorer were it to exclude this valuable tool of insight.

One of the most significant studies, or rather, encounters, in this dual field is that of R.S. Lee in Freud and Christianity. In the introduction to the book, Canon A.E. Baker claimed that Lee's work "throws real light on the Christian religion in many of its types and varieties, for it views its great doctrines in immediate relation to experience."[1](italics mine.) Dr. Lee considers many doctrines and aspects of the Christian faith, e.g,sin, atonement, the Church, the Life and Teaching of Christ, the Fatherhood of God, However, he makes no reference to the Trinity or to the Holy Spirit, which we believe to be the most related to human experience and the most dependent upon it. Lee's study is based exclusively on Freud's work, which he accepts fairly completely.

> "The writer believes that Freud and his school have made a more scientific, accurate and comprehensive contribution to the understanding of human behaviour than any other school of psychology, and in the following pages the argument will take no account of what other schools have to say."[2]

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1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.7
2. ibid., p. 30

He therefore accepts the Freudian model in spite of the many criticisms which have been made of it, or the various modifications which have resulted from the work of Freud's followers, like Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Erikson etc. Dr. Lee's work moves from one psychodynamic system to examine many aspects of the Christian faith.

Our task is different. We will examine and employ many psychodynamic systems in addition to that of Freud, but all in relation to the foundations of one particular doctrine, namely that of the Trinity. Although there is this difference, we write in the same spirit as Dr. Lee does:

> "Psychology is not a substitute for religion; but on the other hand, religious behaviour obeys psychological laws, and it is disastrous to ignore these."[1]

Jung also has written similarly; everything to do with religion, he states, everything it says, impinges so closely on the human soul, that psychology cannot afford to overlook it.[2]

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It is always one's hope in embarking on such an enquiry as this, that one will break some fresh ground, or impart insights which others may pursue. One works, however, on the shoulders of other men, ever indebted to their labours, and at the end, one is

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1. R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p.7-8
2. C.G. Jung, 'A Psychoanalytical Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity', Collected Works, Vol.II, p.109ff.

amazed how very little indeed is original. One arrives at what one thinks are original thoughts only to discover that Augustine or Freud or someone else has said the same thing before! That great men have felt the same experience is some consolation. Freud himself tells us that after reading Watkins Lloyd on The Moses of Michelangelo:

> "My first feeling was one of regret that the author should have anticipated so much of my own thought, which seemed precious to me, because it was the result of my own efforts...."[1]

In regard to the form which this enquiry takes, certain major problems could well have been dealt with at the beginning; we have preferred, however, to deal with them as they arise, e.g., revelation and reduction. Our work does not attempt to solve all the theological and philosophical problems it is bound to raise. It is the work of a psychotherapist concerned with the application of the models he has found therapeutically valuable, to data which have traditionally been regarded as the province of theology alone. Therefore, problems which arise as the result of this enquiry must be left for others, like philosophical theologians, to solve.

Two inconsistencies may be observed in the writing, the first concerns words which I have used and which vary in spelling. For example, the reader may find super-ego, Super-ego, superego, or Superego, because I have decided to quote author's directly

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1. W. Lloyd, The Moses of Michelangelo, 1914, Collected Papers, Vol.IV, p.284

and not modify their spelling. Secondly, with regard to style. There are inconsistencies, largely through the employment of ipsissima verba in the text, when explicating the various schools of thought etc.

The plan of our enquiry will be as follows. We will begin by considering the various psychodynamic models suggested by present-day writers from Freud, Klein, some present-day Freudians, Fairbairn and Guntrip, the Existentialists and Jung; after this, a discussion of their work will be made, and we shall draw our conclusions and state our preferences. This will form the first part of the enquiry.

The second part will be the application of the models to: (i) Monotheism in the Old Testament, considered in relation to the superego. (ii) The Holy Spirit considered in relation to the id, the Unconscious or psychic energy. (iii) The present position of Jesus of Nazareth, and the Christology which resulted from him, examined again by psychodynamics. In each separate study we indicate the present trend in contemporary Biblical scholarship.

Finally, in Part Three, we will consider the above in relation to our approach the contributions of others, and then make a comprehensive statement of our findings; lastly we will suggest ways in which these findings have influenced the formation of the dogma of the Trinity itself. The doctrine of the Trinity, however, is not the subject of this study; we are concerned throughout with what went into it, with its foundations.

P A R T O N E

PSYCHODYNAMIC STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

I have already indicated in the General Introduction to this enquiry that the relating of psychology to the Trinity is no new practice. From St Augustine onwards there have been many examples of theologians who have taken a theory of the structure of man's mind, either of their own construction or from a philosopher or psychologist and employed it to illuminate some aspect of the Trinity, as a Vestigium Trinitatis, or as an analogy.

We now possess, however, theories of the structure of man's mind in greater depth and detail than ever before, and the main purpose is to consider these in relation to the foundations of the Doctrine, and to ascertain how far they can be employed to illuminate it.

In this First Part of this enquiry, I am setting out in some detail the various structures of the mind which I hope to use in the Second Part, when I shall come to consider the Biblical foundations of the Doctrine. The reader may feel at times that I have lost sight of the main purpose of the enquiry by my not relating anything said in this Part One to theology in general or to the foundations of Trinitarian thought in particular. However, I feel that it is best to set out these structural theories in some detail, therefore my concern in this section will be purely with psychodynamics. Much of what is contained in these chapters will be common knowledge to those with an acquaintance with psychodynamic theories; I hope, however, to add comments and

criticisms throughout which will help to indicate the position which I am taking towards each of them. Following this setting out of the various systems, I hope to engage in a discussion as to their logical status. Although this First Part is preparatory to the main discussion in Part Two, it can stand on its own as an independant unit.

The work of "depth psychology" or psychodynamics was initiated by Freud, and it is therefore natural that I should begin by considering his own contribution, before passing to consider those who have followed him in his pioneer work.

CHAPTER I

BEGINNING WITH FREUD

INTRODUCTION

The year 1900 marked the beginning of a new epoch, not only in the birth of the twentieth century, but in a new way of understanding the mind of man, through the postulation of vast hitherto unknown "territory". In his The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud not only named this great area of the mind "The Unconscious", but put forward descriptions as to how it operated and he categorized its functionings.

Freud, however, was one who did not rest content with formulations once made. As his work continued and as new data presented itself, he had the courage to surrender his old ideas in favour of new ones, thereby illustrating the point made by A.D. Ritchie that the permanent thing about science is its method not its conclusions.[1]

Many criticisms have been made,and continue to be made, of Freud's work, and the relevant ones to this discussion will be dealt with in Chapter VII of this first Part. Some are reasonable and skilfully argued; others less so. One popular writer once claimed that psychoanalysts use rather pretentious jargon for very ordinary facts about the human personality already well known, using terms to disguise the commonplace of

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1. A.D. Ritchie, quoted by Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics. p.16

their observations upon the obvious.[1] Freud, however, might agree in some way to this as he admitted that it is difficult in ego psychology to avoid what is already familiar and that his work was more a question of arriving at a new way of looking at things than making new discoveries.[2] On the other hand, Freud would resist any charge that his structural entities like super-ego and id were merely personifications of "conscience" or "temptation".[3]

The permanent thing in psychoanalysis is, as A.D. Ritchie pointed out, its method. Freud's work began as a method of treating those who were mentally indisposed. He showed conclusively how the implications from psychoanalysis went far beyond such treatment. But he also revealed that it could never give up its original field of work, because it still relied upon continual contact with clinical material for further advances and development. "The accumulation of empirical date upon which we base our theories can be obtained in no other way."[4] However, this new method brought forward so much new material that in order to handle the sheer quantity of phenomena, Freud was forced to construct systems of thought or patterns. Without these "models" of comprehension the handling of the material would have been impossible. Freud called these constructs his "Metapsychology".

Two of his biographers give reasons for this strange name. Helen Walker Puner says that Freud refused to apply the legitimate name of philosophy because he may have been classed with Nietzsche

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1. C.E.M. Joad, Science and Ethics, ed. C.H. Waddington, p.26
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.82
3. E. Jacobson makes this claim. The Self & the Object World. p.123. which Freud "answered" in New Introductory Lectures, p.82
4. Freud, ibid., p.194

as "another philosopher" whose work was based on guesses and intuition; also because psychoanalysis had already been dismissed by its detractors as a heap of philosophical nonsense.[1] Ernest Jones says that Freud hoped to found a new science, and quotes Freud as saying that he used the term because his psychology takes one beyond consciousness.[2]

His metapsychology was by no means static. In fact it was continually being altered and developed as new material came to light. It is not my purpose to go into all the various ramifications resulting from alterations in theory which Freud initiated; nor is it my intention to give a "potted history" of "the rise and development" of psychodynamics. The material has been worked through by many who have presented it in a systematic fashion, and one can only refer the reader to some of the authorities who have accomplished this task already.[3]

Because of the evolution of Freud's thought, he is exceedingly difficult to quote, for one must know from which period one is quoting. In spite of the various systematizations of Freud's thought, there is some truth in the remark of Ernst Kris that there is no fully comprehensive statement of the system which is satisfactory since the periods of his work require to be

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1. Helen Walker Puner, Freud - His Life and Mind, p. 215
2. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, pp. 296,304
3. H. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction
   D. Wyss, Depth Psychology - A Critical History
   O. Fenichel, The Psychoanalysis Theory of Neurosis (contains a statement rather than a history)
   J.C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society

clearly distinguished.[1] Guntrip has said that the history of medical sciences like that of other sciences is strewn with discarded hypotheses; "so also is the history of psychoanalysis, and so also surely, the history of theology."[2] The Bible itself contains many discarded hypotheses, which, when set side by side are contradictory and incompatible. Quoting Freud is, in this respect, like quoting from the Bible! One must indicate precisely the period of Freud's work to which reference is being made.

Dieter Wyss, who has systematized the development of Freud's work has divided it into three distinct phases. The first, up to 1900, "From Sympton to the Personality" has as its chief characteristic, the sexual drive. The second phase, 1900-23, "Personality" has the self-preservation drive as its chief characteristic. The final phase "From Personality to Mythology" dates from 1923 when Freud's slim volume "The Ego and the Id" was published; Wyss regards the death drive, aggression, Thanatos, as its main characteristic.[3] However, the third phase differs from the first two, as outlined by Wyss, in a further way. Thus in the earlier ones the emphasis is on the Unconscious, whereas in the third phase the emphasis is more on the actual ego and the analysis of it and this I would regard as the significant difference. One can

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1. Ernst Kris, 'Psychoanalytical Proposition' in Melvin H. Marx, Psychological Theory, 1951, p.337
2. H. Guntrip, Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, 1956
3. D. Wyss, Depth Psychology, pp. 45-165

discern this by comparing the Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis in the Pelican series, or the larger accounts in the Introductory Lectures as against the New Introductory Lectures. The Interpretation of Dreams emphasises the unconscious mental processes which are repressed; The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence by Anna Freud (although not by the Master, but his daughter) exemplifies that the primary emphasis was not on that which was repressed, but on that which did the repressing.[1] Psychoanalysis, Miss Freud claimed, could not concentrate only on the id, but on the whole psyche and the three institutions working within it.

It is with this last phase that we are concerned, and the focal point is the "new" tripartite structure to be found in The Ego and the Id. As already remarked, it is one of Freud's shortest books, yet it is one of the most obscure. Even Joan Riviere, its translator, herself an experienced analyst and student of Freud, found it so.[2] When she was pestering Freud about the obscurities with which she struggled in trying to translate it, and demanding from Freud clearer expressions of his thought, he became exasperated and replied: "The book will be obsolete in thirty years."[3] Miss Riviere adds that nearly thirty years have passed since then and nothing he wrote is obsolete. (She was writing in 1952.) In fact she goes on to say that the original seed of the newer insights, (she was referring to those of Melanie Klein) lay embedded in

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1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 78-80
2. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.6
3. J. Riviere, in Klein and others, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.1

Freud's own thought, unconsidered and undeveloped. It would be true to say that the endopsychic structure worked out by Freud has stood the test of time, and it still serves as a meaningful model for workers in many psychodynamic fields. However, it has not been generally accepted by everyone. Freud, no doubt, would have expected this to happen, for he himself,as we have noted, developed and modified his own theories.

Our task, therefore, will be to indicate some of the changes in thinking about psychodynamic structure which has followed on the work of Freud. After presenting in this chapter the structure at which Freud himself eventually arrived, we shall devote a chapter to Melanie Klein, as her contributions and developments have affected subsequent writers. The thinking of present day Freudians will be represented by the work of Anna Freud and D.W. Winnicott in this country, and by Erik H. Erikson and Edith Jacobson in America. All these writers we would include within the Freudian school.

The second "school" is that of W. Ronald D. Fairbairn[1] whose work has been carried on by Dr. Harry Guntrip, and can be found in the latter's monumental work, Personality Structure and Human Interaction.

The third school, which also has Freud at its fountain head, although it has moved even further away from him, whilst

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1. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality.

still acknowledging its debt ot him, is that of Existentialist Analysis. R.D. Laing and others in Britain, Binswanger and Boss on the Continent, and Rollo May in America are a few of its adherents.

One must, however, add a fourth contemporary school whose work in the field of this enquiry cannot be ignored, namely that of C.G. Jung. As Jung broke away very early on from Freud, historically his system has not the same affinity and contact points with Freud's as have the others. Jung has worked out in detail (in advance for us, as it were) his own explanations and interpretation (and expansion!) of the Doctrine of the Trinity. He has many followers who have subsequently written about their master's findings, as well as numerous critics.

THE FREUDIAN STRUCTURE

We, therefore, turn to Freud's The Ego and the Id and its interpreters. In this book Freud set out a more stable description of the structure of the mind than he had previously held.[1] His original systematization of the mind as being divided into two main sections (conscious and unconscious, with pre-conscious intervening) failed him when considering the problems of

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction. p.93f.

narcissism and melancholia.[1] Guntrip has claimed that preceding the publication of The Ego and the Id, Freud exercised some considerable fluidity in his use of terms before he arrived at the new formulation[2] and how at times the term "Ego" was used expansively to cover almost the total self before it was confined to the role to which it was subsequently assigned.

It was in this book that the tripartite division of the human psyche was first put forward and now its three terms, "Ego", "Superego" and "Id" are in common usage today, even beyond psychological circles. To speak of them therefore means covering much ground that has been well worked already, since many books have been written about this form of psychic structure. However, the main argument of this thesis cannot proceed without indicating what is involved in the various personality theories which require some explanation.

Freud began with the id. "The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure id, which has no direct relations with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only only through the medium of another agency of the mind."[3]

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1. Freud, 'On Narcissism', Collected Papers, Vol. 4 (1914)
   'Mourning and Melancholia', Collected Papers, Vol.4 (1917)
   see Ego and the Id, p. 34f
2. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.89-101
   Guntrip carefully analyses the development of Freud's ego - analysis prior to The Ego and the Id demonstrating its fluctuations and contradictions until it was stabilised in this book.
   c.f. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.121 etc.
3. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 67
   The Question of Lay Analysis, (Two Short Accounts), p.110

Originally everything was id.[1] Guntrip described it as primitive chaos which is present before the ego begins to develop; the concept is purely a biological one of undirected goalless energy.[2] It is the part of the mind most closely related to the body, therefore it is the most primitive and the most fundamental. It is the reservoir of the instincts, supplying the energy and driving force for all our life.[3] "This means that it is the dynamic matrix from which the other systems, ego and superego derive."[4] The id is governed by the inexorable pleasure principle; it is controlled by "desire" and "I want, therefore I must have", by magical thought and undying wishes "which strive to be omnipotently maintained."[5] It is self-seeking, amoral, hedonistic and infantile, and can remain so for it has not the need to adapt to reality, whereas the ego, as we shall see, has this particular function.

Freud regarded the instincts which it contained as of two kinds; Libido, or the Life Force, Eros (a unity of self-preservation and sexual instincts); and Aggression, the Death Drive, Thanatos. These elementary instincts seek crude expression and

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1. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.23
2. From notes on a lecture given at theDavidson Clinic, February 1965
3. Freud, ibid., p.2
4. P. Heiman, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.122
5. J. Biggar in a lecture at the Davidson Clinic, February 1965 "Omnipotence of thought" originates in Freud, Totem and Taboo, Chapter III, p.81f.

satisfaction.[1] The id, moreover, has no idea of time; it is completely timeless.[2]

The word "Id" was borrowed by Freud from Georg Groddeck[3] whose The Book of the It describes the life of man as "lived in" by strange uncontrollable forces. This book will be considered later on in this enquiry. However, it is worth recalling that we owe the word "Id" and the word "Ego" also, not to Freud himself, but to his translators. Freud wrote "Ich" and "Es", i.e., "I" and "It" in German. (Also "Überich" for "Super-ego".) However, these two words used thus in juxtaposition carried overtones in German which they obviously lack in English.[4] Groddeck's use of the word "Es" goes back to Nietszche, who used the term for whatever in our nature is impersonal, i.e., subject to natural law[5]; and when Martin Buber wrote "I and Thou" contrasting the "I-Thou" and "I-It" relationships, he was likewise writing in the tradition which carried the overtones mentioned.[6]

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1. For Freud's description of these, New Introductory Lectures,.124
   c.f., Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.74
   J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post Freudians, p.10-11
   Fenichel, The Psychoanalytical Theory of Neurosis, p.54-55
2. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, (1920) p.22. "We have learned that unconscious mental processes are in themselves 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporarily, that time does not change them in any way and this the idea of time cannot be applied to them."
3. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.27
   New Introductory Lectures, p.97
4. J. Riviere's footnote to Freud's, The Ego and the Id, p.28
5. Groddeck, The Book of the It, p.28 footnote
6. M. Buber, I and Thou, (1937) see Introduction, p.vi etc.

Freud said that the impersonal pronoun seemed particularly suited to express the essential character of this province of the mind.[1] Hence the id is not in the least personal; it is, of course, unconscious.

Now Freud designated as "unconscious", "any mental process the existence of which we are obliged to assume - because, for instance, we infer it in some way from its effects - but of which we are not directly aware."[2] Philip Rieff states that the Unconscious "functions for Freud as a 'god-term'"[3] and he goes on to say that the unconscious was thought of by Freud as somewhat like a "hidden-god - indifferent, impersonal, unconcerned about the life of its creation", and that it is always inferred in negative terms. Not only is the id an unorganized reservoir of instinctual drives, contradictory and lacking in logical order, it is also "where" the repressed material "goes". This material, as Freud showed in The Interpretation of Dreams exhibits some degree of logic and organization, yet operates according to different principles from those which govern the system Conscious and Pre-Conscious. It has its own dynamic laws and characteristics. The id therefore has the twofold function of being an unorganized reservoir of drives or instincts, and a repository of repressed and forgotten material, all of which becomes organized in the dream and phantasy.

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1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.97
2. Freud, ibid., p.94
3. P. Rieff, Freud - The Mind of a Moralist, p.34-5

There remains some doubt as to whether Freud really integrated within the id both the instinctual endowments, and the repressed material now unconscious. The instincts are inborn, hereditary endowments; the repressed material owes its origin to environmental influences. The repressed material belongs to the earlier system when Freud thought of the mind in terms of functions, Conscious, Pre-Conscious and Unconscious; the id, composed of instincts, belongs to Freud's last theory when he thought of the mind as structure. He did write, in 1938, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, "Id and Unconscious are as intimately united as ego and Pre-Conscious." (p.23) This was Freud's last book, his last "short account" of the system he had created. Yet more than this statement is surely required to clear up all the misunderstandings that arise.

In his early days, Freud said, "The interpretation of dreams is in fact the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious...."[1] The dream, however, was to Freud, an ego construction; but if we only know unconscious, id, material by inferring it from the ego, we are therefore involved in a circular argument. Rieff points out this circularity in the way in which Freud conceives the unconscious part of the mind, with the "unknown part becoming that through which the known takes on meaning. It is actually through consciousness that we form an idea of our unconscious drives and motivations. Yet at the same time we are invited to understand

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1. Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p.60

consciousness from what it appears to be if compared with what it is not."[1]

These contradictions have caused some analysts to find little relevance in the term "id"; they find that the term is used to cover too many phenomena; not only are repressed organised material and original unorganised material residing in the id, there resides also, according to Freud, our forgotten origins - part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into the world.[2] Freud no doubt meant the kind of material which he reconstructed in the myth of the brother horde slaying the primal father, in Totem and Taboo.[3] The term "id" therefore is now seen to include much besides the instincts and the repressed unconscious material.

The second institution of the mind, according to Freud's scheme was the Ego. This comes into being in the course of normal development where the child comes to terms with external reality, and a part of the id comes to be differentiated and organized to form the Ego. This institution is the interpreter and mediator of the various parts of the mind and the external world.[4] Freud describes the Ego as part of the id[5] but one which has become

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1. P. Rieff, Freud - The Mind of a Moralist, p.35
2. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.28 (For an example of this see Introductory Lectures, p.324)
3. Chapter 4, Section 5, p.140
4. Heiman, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.122
   Fenichel describes the ego as the part of the mind which handles reality. Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.35
5. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties, p.123 where Freud says that ego and id are part of the same organisation.

modified by the direct influence of the external world, as a bark grows on a tree.[1] "The ego indeed is the organised portion of the id",[2] the id and the ego being part of the same organisation. The ego was developed for the reception and exclusion of stimuli, and it controls the paths of access to motility.[3] But the ego is characterized by a "remarkable trend towards unification" towards synthesis which the id lacks - contradictions and antitheses can exist there without conflict, which the ego would feel that it must resolve.[4] In the task of bringing the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, the ego "endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns supreme in the id... The ego represents what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to the id which contains the passions."[5] The ego is governed by conditions of safety, for itself no doubt, in that it defends itself against the id, but it also defends the id from reality. Freud also spoke of the ego as being first and foremost a body ego, and he finds an anatomical analogy for its formation in that of the"cortical homunculus"[6] The ego is a "precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes";

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1. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.153
2. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,pp.32 and 123
3. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.101
4. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, p.106
5. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.29-30
6. Freud, ibid., p.31 and footnote by Joan Riviere.
   c.f. Freud's description of the emergence of consciousness in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,(1920) p.19-20, which clearly applies to what he subsequently called the "ego", following 1923. Before that time his use of the term fluctuated, see footnote 16.

it contains "the record of past object choices",[1] and it is "formed out of identifications taking the place of cathexes on the part of the id which have been abandoned."[2] Freud once speaks of this process working in relation to himself. Following his rupture with Fliess, he writes to Ferenczi as follows, "A part of homosexual cathexis has been withdrawn and made use of to enlarge my own ego."[3] So far one has tried to describe the ego solely in terms of Freud's own language. Flugel, however, who is one of the most able Freudian interpreters, describes the ego in more homely terms as "the part which we recognise most intimately ourselves, the part which is conscious (or mostly so), which interprets and co-ordinates the impressions from the outer world and from our own bodies that reach us through the sense organs..."[4] It is therefore the part of the individual which he discloses to the world; he tests reality by this institution. For the most part, the ego is conscious, but Freud came to the conclusion that parts of the ego (namely its defences) are unconscious, as are the id and superego.[5]

As has already been pointed out, the concept of the ego as found in The Ego and the Id differs from that to be found in Freud's earlier books, like Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921).

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1. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.36
2. Freud, ibid., p.68
3. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, p.360
4. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p.43
5. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.153

Guntrip has shown how in the former "the ego has swallowed up everything and has become in effect the basic unitary primary self", and how similarly in the latter the ego is the primary reservoir of all instinctive energies, libidinal and aggressive..."[1] i.e., it has taken over the function of what Freud was later to call the id. In The Ego and the Id however, the terms are separate and defined. Freud also regarded the ego as the seat of anxiety due to its being harassed on all sides - objective anxiety results from the pressure of the external world; moral anxiety in face of the demands of the super-ego, and neurotic anxiety in the face of the strength of the impulses and passions of the id. It lies at the centre of these forces and has no easy task.[2]

The third category of institution is the "super-ego", which Freud called a differentiating grade within the ego. When his primary structure of the mind consisted of Conscious/Pre-Conscious/Unconscious, Freud gave the name "censor" or "door-keeper" to a force he postulated lying between the unconscious and pre-conscious. He said that this force proceeded from the ego.[3] Also he had used the term "ego-ideal" and referred to its origin in the early narcissistic strivings: "That which he projects ahead of him as his ideal is merely his substitute for the lost narcissism of

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, pp.90 & 92
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, pp.104 & 112
3. Freud, Introductory Lectures, p.26-2

of his childhood - the time when he was his own ideal."[1] After The Ego and the Id the term censor is dropped, and although "ego-ideal" is still used by Freud, it is now but a component part of the larger super-ego, and stands for the idealized imaginative concept of oneself, which as we have seen, was conceived as being built up by libido being directed narcissistically.[2]

The super-ego has other components, for example, identification with the father, "which takes place in the pre-history of every person."[3] Freud argued that it is not the consequence or outcome of any object cathexis, but "it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis." This kind of statement is similar to that already quoted in relation to the id, which Freud stated contained "our forgotten origins - part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into the world."[4] When Freud talks in this way, one naturally thinks of the psycho-biological mysticism which surrounds Jung's concept of the "collective unconscious", which seems to be handed on from generation to generation like the genes of the body, in an hereditary manner.

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1. Freud, On Narcissism, and, Mourning and Melancholia Collected Papers, Vol 4, p.51
2. "It would not surprise us if we were to find a special institution in the mind which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic gratification is secured from the ego-ideal, and that, with this end in view, it constantly watches the real ego and measures it by that ideal...we may say that what we call our conscience has the required characteristics." On Narcissism, p.52 (see also Introductory Lectures, p.371)
3. The Ego and the Id, p.39
4. see footnote p.40

Freud, however, extended the identification to cover not only the father but both parents, including also persons in authority. As with the formation of the ego, these identifications are made as "precipitants of abandoned object relations."[1] But Freud makes further qualifications. The first is that the super-ego of the child is not really built on the model of the parent, but on that of the parent's super-ego; it takes over the same content and becomes "the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down from generation to generation."[2] The second qualification is that the relation between the super-ego and ego is not merely a reproduction of the relation between a father and a child, but "is the reproduction, distorted by a wish of the real relations between the ego before it was subdivided, and an external object." Thus the severity of a person's super-ego is not due to objects only, but to the child's aggressiveness generated by those objects, and then introjected along with the objects. So there is a highly subjective element in this aspect of the super-ego.[3] Freud goes on to show how the severity of the

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1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.119
   c.f. Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, where she states that the super-ego or ego-ideal arises through the substitution of identifications for object-cathexes through introjections, "the process first recognised in melancholia but now known to occur frequently." p.29
2. Freud, ibid., p.90
3. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p.110ff.
   An interesting discussion on the formation of the super-ego between Prof. C.H. Waddington and Dr. Karin Stephen in Science and Ethics.
   c.f. M. Klein, 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child', Psychoanalysis Today, p.66
   Freud, Introduction to 'Woodrow Wilson', Encounter, January 1967 p.1-24. On Wilson's installation of his Almighty Father as the super-ego. See especially p.10

super-ego in no way corresponds to the severity of treatment which the child has experienced. The aggression, rebelliousness and anger which the child generates in dealing with objects and in meeting the prohibitions of life is built into this institution by being turned back upon the self, no doubt to control further aggression. Freud, of course, would say that these forces came from the Death Drive, as he connected aggression with it. However, he did make clear that lenient parents are capable of producing children with severe super-egos , as the children are denied objects upon which they might appropriately project their aggressiveness, so they internalize it and introject it. The conclusion of this fact is surely that super-ego, far from being passed from generation to generation, in fact varies from generation to generation. Perhaps a way round this apparent contradiction would be to say that the same standards are passed on from generation to generation, but not with the same intensity. The difference would then be a quantitative, rather than a qualitative one. However, this will not meet the basic objection, as quantities of aggression built into the super-ego will change not only its quantity, or intensity, but also its quality. It could be argued, however, that there are levels of super-ego structure and that the aggression functions at a lower level than that which is involved in making ethical judgements. For example, Winnicott, in speaking of the introjected father-figure element in super-ego formation, says that "the introject may become human and father-like, but in earlier stages, the super-ego introjects, used for control of id-impulses and id-products, are

sub-human, and indeed are primitive to any degree." He also defines introjection as "a mental and emotional acceptance."[1]

Freud also describes the super-ego as "the heir of the Oedipus complex"[2] for it originates at its dissolution. The way this happens is that the ego of the child turns away from the Oedipus complex in consequence of the threat of castration.[3] Fenichel bases this on the retaliatory idea of talion: "the very organ that has sinned has to be punished."[4] He also shows how an inverted solution, by denying in phantasy one's penis, can come about. It has therefore sexual, biological components. It also represents "an energic reaction-formation against" the earlier object choices of the id.[5] In spite of their apparent difference, the id and the super-ego have, according to Freud, one thing in common; they represent the influences of the past (the id, the influence of heredity, the super-ego, essentially the influence of what is taken over from other people) whereas the ego is principally determined by the individual's own

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1. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, p.18-19
   c.f. M. Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p.198
2. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.47-8
3. Freud,'The Passing of the Oedipus Complex', Collected Papers, Vol 2. p.273
   Brierley adds that the ego abandoning the parents as sexual objects in the real world introjects them so that the super-ego replaces the Oedipus Constellation.
   Heimann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.133
   Freud, Inhibitons, Symptoms and Anxieties, p.91f and p.111-2 (For his statement on castration in relation to the Oedipus Complex.)
4. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.77
   ibid., p.79
5. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.44
   Winnicott, ibid.,p.18

experiences.[1] A split took place in the ego, with this separate part now exercising an observing and criticising function over the ego itself.[2] The super-ego occupies a special place between the ego and the id. "It belongs to the ego; but it has particular intimate connection with the id."[3] But it also takes up a kind of intermediary position between the id and the outside world.[4]

The character of the super-ego in its various operations can be cruel, tyrannical and severe; it can hold the ego at its mercy, and tensions between these two institutions are expressed in our moral sense of guilt.[5] Anna Freud claimed that "identification with the aggressor", one of her mechanisms of ego defence, plays an important part towards the formation of the super-ego.[6] As one interpreter of Freud has put it, the super-ego is the part of the mind which "arrogates to itself the right to supervise the rest."[7] It possesses a compulsive character which manifests

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1. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.4
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.80-3. This idea emerged earlier also in Mourning and Melancholia, p.157
3. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, p.137
   Fenichel, Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.107
4. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.79
5. see note 2
6. A. Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, p.124
   see also: J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.70
   Guntrip, Personality, Structure and Human Interaction, p.109
   Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.168 says that indentification of the object of one's fear can be an attempt to master anxiety.
7. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.48

itself in the form of a "categorial imperative"; according to Freud it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved.[1]

The quality and strength of super-egos vary from person to person, and they play a large part in the determination of a person's character. An over-conscientious or rigidly perfectionist person may be said to have an over-determined, "totalitarian" super-ego. On the other hand, certain persons categorized as psychopaths may have super-egos which are underdeveloped and insufficient.

One last point should be made again: the super-ego operates unconsciously.

This statement of Freud's theory of the mind dating from 1923 has been given as far as possible in Freud's own words. Writing about it in 1932, Freud said, "When you think of this dividing-up of the personality into ego, superego and id, you must not imagine sharp dividing lines such as are artificially drawn in the field of political geography....After we have made our separations, we must allow what we had separated to merge again. Do not judge too harshly of a first attempt at picturing a thing so elusive as the human mind."[2] Some have judged harshly, but generally speaking, the model has served as a meaningful one in psychoanalytical and social-study circles until the present time.

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1. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.49
2. Quoted by Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.135

It will be seen, however, that the model is conceived in spatial terms. Freud admitted that in psychology we can only describe things by the help of analogies, and therefore a spatial analogy for the mind was justified. He admits, however, that we constantly require to change the analogies which are being used, for none of them lasts long enough. But in psychoanalysis "we take spatial ways of looking at things seriously."[1] Early on, he compared the mind to various rooms, but after 1923, he provided two diagrams. One occurs in The Ego and the Id (p.29) which relates to these two institutions; another in New Introductory Lectures (p.106) which takes into account the super-ego as well. (Figs 1 and 2) Here also Freud wrote that the purpose of psychoanalysis was "...to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of vision, and so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions of the id. Where the id was, there shall ego be."[2] For Freud, the secret of successful living lies in the maintenance of a reasonable balance between ego, id and super-ego. Dr. R.S. Lee has put the matter as follows:-

> "...mental health and strength depends on a just balance between ego, id and superego, so that the ego is free to handle the world, yet full of energy for its tasks because in good relations with the id, and at the same time, under enough control from the superego not to choose the first primitive satisfactions

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1. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, p.105
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.106

> which offer, but to build up its energy for greater, more integrated and more permanent satisfactions."[1]

Also later in the same book, Dr. Lee speaks of the harmonious co-operation or synthesis from which id, ego and super-ego all grow in strength, because inner conflict is reduced to a minimum; a healthy development is found in a balance of tensions between these three forces.[2] Similarly another Freudian interpreter writes:-

> "The ego of the adult has to maintain a balance between the three forces that besiege it - id, superego and reality - in order to preserve the life-functions. At the beginning of development, in the young child, the absence of superego and the immaturity of the ego are responsible for the unbalance that exists: the ego alone is not capable of safeguarding the life functions, and the child is therefore dependent on his environment. With the gradual strengthening of the ego, and the development of the superego, as the child grows older, his personality structure more closely resembles the adult's."[3]

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1. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.77
   What Freud offers is a psychological explanation to an age-long problem of man, that of authoritarianism and order as against freedom and self-expression. It has been regarded by moral philosophers as a matter for discussion, which is an intellectual pursuit, an activity of the conscious mind. Freud would argue that the problem is decided for each man in the unconscious mind, according to the structure of that mind; in some, id impulses are constantly breaking out because of inadequate superego formation; in others, the superego constraint is so strong as to be a ruthless threat or tyranny, inhibiting the expression of true feelings, and protecting the ego from forces which it is unable to face and has to deny.
2. Lee, ibid., pp.176,179
3. M. Kris, Child Analysis in Psychoanalysis Today, p.53 (ed. Sandor Lorand)

These statements show that more than spatial metaphors are involved in the stating of psychodynamic theory; the reason being that the material under consideration is dynamic and not static. We are now concerned with the concept of a balance between various forces or "institutions". This was put very forcibly by Miss Anna Freud at the Sixth International Congress of Child Psychiatry in Edinburgh, when she stressed that the concept of health as developed in the physical field cannot without alteration be carried over to the mental field. When bodily functions work together there is health; but in mental health, there are always some functions at variance with others. Mental health depends on the compromise between various parts and the resulting balance between them.[1]

From all this one can see the wisdom of Freud's remark that "where the id was there shall ego be."[2] If two of the three institutions are unconscious, the task of attaining a balance resides with the conscious part, the ego. In fact the importance given to the ego in its need to extend its control into the domain of the other institutions, so that the id shrinks and the super-ego loses its power, as the ego colonizes areas previously controlled by these other institutions, gaining mastery over the whole psychic operations, indicates that not only balance is required for psychic health, but also a shift

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1. From Miss Freud's speech at the Congress meeting on July 25,1966 in Edinburgh.
   c.f. The Ego and The Mechanisms of Defence, p.193
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.106

of the boundaries resulting from this ego expansion. Ego mastery and ego strength is therefore the main requirement for balance of the institutions. We can now see the importance given to that institution in the last of Freud's psychic formulations.



FIG 1: FREUD'S FIRST MODEL
"The Ego and the Id" - P29.



FIG 2: FREUD'S LATER MODEL
"New Introductory Lectures" - P105.



FIG 3: GUNTRIP'S DIAGRAM OF FREUDIAN ANALYSIS
"Personality Structure and Human Interaction" - P335.

CHAPTER II

CONTINUING WITH KLEIN

We have so far explained Freud's model of man's endopsychic structure as he left it. It was natural that the work begun by Freud did not stop with his death. Like all honest investigators he had had the courage to change his ideas more than once in the face of fresh empirical evidence. As we have seen he suggested that his book, The Ego and the Id, which contained his final revision of man's psychic structure would be "obsolete in thirty years."

One of these developments took place in Britain between the wars, where there grew up what eventually came to be known as the "English School" of Psychoanalysis, under the leadership of Mrs Melanie Klein. She embraced, in her thinking, Freud's basic ideas, including his concepts of the Death Instinct and the threefold structure of id, ego and super-ego; but she developed them, modifying and embellishing them with further concepts and ideas. Although we have no fresh structural model from Klein, much of her work has received acceptance from present day Freudians, who have assimilated some of it and rejected some of it; also the Fairbairn-Guntrip theories cannot be understood without reference to her work, even although they depart from her findings. As her influence has been considerable in this country, her work cannot be ignored in an enquiry such as this one.

Her earliest large-scale work known over here - she began her analytical work in Berlin under Karl Abraham - was The Psychoanalysis of Children. This book demonstrated that she had not only extended the therapy originated by Freud for adults to that of young children, but also the theorizing and dogma based on that therapy. Her psychoanalysis of children was carried out by her devising certain play techniques, whereby she claimed that she was able to externalize the child's inner conflicts based on their underlying phantasies, thereby relieving their anxieties and strengthening their egos at the same time. Her methods have been criticised by Anna Freud, who also worked with young children, and the differences between them are considerable.[1] The bizarre material which she produced, plus her interpretations of it, have been debated almost endlessly.[2] These are extremely subjective, and cannot be checked empirically by the methods of experimental psychology. If one views this work from a strictly "scientific" point of view, one will regard it as too speculative. How far has she read into her material preconceived notions of her own? There is also disagreement about her timing of the developments of the individual, e.g., her dating the origins of the super-ego and the Oedipus complex to the first year.

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1. A useful summary is to be found in J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.77-79
   see also D.W. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.171
2. G. Gorer in Psychoanalysis Observed speaks of Klein as carrying to a logical extreme the predominance of theory over observation. p.42

As we have said, Klein accepted Freud's basic structure of the mind; nevertheless, she wove into it her own distinctive theories and concepts. She has her own terminology making use of such concepts as: objects relations, internal objects, part and whole objects; "good" and "bad" breast; splitting, projection and introjection, reparation; paranoid-schizoid position, depressive position, manic defence. Definitions for most of these terms can be found in the Glossary at the end of Hanna Segal's book An Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein.(p.104-7) However, as many of these terms are inter-related with one another and with the structure of the personality as formulated by Freud[1], some attempt shall be made here to describe them in their relations, rather than as individual items.

Freud wrote: "In man, birth is a prototypic experience... and one is therefore inclined to regard anxiety states as a reproduction of the trauma of birth."[2] In the same book he says that anxiety is something like a reproduction of the situation of birth going on in the mind.[3] In his Introductory Lectures he also associated it with the Latin word meaning a narrow place, a strait, angustiae, or with the German Angst.[4] Klein goes further and describes the process of birth as involving the child

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1. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, He draws on the work of Klein to explain Freudian concepts. p.132-149 and elsewhere.
2. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, p.99
3. Freud, ibid., p.25
4. Freud, Introductory Lectures, p.344
   see also R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p.33

in anxiety of a persecutory nature. He is at the mercy of forces which he cannot understand or grasp intellectually; but he feels discomforts unconsciously.[1] However, this is partially mitigated by the love, care and warmth provided by his mother; with her, the infant has his first relation to a person, "or, as a psychoanalyst would put it, to an object."[2] This is the first object-relation, so these are present from the beginning of life.[3]

(In parenthesis, we would meet an objection to psychoanalysis, on the grounds that by speaking of personal relations as "object-relations" it turns what is basically an "I-Thou" encounter into an "I-It" piece of phenomenon, with words of Buber, "The particular Thou, after the relational event has run its course, is bound to become an It."[4])

To return to Klein, she asserts that objects-relations start almost at birth and arise with the first feeding experiences; she also asserts that all aspects of mental life are bound up with object-relations.[5] All experiences which the child has are related to his mother, bad as well as good. Klein says that he reacts to the good aspects of his mother by libido, the Life Instinct, and to the bad, frustrating aspects of the mother when the Death Instinct is converted into aggression, and directed back towards the "bad object" i.e., the bad aspect of his mother. So

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1. Klein, Our Adult World, p.4
2. ibid.
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.293ff.
4. Buber, I and Thou, p.33
5. Klein, New Directions in Psychoanalysis, p.21
   c.f. Our Adult World, p.6

here we have splitting; the mother has been split into two internal objects, a good and a bad. This is due to the conflict between the two basic instincts with the result that the object-relations are relations, not with whole, but with part-objects.[1] All this takes place, according to Klein, during the first three months, when the child is in the paranoid-schizoid position. All the child's activities and patterns of behaviour during this position are to help the child to defend itself from danger and to master anxiety.[2] The ego at this stage lacks coherence and integration and it has to split to defend itself; it splits not only the object, internal or external, but also itself, the ego, which has a corresponding split in it.[3] Hence splitting is one of the earliest ego defences[4] along with omnipotence and denial. Also when the object is denied or annihilated, a part of the ego is denied or annihilated too.[5]

As well as the use of new concepts being brought in to embellish Freud's structure, one must ask if one can speak of an ego at so early a stage in human development. Klein in 1959 stated that she assumed that the ego "exists and operates from birth onwards."[6] However, in 1946, she was less dogmatic[7], and

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1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.205
2. Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.248
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.298
4. Heimann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.25
   c.f. Klein, ibid., p.209 and Our Adult World, p.7
5. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.299
6. Klein, Our Adult World, p.5
7. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.295-6

admitted that little is so far known about the structure of the early ego. She mentions some of the suggestions, for example, Glover's concept of ego nuclei[1], Fairbairn's central ego with two split-off subsidiary egos, and Winnicott's emphasis on the un-integration of the early ego; she favours this last one of the three. She admitted that the ego at the beginning lacks cohesion, and possesses a tendency towards integration and also one towards disintegration, falling to pieces. However, according to Klein, there seems to be some sort of an ego present from the beginning, and it has the task of defending itself against anxiety stimulated by the struggle of two opposing instincts within, and the influences of "good" and "bad" without. This can perhaps be represented diagramatically:



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1. Glover's concept of ego nuclei which progressively integrate into one unitary ego, is found in 'A Psycho-analytical Approach to the Classification of Mental Disorders', Journal of Mental Science, October 1932
   Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, pp.39,49,53,63,104 accepts the idea that there are these nuclei derived from scattered instincts and that they all converge as a synthetic integration above the age of two as an ego.(p.49)
   Fenichel, Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,p.49 also accepts Glover's theory.

Whilst there is some ambiguity in Klein's thought about the nature of the ego at the beginning of life, there is no ambiguity as to how the ego develops. She asserts that introjection and projection are used by the ego of the child from the very beginning of post-natal life, and these are employed in building up the ego and further, in strengthening it.[1] This dual mechanism is also regarded as the earliest of the ego defences against anxieties from within and without.[2] As food is taken in and "introjected" so are the experiences associated with the "good breast", Klein asserts. On the other hand, all painful and unpleasant sensations are by this device of projection relegated outside oneself; "...they belong elsewhere, not in oneself. We disown and repudiate them as emanating from ourselves...we blame them on to someone else."[3] To ward off anxiety, the infant aims at keeping inside itself the good object and identifying itself with it; but, as we have seen, it also wants to keep out the bad object and those parts of its own inner world it does not wish to acknowledge. Although the whole experience is pre-verbal, it is as if the child were saying, "This does not belong to me; it belongs out there to that unwelcome object." But this "thought" is introjected. Now as this process is repeated, projection leading to introjection of that which has already been projected, then

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1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.209
   Our Adult World, p.5
2. The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.248
3. Riviere, 'Hate, Greed and Aggression,' Love, Hate and Reparation, p.11

on to further re-projection, the ego is built up over against the inner and the outer world. Feelings go out, they are altered by reality, and are brought back in again. Reality is brought in and altered by feeling and is pushed out again. So with this dual device, Klein asserts, the child's ego is built up and he is able gradually to distinguish the "me" from the "not me", and it is this to-ing and fro-ing which makes this possible.

Of the two terms which Klein uses, projection is the older; it was already in general use in psychology as a concept relevant to perception. Introjection, on the other hand, was originally introduced into the vocabulary of psychoanalysis by Ferenzci, and it was used by Freud with reference to the development of the super-ego. Klein's brilliant combination of the two meant that these terms were altered in their meaning, being broadened to include not only intellectual data projected, but also, or rather mainly, emotional data, possessing strong feeling tone. It is clear that introjection and projection play their part in perception as normally understood. Winnicott speaks of the infant's growth taking the form of a continuous interchange between inner and outer reality, each being enriched by the other, where the child is not only a "potential creator of the world" but populates the world with samples of his own inner life. He adds, "perception is almost synonymous with creation."[1] So with this dual device

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1. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.91

the child adds something new not only to its experience but to itself, but also rids itself of something.[1] This process, according to Paula Heimann, one of Klein's circle, has "an inestimable share in the modification of the original id into the ego."[2] She goes on to state that these mechanisms of introjection and projection represent "not only an essential part of the function of the ego, they are the roots of the ego, the instruments for its very formation." So we return to the question as to whether or not there is an ego at the very beginning. It would seem that Heimann accepted Freud's idea of the ego being formed out of the id, as against Klein who asserts that there is an ego from the beginning. But Heimann states, further on, that a sharp distinction cannot be made at the beginning between the ego and the id, for the ego is formed from experiences with the outer world. "The earliest contacts (introjections and projections) start this process. The infant's first sucking is then neither an id-activity nor an ego-activity; it is both, it is an activity of the incipient ego." Perhaps this phrase "incipient ego" expresses

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1. Winnicott, ibid., p.180 where he speaks of the object being at first a subjective phenomenon which becomes an object objectively perceived. The process of such perception takes time, for the child needs a facilitating environment which will give the infant an experience of omnipotence, whereby it creates and re-creates the object. Hence Winnicott says on p.181: "A goodobject is no good to the infant unless created by the infant. The object must be found in order to be created. This has to be accepted as a paradox...."
2. Heimann, 'Functions of Introjection and Projection', Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.126

the general opinion among psychoanalysts. All would agree that originally in the womb there is the "symbiosis" of mother and child[1]; the undifferentiated oceanic feeling of the child in the womb, before "self" and "not-self" are distinguished and differentiated.[2] Whether this continues after birth is a matter of disagreement. It would seem that the child emerges from it from time to time, but is always able to sink back into it again. No doubt this would afford relief from the paranoid-schizoid position of the first quarter of the first year.[3]

However, projection and introjection operate from the beginning and through them an inner world is built up which is partly a reflection of the external one. Klein argued that the interaction between these two continues through every stage of life, and that even in the adult, the judgement of reality is never quite free from the influence of his internal world.[4] Of these two processes Anthony Storr has written: "Whereas introjection is the phenomenon in which characteristics belong

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1. Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving, p.18-19
2. Klein, Our Adult World, p.5
   Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.11-12
3. Segal, ibid, p.xiii, emphasises that Klein chose the word "position" because she was describing not a passing "stage" or "phase" but "a specific configuration of object relations, anxieties and defences which persist throughout life." Originally Klein called this the "Paranoid Position" but modified it by incorporation of Fairbairn's basic psychopathological position, "the Schizoid Position". (see Developments, p.292-320)
4. Klein, Our Adult World, p.5-6. Her"conclusion" is quite Kantian!

to others are attributed to oneself, projection is the phenomenon in which characteristics belonging to oneself are attributed to others."[1] Balance between the two would be considered as normal development. True ego development and object-relations depend upon such a balance.[2]

So far we have considered how the ego is built up during the paranoid-schizoid position, through the reciprocal action of projection and introjection. But according to Mrs. Klein, not only is the ego built up in this way and at this period, but also the super-ego. Both aspects of the mother's breast, good and bad, are introjected, and form the core of the super-ego.[3] We feel impelled to ask: When does a good or bad object which is introjected contribute towards ego formation and when towards super-ego formation? Paula Heimann suggests that "the discriminating factor lies in the attributes of the introjected parents with which the child is predominantly concerned at the moment. The emotional situation in which the child performs the act of introjection decides the result."[4] This is the only indication

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1. A. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.88
2. Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.303
   The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.203
   In Envy and Gratitude p.19-20, Klein states: "Through the processes of projection and introjection, this inner wealth given out and re-introjected, an enrichment and deepening of the ego comes about." Klein asserts that this comes through having assimilated the good object.
3. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.61-2
4. Heimann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.137

one can find of an answer to the question, and it cannot be regarded as very conclusive, which is not surprising in view of the inferred, if not speculative, nature of the theorizing. Perhaps one could give a very rough answer and say that mainly good object-relations contribute to the up-building of the ego, and mainly bad object-relations to the formation of the super-ego; but there are too many exceptions to allow even this.

Mrs Klein also pushed back the origin of the super-ego and Oedipus Complex to the earliest stages of the child's life.[1] In this we are introduced to an incredible world of child phantasy.[2] Here the child, in the schizoid-paranoid position is at the mercy of cannibalistic phantasies of being devoured, cut up, torn to pieces, being surrounded by menacing figures, the evil monsters of myth and fairy stories, which are features of the child's parents as seen distorted by his aggression after undergoing the devices of projection and introjection. The point is that the child has projected his own aggression on to the internal figures, which go to form part of his early super-ego, and his anxiety is increased by the added guilt derived from his aggressive impulses towards his first loved object.[3] Strong repression is

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1. Klein, 'Early stages of the Oedipus Complex and Super-ego Promotion', p.179f. Psychoanalysis of Children. 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child', Psychoanalysis Today, p.4ff.
2. The Kleinian concept of phantasy will be dealt with fully when we come to consider the id. Only that which concerns the super-ego formation will be dealt with here.
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.274

required to defend the feeble ego against the super-ego which is so menacing.[1]

Ernest Jones has said that Klein's phantasy world is one that reminds us of Belsen and Walt Disney at his most grotesque.[2] Guntrip says that the symbolization is easily recognized as falling into oral, anal, and genital categories.[3] Winnicott describes the infant at this stage of suffering talion fears, and that the terrifying super-ego formations "relate directly to the infantile impulse and to the fantasy that goes with body functioning and with crude excitements involving instinct."[4] It was Klein, however, who by analysing the deep layers of the child's mind and discovering enormous quantities of anxiety which is translated into fears of imaginary objects and terrors of being attacked in all sorts of ways - these in fact being opposed by a corresponding amount of repressed impulses of aggression - showed the causal connection between the child's fear and its own aggressive tendencies. Hence we have the early super-ego which is especially severe. Klein asserts that in no period of life is the opposition so strong between ego and super-ego as in early childhood, where the tension between the two is felt as anxiety.[5] Although the child displaces his source

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1. Klein, Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p.203
2. Klein, ibid., p.11
   Storr compares them to horror comics or Foxe's Book of Martyrs! (Integrity of the Personality, p.56)
3. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.201
4. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.101
5. Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p.198

of anxiety outwards by projection, and turns his objects into dangerous ones and re-introjects them, the real source of all this is his own aggressive instincts, or as Klein would say, his Death Instinct. He will fear this internal object which he has introjected in proportion to the degree of his own sadistic impulses. With the reciprocal action, the to-ing and fro-ing of projection and introjection, the savage super-ego of the child is built up, at the period of "its first oral introjection of objects."[1] In this way Klein dots the "i"s and crosses the "t"s of Freud's original contention that the original severity of the super-ego does not represent accurately the severity experienced in reality, but the child's aggressiveness towards parental figures.[2,3]

The point that Klein continually makes is that the Death Instinct is responsible for all this. It converts itself into the

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1. Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p.179
2. Love, Hate and Reparation, p.112
   K. Stephens, Science and Ethics, (ed. Waddington) p.65,73
   Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p.43-49
3. Klein, in Contributions to Psychoanalysis, (1945) p.339ff. re-states her general thesis regarding the early super-ego and Oedipus Complex, of how they set in under the supremacy of pre-genital impulses in the phase of maximal sadism. On p.287 she compares and contrasts her ideas with those of Freud. She states that she assumes that a child has an unconscious knowledge of the genital organs of the other sex. She also deals with castration anxiety which Freud said was the single factor determining the repression of the Oedipus Complex. Although she regards it as a dominating fear in a boy (cf. Psychoanalysis of Children, p.340) it is the child's feelings of guilt about his aggressive desires and his love to preserve his father as an internal and external object which cause the Oedipal situation to lose its power.

aggressiveness with which the child invests the internalized objects, turning them into terrible monsters. It was Freud, of course, who first allied this "threat to the self from within the self" with the child's innate aggressiveness. If this is projected, it will be felt as an external threat. Klein claimed that added to the devouring breast (the mother) is the devouring penis (the father) and these cruel and dangerous internal figures are used by the Death Instinct to become representatives of it.[1] Again, she speaks elsewhere of whole objects, where the child displaces its own aggressiveness on to the father, turning him into a veritable ogre, and re-introjecting him as the super-ego.[2] But in all her arguments she says that the fear of death is there from the beginning and through the various processes described, enters into the fear of the super-ego. She therefore rejects Freud's supposition that the fear of death is the final transformation of the fear of super-ego.[3] To Klein the Death Instinct is the cause of all developments described. Few agree with her on this matter. Why is a death instinct required at all? Would not the fact of innate aggression followed by its developments through introjection and projection of part-and whole-objects explain the matter? Could not the Death Instinct be built

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1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.277
2. Money-Kyrle, New Directions in Psychoanalysis, Introduction p.xi
   An example of this kind of internalised bad object is to be found in Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.246-8
3. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties, p.111-2

up from the processes which Klein so ably describes? Winnicott puts the matter for those who disagree with Klein. He argues that the anxiety in these early stages of the parent-infant relationship relates to the threat of annihilation - the annihilation of personal being. "At this stage the word death has no possible application and this makes the term death instinct unacceptable in describing the root of destructiveness. Death has no meaning until the arrival of hate and of the concept of the whole human person."[1] In Kleinian language, the concept of death cannot be entertained by the child until the depressive position is reached.

There is another side to super-ego formation in Kleinian teaching, and this lies in the idea of internalized "good" objects (mother - breast) which helps to form a kindly and benign aspect of this institution. It strengthens the infant's capacity to love and trust his objects; it heightens the stimulus for the introjection of further good objects, and is a source of reassurance against anxiety, acting as a defence against it.[2] In a similar way, Heimann speaks of a kind super-ego formed by benign internal objects, which enables the ego to integrate, develop and venture

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1. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.47. cf.p.191 where Winnicott says that he cannot accept that life has death as its opposite, except clinically in the Manic-Depressive swing. He thinks it is not valuable to join the word death with the word instinct at the immature phases of the infant's life.
   see also Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.129
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.198ff and p.298

forth, such a kindly super-ego is no less potent than the threatening super-ego which prevents activities.[1] It is achieved through encouragement being given by the parents, which is internalized, so that the super-ego is not only a source of guilt, but also an object of love.[2,3] In asserting this, she is also going against Fairbairn's contention that only the bad objects are internalized.[4]

Kindly figures in reality do help to overcome the sadism of the primitive super-ego, for as the child relates them to it, it in turn becomes milder and more reasonable.[5] The reduction of the sadism enables the ego to have more "space", and the child is happier as a result of the super-ego becoming more reasonable. Klein was able to effect this change with disturbed children

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1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.138
2. Klein, ibid., p.205
   See also, Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.62
3. cf., "Here is a benign circle for in the first place we gain trust and love in relation to our parents, next we take them, with all this love and trust as it were, into ourselves, and then we can give from this wealth of loving feelings to the outer world again." Klein, Love, Hate and Reparation, p.115
   A comment on 1 John 4. 19 ?
4. Klein, ibid., p.295. For Fairbairn's contention see Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.93 "...it is difficult to find any adequate motive for internalization of objects that are satisfying and "good". I find it difficult to attach any meaning to the primary internalization of a good object." p.111
   He says this because internalization of objects is essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the satisfying object but the unsatisfying object that the infant seeks to coerce.
5. Klein, 'The Early Development of Conscience in Children', Psychoanalysis Today, p.68

through her play analysis, and her optimism and trust in its efficacy can be illustrated by the conclusion she gives to her paper on 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child', where she expresses the Utopian hope that one day psychoanalysis will become part of every child's education.[1]

The child also leaves behind the primitive sadistic super-ego as it moves from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position at about the second quarter of the first year.[2] In the first position the child splits up the objects into good and bad without realizing that they are in fact one object. In the second (depressive) position the child perceives not part-objects but whole-objects; no longer are they split up into ideally good or overwhelmingly bad categories; they are seen as they are in reality, both "good" and "bad", and this causes the child to experience some depression because of the ambivalent feelings due to the hostile components he has towards his loved objects; he fears that he will lose their love because of his

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1. Klein, ibid., p.73
   However, on p.370 of Psychoanalysis of Children she is more realistic and says that all analysis can do is to relax the pre-genital fixations and diminish anxiety and thus assist the super-ego to move forward from pre-genital stages to the genital one. Every advance made in the reduction of the severity of the super-ego means that libidinal impulses have gained power in relation to the destructive ones, and that the libido has attained the genital stage in fuller measure.
2. For a description of this in detail see:
   Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.54-68
   Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.226ff.,p.284
   and Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p.283ff., p.311

hostility,[1] and his inability to hold together destructive impulses and feelings of love towards the same object (person).[2] As these good and bad objects synthesise into one, the ego assimilates the super-ego, which becomes more realistic. The whole process of the depressive position mobilizes in the child the wish to repair the damage which it thinks or feels that it has done due to its omnipotence of thought. This takes the form of restitution or reparation, in order to restore his loved objects or bring them back to wholeness.[3] Alternatively, the child may use what Klein calls "the Manic Defence" to keep the depressive anxiety at bay.[4] However, this position sets in a process whereby reality intervenes on the child's psyche to a greater extent than before, and the result is that as good and bad objects are synthesized into one, the ego assimilates the super-ego.[5]

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1. Winnicott thinks this is a bad name for it, as being depressed here means "an achievement and implies a high degree of personal integration and an acceptance of responsibility for all the destructiveness that is bound up with living, with the instinctive life, and with anger at frustration." The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p.176

   For a good description see:
   Segal, 'A Psychoanalytical Approach to Aesthetics', New Directions in Psychoanalysis, p.386ff.
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.283f
3. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.79f
4. Segal, ibid, p.69f
5. Klein links up some of these experiences with mourning, whereby the ego is enriched through the process. (see, Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p.311f.)

We now come to the id as conceived in Melanie Klein's thought. Already we have had to refer to certain aspects of it, in connection with phantasy. It will be seen that it is difficult to deal with the institutions separately, as they are all inter-related, for example, she describes in almost identical terms the formation of super-ego and ego, and constantly refers to her other concepts in so doing. However, it is quite clear that she regards the id, as did Freud, in being formed by the two instincts, Eros and Thanatos, Libido and Aggression. We have considered her view of theDeath Instinct already[1]. Now the expression of these instincts takes place in phantasy and as instincts are by definition object-seeking, and the ego from birth is capable of object-relations, internalized objects are therefore utilized in the phantasies.However, phantasy is not pure id; it is the mental expression of the instincts through the medium of the ego.

Fenichel distinguishes between two kinds of phantasy (he spells it actually with an "f" - fantasy); one is creative which prepares for later action; the other is day-dreaming, the refuge for wishes which cannot be fulfilled.[2] Segal puts the matter a little differently. "Since phantasy aims at fulfilling instinctual drives, as a defence against the external reality

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1. See page 69, note 1. Another celebrated psychoanalyst who accepts the idea of a Death Instinct is Karl Menniger, whose book, Man Against Himself, abounds in descriptions of masochistic,self-destructive acts which men commit against themselves. cf. Flugel's 'Polycrates Complex', Man, Morals and Society, p.176-201
2. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.50

of deprivation."[1] However, Susan Isaacs says that she herself is not concerned with day-dreaming, which is formed by conscious phantasies. She has, therefore, adopted a special spelling of the word with phantasy to be used only when referring to Unconscious mental content. Hence phantasy is "the primary content of unconscious mental processes."[2]

Unconscious phantasies are the source of every mental process, and this is a primitive aspect of mental life which was in operation before the higher functions developed. One of Freud's first teachings was that everything conscious has a preliminary stage[3] in the unconscious. Phantasies are pre-verbal in origin, they are active in the mind long before words, and continue to operate alongside and independently of words. Reality-thinking cannot function without the simultaneous operation of concurrent and supporting unconscious phantasies, and these, as has been said, are the primary content of mental processes. Phantasies according to Kleinian thinking underlie all we say and do.

Joan Riviere attempts to describe phantasy in more explicit terms. She draws attention to the fact we have already noticed, that the psyche responds to the reality of its experiences by interpreting them,or rather by misinterpreting them, in a highly

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1. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein,
2. Guntrip would re-word this: "...the primary content of the unconscious mental processes is an emotionally active psychic structure, and that phantasy is its emergence into consciousness." Personality, Structure and Human Interaction, p.224
3. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, (1932), p.41

subjective manner. This increases its pleasure and preserves it from pain. Freud called this act of subjective interpretation "hallucination"; Riviere says that it comprises what we mean by phantasy life.[1]

When discussing the id as interpreted by Freud, we said that he regarded it as the part of the mind most closely related to the body, almost in direct contact with somatic processes, taking over from instinctual needs and giving them mental expression; Isaacs regards this "mental expression" as unconscious phantasies. They spring from the sensations and emotions of the body, i.e., their source is internal, their origin is not "articulated knowledge of the external world." So phantasy is the operative link between id impulse, which, through the instincts, is biological, and the mechanism of the ego. Normal workings of logic are not to be found in the id; as with Freud, Klein stated that contradictory phantasies can exist side by side[2], and the origin of this is no doubt due to the contrary instincts.

But how do we know all this? Isaacs states that views held by the Kleinians about phantasy are based wholly upon inference. Unconscious phantasies are always inferred, they are not directly observed as such. She justifies her statement by saying that the technique of psychoanalysis as a whole is largely based upon inferred knowledge.[3] Many, however, who would agree with the

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1. Riviere, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.41
2. Klein, Love, Hate and Reparation, p.75
3. S. Isaacs, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.69

statement, would also object to the nature of what Isaacs has inferred. Here are some examples from Melanie Klein's first book, The Psychoanalysis of Children:

> "Arithmetic and writing represented violent sadistic attacks upon her mother's body and her father's penis to her unconscious....They meant tearing, cutting up or burning her mother's body, together with the children it contained, and castrating her father."[1]

> "The little girl turns away from her mother and takes her father's penis as an object of gratification. At first, this gratification is of an oral nature, but there are genital tendencies at work already...."[2]

In Contributions to Psychoanalysis Klein states that in both sexes there is an unconscious knowledge of the existence of the penis as well as of the vagina[3], and in Developments in Psychoanalysis, Klein speaks about devouring and scooping out the mother's body and breast[4]. All this, of course, is inferred; but this does not mean to say that it is valueless. Yet, how can a baby of six months know about sexual intercourse, or about its father's penis? How can a child be aware of something of which it has no knowledge? Her assumption of the child's unconscious knowledge of sex is for Klein a fundamental one; yet lays itself open to obvious criticisms.[5]

It is natural that the whole work of Melanie Klein should have been criticised from many angles. The major difficulty,

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1. p.69
2. p.210 and also pp. 269,326,331
3. p.380
4. p.206
5. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.212

according to Brierley[1] lies in her generalizations which "tend to be expressed in perceptual rather than conceptual terms. She seems to mix the language of phantasy with abstract terminology." Whilst Brierley believes that our generalizations should be in closest accord with our experience, she still thinks that Klein's choice of terms was too close to the specific source material to be of value.

In addition to this criticism, Dr. Jean Biggar stated that Klein made the unwarranted assumption that the findings about the developments of abnormal children whom she had to analyse could be applied 'holus-bolus' to normal children - that the phantasies she observed in the disturbed children worked in the normal ones as well.[2] Freud was more careful to say that the psychoanalysis of neurotic patients provided clues towards normal development.

Winnicott[3] acknowledged that Klein went deeper and deeper into the mental mechanisms of her patients, but made the mistake of assuming that deeper meant earlier, pushing them back in time further and further; also that she failed to pay enough attention to environmental factors. "I would say that Melanie Klein represents the most vigorous attempt to study the earliest processes of the developing human infant, apart from the study of child care."[4] Little or no consideration is taken into account as to how the

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1. Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.68-9
2. Dr. Jean Biggar in a lecture at the Davidson Clinic, 1965
3. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and Facilitating Environment, p.177
4. Ibid., p.126

child has been treated by the parents, e.g., deprivation, negligence or cruelty; only the child's reactions are stated. In fact her exclusive concern is with the inner world of the child.[1]

As we have seen, Winnicott could not accept the concept of the Death Instinct[2], and we observed too that he voiced the views of most analysts except those of the inner circle of Klein's own followers.[3] Biggar thought Klein made a mistake to tie anxiety up with the Death Instinct, as the child's primary anxiety is of being left alone and not having his needs met, neither of which are primarily associated with death. Fairbairn and Guntrip likewise reject the Death Instinct.[4]

It is obvious that there are tremendous methodological difficulties with the theories of Melanie Klein. They are derived almost exclusively from the inner world of child phantasy which she claimed to have discovered. This inner world, however, has itself been inferred from the play of children, which has in turn been interpreted according to Klein's own intuitions. If we are to look for an empirical anchorage for these, it is to be found

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1. "The only disputable aspect of Mrs Klein's clinically based account of the Inner World is that it owes more to the projection and re-introjection of innate sadism than to external bad handling of the infant." Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.230
   One could think of others, e.g., the interpretation of the child's unconscious knowledge of sex, the subjective nature of phantasy interpretation and its impossibility to be verified.
2. See page 69, note 1
3. Segal, Heimann, etc.
4. Guntrip, ibid., p.207-8 and Fairbairn, Pyschoanalytical Studies of the Personality, p.78-9

in the material which has been made available from the psychoanalyses of patients at later periods of life, which has been read back into the earlier stages, and from this reading-back the inner world has in part been re-created. If ever there was an example of the dual mechanism of projection and introjection, it is to be found in Klein's theories!

Her methodology therefore partakes of the same circularity which Rieff observed in the creation of Freud's Unconscious. If Freud's work was metapsychological, Klein's is even more so, in fact it is almost mythical in nature and cannot even be regarded as a scientific hypothesis.

Yet, we do not regard it as valueless. Psychotherapy, we have seen, is a technique which can use hypotheses which are both unproved and unprovable; it is not a strict science. These unproved and unprovable myths do lack sound scientific basis, but they can still have value as descriptive schemata of a provisional nature. To this problem we will return in the last chapter of this Part.[1]

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1 (Both the phrases in italics are from Anthony Storr.)

CHAPTER III

PRESENT DAY FREUDIANS

As representatives of present day Freudian thinking, four influential thinkers on psychoanalysis have been chosen; two are on this side of the Atlantic and two in America. The first is D.W. Winnicott.

1. D.W. WINNICOTT

Dr. Winnicott came to psychoanalysis through paediatrics, as is evidenced by the title of his first collected papers.[1] He is now well-known as an authority on child rearing, and has published several books on the subject.[2] However, much of his thinking is to be found in his recent collection of papers called The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, to which most of the references will be made here.

This collection of papers centres upon a study of the development of the ego of the infant, within the care of its mother. "We can say that the facilitating environment makes possible the steady progress of the maturational process. But the environment does not make the child. At best it enables the child to realize potential."[3] It is the mother herself who not only provides, but

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1. Collected Papers, (1958) Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis
2. The Child and the Family, (1957)
   The Child and the Outside World, (1957)
   (combined and condensed in a Pelican paperback)
   The Child, the Family and the Outside World, (1964)
3. The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, p.85

is the facilitating environment.[1] If the maturational process depends on the quality of the facilitating environment it is just another way of saying that the ego development of the child depends on the quality of mothering which the child is given.[2] He says that maturational processes can become dammed up because of a failure in the facilitating environment[3], and that "without good enough mothering the early stages in development cannot take place."[4]

Our primary concern is with his use of the three-fold Freudian structure of the human psyche and related terms. He speaks with appreciation of Freud's introduction of the concept of the super-ego. "With this new term, Freud was indicating that the ego, in coping with the id"(and endeavouring to control it)" employed certain forces which were worthy of a name."[5] By the development of the super-ego, anxiety matures into guilt, therefore guilt appears as a result of changes taking place within the person's psychical structure. Winnicott connects with this the contention

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1. The Maturational Process and theFacilitating Environment, p.85
2. When we speak thus, we observe the hybrid kind of language which Winnicott uses to describe human development.
   Brierley (page 77, note 1) objected to Klein's language as being too close to her material, using perceptual rather than conceptual terms. The same could be said of Winnicott, perhaps even more so, for he uses terms of every day experience. However, he is always clear, and because of this one can dismiss very largely this linguistic objection.
3. ibid., p.207
4. ibid., p.74
5. ibid., p.16, 18

of Burke that "guilt resides in the intention." In speaking of the super-ego he adds in parenthesis: "It has been pointed out that there is a parallel between the maturing of the super-ego in the individual child and the development of monotheism as depicted in early Jewish history."[1] However, he does not say where this has been done.

Winnicott also uses the word "id" as synonymous with the instinctual life of the individual.[2] The instincts themselves are object-directed towards the "object mother" who by her reliable presence as "environment mother"frees the baby's instinctual life.[3] The result of this is that the sense of guilt in relation to the id drives becomes further and further modified into what is known as concern.[4]

Winnicott also speaks of the "repressed unconscious", which is a special aspect of the unconscious. This he contrasts with the "unconscious generally" which he regards as the "storehouse of the richest areas of the person's self"; the repressed unconscious is "the bin in which it is held (at great cost in terms of mental economy) that which is intolerable and beyond the capacity of the individual to accommodate as part of the self and of personal

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1. ibid., p.19
2. ibid., p.68
3. ibid., pp.75,77
4. This means therefore that concern, so often associated with care, originates, not as does care, in libido, but in anxiety, and is the result of the modification of anxiety, through libido to concern.

experience."[1] The unconscious proper can be reached in dreams, but this repressed unconscious is not freely available for us and "appears only as a threat or as a source of reaction-formation (for example, sentimentality indicating repressed hatred)."[2] Although he does not use the word id in this connection, it is difficult to fit this material into any other system than the id itself, as he defines the id "for phenomena that are not covered and catalogued and experienced and eventually interpreted by ego-functioning."[3]

The main part of Winnicott's book, however, is concerned with the ego. He defines the ego as "that part of the growing human personality that tends, under suitable conditions, to become integrated into a unit."[4] However, he emphasises the large part which a mother plays in providing support for the infantile ego and enabling it to grow. In traditional Freudian theory where the ego is the part of the id modified by coming to terms with environment, it was natural that emphasis was placed on the structure of the ego together with the defences it employed. Winnicott states that whereas the study of ego defences takes the investigator back to "pre-genital id-manifestations", the study of ego psychology takes him back to the nursing dyad, the mother and infant, where the child is in complete dependence on

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1. ibid., p.218
2. ibid.
3. ibid., p.56
4. ibid., p.56 (In Collected Papers he speaks of its primary unintegrated state.)

the mother's "holding" and care.[1] Because of this emphasis, Winnicott devotes much of his writing concerning ego formation to the part played by the mother in providing support for the infantile ego and enabling it to grow. He speaks of the "holding" of a child, and of "good enough mothering." By these two activities the infant is able to move from a "subjectively conceived object" (the mother's being regarded as an extension of the self) to a relationship with an object objectively conceived; the child is able to develop from absolute dependence on the mother, through the stage of relative dependence to independence.

As a result of the mother's care, there is built up in the infant a continuity of being which is the basis of the child's ego strength; if a child, however, lacks these essentials there may be ego-weakness. Winnicott speaks about "good enough mothering" which, by meeting the infant's needs at the beginning, enables it to have a brief <u>experience of omnipotence</u>, (author's italics).[2] The mother is required to meet the infantile omnipotence and implement it. If the mother fails to sense her infant's needs in this respect, the spontaneity of the child will be lost and the child's "true self" will not be able to emerge; he will then be obliged to adopt a "false self" out of compliance with the mother whom he is afraid to lose.

If the needs of the child are met, it will be able to

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1. ibid., p.42
2. ibid., p.57

develop along lines whereby the tendencies for integration within the child itself work to bring about a state in which the child in fact becomes a unit, "a whole person, with an inside and an outside, a person living in a body more or less bounded by the skin."[1] Then "me" and "not-me" are distinguishable, and the growth can continue by interchange between inner and outer reality, each being enriched by the other. (This appears to be the same process described by Melanie Klein as the device of projection and introjection.) The surface of the skin is the limiting membrane and holds the position between the infant's "me" and "not-me"[2]. "The psyche has come to live in the soma and an individual psycho-somatic life has been initiated."[3] The child then has the "I AM" feeling.

One factor which facilitates the child's ability to integrate and become a unit is called by Winnicott "The Transitional Object". He assigns a most fundamental place to this phenomenon is human development.[4] This Transitional Object consists of a small woollen toy, such as a teddy-bear or a piece of soft cloth; it need not have a specific shape as its feel and smell is what matters most rather than what it looks like - and it is for the child an object of its own creation, invested with great emotional

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1. ibid., p.91
2. ibid., p.45
3. ibid., p.61
4. The most straightforward explanation of this concept is to be found in the chapter, 'First Experiments in Independence', in, The Child, the Family and the Outside World, p.167f

significance and infantile omnipotence. It also belongs to the mother in that it stands for her as a substitute when she is absent. The child endows it with the qualities of the mother, but it possesses for him the added advantage that it does not go away as the mother does. Winnicott emphasises that it is not the object that is transitional, but the rich emotional thought-world which it represents; this thought-world is of the infant's transition from being merged with the mother in a symbiosis to a relationship with the mother as an object outside of itself. It helps the child to sort out fact from fantasy, and to move from omnipotent to more realistic and empirical ways of thinking.

Winnicott also speaks of this emergence towards the "I AM" feeling in his recent book, The Family and Individual Development. He begins with the complete symbiosis of the infant and mother where "nothing has yet been separated out as not-me" to the child, who through maternal support, as outlined, has developed an ego which can organize its own defences against the anxieties which come from within (the id) and without (reality).[1] The environment has to be favourable for the infant to be able to make its journey towards autonomy and become integrated into a sense of unity of personality.[2]

The following quotation is a summary of this process:

"Before integration the individual is unorganised, a

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1. The Family and Individual Development, pp.16-19
2. ibid., p.25-8

> mere collection of sensory-motor phenomena, collected by the holding environment. After integration the individual IS, that is to say, the infant human being has achieved unit status, can say I AM (except for not being able to talk). The individual has now a limiting membrane, so that what is not-he ~~or~~ not-she is repudiated and is external. The he or the she has now an inside, and collected memories of experiences, and can be built up the infinitely complex structure that belongs to a human being.
>
> I suggest that this I AM moment is a raw moment; the new individual feels infinitely exposed. Only if someone has her arms around the infant at this time can the I AM moment be endured, or rather, perhaps, risked."[1]

It will be noted later that this I AM experience to which Winnicott draws attention has close affinities with existentialist thought. However, "being" for Winnicott is not a "ground term" as with some Existentialists, because it is not there from the beginning; the infant, after birth, has to emerge into being.[2] Being is the result of successful maternal care, in which the infant can build up a continuity of being which is the basis of ego strength.[3] Winnicott argues that the mental health of any individual, in the sense of freedom from psychosis or liability to psychosis, namely schizophrenia, is laid down by maternal care.[4] This implies that schizophrenia is psycho-genetic in causation, which fits in with his idea of mental illnesses not being like physical illnesses, but are "compromises between success and

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1. The Family and Individual Development, p.148
2. The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, p.43
3. ibid., pp.53,54
4. ibid., p.49

failure in the individual's emotional development."[1]

In the above account of ego development we have seen that Winnicott has introduced into Freud's terminology two further dualistic concepts. The first is that of the two mothers, and the second of the two selves.

As the mother is the child's first object, she is naturally the goal of the erotic and aggressive drives; in this capacity she is the object-mother. However, the child also needs the mother as part of the total environment on which he depends; he requires a kindly environment to contain his discharges of id-tension[2]; therefore the mother is required because of her survival value as environment-mother. The child will then be able to integrate the two aspects of mother, and to know that his omnipotent phantasies of destruction have not killed her. In typical Winnicott thought, the mother meets the omnipotence of the child's id drives; this permits the child's guilt to develop into concern and provides opportunities for reparation for its feelings.[3] Elsewhere Winnicott speaks of the environment-mother as being human, and the object-mother as being a thing. One wonders if this is the psychological origin of Buber's dichotomy of the "I-Thou" and "I-It" relationships?

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1. ibid., p.222
   see also "Collected Papers,(1958) p.162 where he says that schizophrenia is "a sort of environmental deficiency disease." and on p.291 he speaks of psychoanalysis itself as "a study of environmental adaptation relative to patient's repressions..."
2. ibid., p.75
3. ibid., p.78

The second dualism is that of the "false-self" and the "true-self". The former, we are told, is built up on the basis of compliance, and in adverse circumstances it can perform a defensive function which is the protection of the true self. The true self is then "buried" and cannot be shown because of anxiety and fear. The false self is built up more by introjection than projection; by it the child puts on a show of being real to adapt himself to whoever happens to dominate the scene, but essentially the false self is a reaction of compliance to environmental demands. The "true self" develops when the mother meets the omnipotence of the infant, as we have described, and makes sense of it; she allows id demands to be expressed so that they can develop into the ego structure. When the mother meets the child's omnipotence she permits the child to abrogate it, once the child has expressed it. The child can enjoy the illusion of being omnipotent, of creating and controlling, and then it is gradually able to dispense with it, as it is no longer required, simply because spontaneity has taken over. The "true self" is spontaneous; the true self can be creative and feel real; whereas the false self results in a feeling of unreality and a sense of futility. Guntrip, however, connects Winnicott's "true" as against "false" self with the original psyche-soma which Winnicott speaks of in his Collected Papers.[1] Winnicott would regard it as a sort of id, out of which the ego is developed. Guntrip

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1.pp.201 and 244

says, "clearly the psyche-soma is not an impersonal id, but the primary natural self, the libidinal psyche,and it is the true self with which the patient must establish contact.... An impersonal id is not the concept of a true self.[1]

Charles Rycroft has pointed out that "true" and "false", like authentic and inauthentic of the existentialist writers, are evaluative concepts, not scientific causal ones.[2] This is undoubtedly true and must be accepted. In the same volume, however, Peter Lomas writes that the distinction between the two selves is important because it is immediately meaningful in terms of human experience, and it has arisen independently in the minds of several thinkers.[3]

2. ANNA FREUD

We have already referred to Anna Freud's work when considering the structure of the human psyche as detailed by Freud himself, following his re-systematization in TheEgo and the Id. Her own book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence played its part in the general movement of bringing the ego into the foreground of psychoanalysis. The ego is regarded as central, for

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.115-6
2. Rycroft, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.16
   cf. Guntrip regards this as a valuable concept but then the term "true" is too tinged with evaluatory meanings, and is not sufficiently scientifically descriptive. He prefers "natural self" as would Fairbairn also. Guntrip, ibid., p.412
3. Rycroft, ibid., p.134

it is the medium through which we get a picture of the two other institutions, the super-ego and the id.[1] Too easily can analysts devote their time to the analysis of the unconscious id material, without gaining any deeper understanding of the individual.[2] The reason for this is that large portions of the ego are themselves unconscious and these are concerned with the defences which the ego has built up on all sides to master the instinctual life, to deal with reality and to cope with the super-ego.[3] Although the analyst will meet great resistance from the patient in this part of the analysis, unless these parts of the ego are analysed, one cannot lay bare the deep-seated problems so as to effect a change.

Anna Freud listed various methods of defence which the ego employs; including regression, repression, reaction-formation, projection, introjection, turning against the self and sublimation or displacement of instinctual aims. She also added to these denial in phantasy, restriction of the ego, identification with the aggressor,[4] and a form of altruism. In all this she emphasises the magnitude of the achievement of the ego in employing the defences it does, "establishing the most harmonious relations possible between the id, the super-ego and the forces of the outside world."[5]

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1. A. Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, p.6
2. ibid., p.16
3. ibid., p.26-7
4. Anna Freud described this mechanism of identification with the aggressor, as a preliminary stage of super-ego development. (ibid., p.129)
5. ibid., p.192-3

Anna Freud came to England before the war, and since that time she has worked with children and with adolescents, and has contributed much to our understanding of their disorders and unusual behaviour.[1] Her most recent book, Normality and Pathology in Childhood, again repeats some of her basic thoughts, such as the over-valuation of the unconscious determination of behaviour patterns and of the need to analyse ego resistances before id content.[2] She not only speaks, however, of resistances of the ego to safeguard its defences, there is also the resistance of the super-ego which opposes analytical licence, and that of the id, which resists change, because it is tied to the principle of repetition.[3] Melanie Klein, we saw, regarded child analysis as a means of liberating the ego; Anna Freud still continues to adhere to the view that the immature ego is threatened by the process of analysis.[4] The difference between adult analysis and child analysis lies in the fact that in the former the analysts emphasise unconscious psychic material, and in the latter the powerful influence of environment: hence child analysts look not only at the inner world of phantasy, but also at the outer world of the child's experience. (It is interesting to observe that Erikson in discussing Martin Luther's stormy adolescence remarks that psychoanalysis ignores the work-history of

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1. 'Adolescence', The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol 13, p.255-278
2. Normality and Pathology in Childhood, p.26
3. ibid., p.33
4. ibid., p.33

patients, concentrating almost exclusively on their inner lives.[1])

However, one significant point occurs in the new way in which Anna Freud postulates psychic structure. She naturally adheres to Freud's tripartite structure of the psyche, as ego, super-ego and id,[2] but often it is divided in a two-fold or four-fold way, as follows: the ego and super-ego are considered together as against the two Drives of Libido and Aggression.[3] It could be put diagramatically:-

EGO	SUPER-EGO
LIBIDO drive	AGGRESSION drive

She speaks of the series of steps which a child takes from un-differentiation to structuralization of the personality into the three categories; first of all there is division between ego and id, followed by division within the ego; after which super-ego, ego-ideal and ideal-self are given the role of guiding and criticising the ego's thoughts and actions.[4] Hence, apart from the different division of the structure, her scheme is essentially the same as Freud's.

3. ERIK HOMBURGER ERIKSON

Erikson, like Anna Freud, his teacher, has worked extensively with adolescent patients and young children, but he includes

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1. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p.15
2. A. Freud, ibid., p.132
3. ibid., p.140
4. ibid., p.131

in his field of study the investigation of primitive societies and has studied the effects of child rearing on the social structure of society. He deals with these implications in his book Childhood and Society, which also contains his central concept of "ego-identity" or "identity-crisis"; the latter is also to be found in his biographical study Young Man Luther, in which psychoanalysis is used as a historical tool in order to re-evaluate Martin Luther and his times.

> "I have called the major crisis of adolescence the identity crisis; it occurs in that period of the life cycle when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood, and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself, and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be."[1]

Erikson is a Freudian and he quotes the threefold traditional structure with approval and considerable literary embellishment.[2] He also accepts Anna Freud's mechanisms of defence of the ego, and concludes that the ego is "an 'inner institution' evolved to safeguard that order within individuals on which all outer order depends."[3] The study of the ego to Erikson is a study of interdependence of inner and social organization.[4]

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1. Young Man Luther, p.12. The concept is fully explicated in Identity and the Life Cycle.
2. Childhood and Society, p.186-7
3. ibid., p.188
4. ibid., p.178

> "The human being at all times, from the first kick *in utero* to the last breath, is organized into groupings of geographical and historical coherence: family, class, community, nation. A human being, thus, is at all times an organism, an ego, and a member of a society and is involved in all three processes of organization. His body is exposed to pain and tension; his ego to anxiety; and as a member of a society, he is susceptible to the panic emanating from his group."[1]

Erikson therefore insists on three processes being studied all at the same time: the somatic process, the ego process and the societal process; hence biology, psychology and the social sciences are all required for the purpose of full understanding. He says that his thinking is dominated by this trichotomy, and that in his methodological approach, he is involved in observation of somatic changes, personality transformations and social upheavals. Erikson is critical of psychoanalysis at first having little to say about the way in which the ego's synthesis grows - or fails to grow - out of the "soil of social organization", implying that it was too restricted.[2] He also asserts that neurological factors play a vital part in ego development. He claims that a study of identity on the broader basis suggested by himself is as necessary for our time as that of sexuality was for Freud's time. Therefore, it may be safe to record that his psychology has for its central study "ego-identity", within a threefold schema of biology, psychology and sociology.

Erikson's "ego-identity" concept has been criticised by

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1. ibid., p.31
2. ibid., p.273

Edith Jacobson who claims that it ignores infantile development and the ontogenetic factors, and that he uses the word "ego" too broadly, where he should really speak of man's whole self including his instinctual development, his uneven super-ego formation and his object relations and identifications, i.e., the whole psychic organization and its object world considered together.[1]

4. EDITH JACOBSON

Dr. Jacobson's book The Self and the Object World is a contemporary restatement of classical Freudianism, with some modifications. It is natural that her work should be influenced by that of the other writers we have mentioned, Klein, Anna Freud, Winnicott and Erikson, but there is no uncritical acceptance of anyone's work[2] as Dr. Jacobson is an individual writer and thinker.

Her book is concerned with the development of the psychic structure from the time of intra-uterine existence, through infancy, latency, adolescence and adulthood. She begins with the infant in the womb, accepting Freud's descriptive term "narcissistic" for this state. Even in the embryonal stage, Jacobson suggests that there is a "diffuse dispersion of undifferentiated drive energy in the unstructured "primal" psychophysiological self."[3] At birth this activity continues as dispersions or discharges to the outside possibly through "biologically

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1. The Self and the Object World, p.24-32
2. ibid., pp.46 and 48
3. ibid., p.52

pre-determined though limited channels" and these are the precursors of object relations.[1] At the beginning therefore these drives are biologically pre-patterned, but undifferentiated, in the sense of Freud's two instincts of Eros and Thanatos (the latter, however, Jacobson cannot accept). But differentiation does occur. "Libidinal and aggressive cathectic gathering poles are formed around nuclei of as yet unorganized and disconnected memory traces."[2]

It will be seen that when she speaks of drives being "psycho-biologically determined" her concept of what is called the id is rooted in biology. At first, the "undifferentiated energy of the primal self" is discharged by the infant in the womb and soon after birth, then it is differentiated into the two basic drives of libido and aggression. She also conceives the "primary autonomous" core of the ego lying in the whole sensory and motor systems waiting to be developed. The future structure of the whole psyche is "biologically pre-patterned."[3]

Jacobson follows Freud on the formation of the ego, whilst rejecting, as we have seen, Erikson's concept of ego-identity. All her writing betrays an intense style, in which every single entity is considered in relation to others. For example, she writes:-

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1. ibid., p.9
2. ibid., p.52
3. When we consider the concepts of Fairbairn and Guntrip, we shall see that they regard the super-ego, for example, as a psychic entity, of psychological origin, free from biological factors or influences.

> "...identity formation must, at any phase, reflect man's complicated instinctual development, the slow maturation of his ego, his uneven super-ego formation, and the intricate vicissitudes of those object relations and identifications with his family and his social milieu upon which his individual, personal, cultural, social adult life in and with his environment is founded."[1]

No psychic entity is ever considered in isolation; there is continual interaction throughout the psyche. This is what one would expect in a study of psychodynamics, otherwise it would be psychostatics! With Jacobson, a structure of the psyche is surely postulated; but the interaction between the various elements, together with the underlying biology and the object world, is seldom excluded.

Jacobson speaks of the mother's care of the child stimulating both ego development and libidinal activity; and adds that the mother's influence on the growth of the child's ego cannot be better conceptualized than "in terms of our drive theory".[2] She asserts that it is in the "psychobiologically pre-patterned (instinctive) responses" which provide for the discharge of psychic drive energy that the child's emotional ties to the mother are rooted.[3] Long before the baby is aware of the mother, or of itself, "engrams are laid down of experiences which reflect his responses to maternal care in the realm of his entire mental and body self."[4]

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1. ibid., p.32
2. ibid., p.37
3. ibid., p.34 footnote
4. ibid., p.34

In the growth of the ego, Jacobson considers both merging with the mother (symbiosis) and efforts to imitate the mother[1]; merging, however, she regards as the foundation of all object relations and future identifications.[2] Playful imitations are forerunners of true ego identifications; but reaction formations are but precursors of super-ego formation. By this a problem raised in considering the psychology of the Kleinian school is solved (see Chapter II.p.64). We asked: When does an introjected object contribute towards ego development, and when towards super-ego development? The answer then given by Paula Heimann was that the emotional situation in which the child performs the act of identification decides the result. Here Jacobson is more definite in relegating the ego contribution to an identification following the introjection, and the super-ego contribution to a reaction-formation taking place. However, the emotional situation of the child could still determine which.

By the second year, the child's body and ego growth have proceeded, and he now competes with and rivals his loved object. He develops "self-images" as well as being able to discriminate between wishful and realistic images of the self out of which come his ego-ideal and ego goals, i.e., realistic goals regarding the future. The parents do not only stimulate the growth of the ego; they also "support the control, partial inhibition, partial fusion,

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1. ibid., p.42. She quotes Fenichel in support p.31 Psycho-analytic Theory of Neurosis.
2. ibid., p.39

neutralization and utilization of sexual and aggressive drives in the service of the ego and of 'secondary' process functioning."[1] It is the parents who "promote the child's gradual individuation and his advance from the psychobiologically determined dependency situation to independent ego activity spreading out to social, cultural and eventually ego-syntonic sexual pursuits."[2] Like Melanie Klein, Jacobson sees an important part played by frustration in the up-building of the ego, in that it causes the child to turn his aggression towards the frustrating objects and his libido towards himself, thereby reinforcing the distinctions between object and self; this enhances the narcissistic endowments of the ego and promotes the "eventual establishment of secondary ego and super-ego autonomy."[3] Also frustration is related to identification. Any kind of identification implies, "I don't need you; if you don't want to do it for me, I can do it for myself...." Where the frustration leads to taking over the role of the frustrating person, it is a form of identification with the object (parent) who frustrates us most.

The two following quotations on ego development and functioning illustrate again both Jacobson's highly individualistic style, and her constant practice of inter-relating the various activities of the ego both with internal institutions and the outside world.

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1. ibid., p.54
2. ibid., p.55
3. ibid., p.56

> "Normal ego functioning presupposes a sufficient, evenly distributed, enduring libidinal cathexes of both object and self-representations."[1]
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> "...all ego activity, being satisfaction of the self on an object, must combine inter-related self and object-directed (libidinal, aggressive and neutralized) cathectic and drive discharge processes, must be valid for emotional experience too."[2]

It is, however, in her consideration of the super-ego that we find Jacobson's work most helpful. However, we again meet the complex inter-relatedness of the various functions and the distinctive language which makes systematization very difficult. By and large, she follows Freud, rather than Klein, in her explanation of super-ego development. Klein erroneously backdated the super-ego's beginning to the first three months of life; this was because she failed to "distinguish the constitution of self and object representations, and of object relations and ego identifications, from super-ego formation."[3] Although Jacobson admits that love and identifications are difficult to differentiate at the very early stages, she regards, however, the first pre-genital formations which already begin to constitute internalized parental demands and prohibitions, as forerunners of the super-ego. "However, even though the foundations of ego-ideal and super-ego are laid down during the first years of life, the super-ego seems to arise as a definite psychic system only with the passing of the Oedipus Complex."[4]

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1. ibid., p.82
2. ibid., p.84
3. ibid., p.94
4. ibid., p.115

In this she follows Freud in regarding the super-ego as the "heir to the Oedipus Complex."[1]

From her section in the book mentioned dealing with the formation of the super-ego, (which is complicated by her closely woven inter-relatedness of each part of the psychic structure, and, moreover, is repetitive) one is able to draw out the various components of super-ego formation. She stresses that the whole process is gradual and complex, and that it has pre-oedipal forestages.

1. The first component part of the super-ego is the "ego ideal". The super-ego is the place where a child's wistful, grandiose longings and phantasies about itself can find a safe refuge and be maintained there to the profit of the ego.[2] In support, she quotes Freud On Narcissism (1914) that the ego-ideal is the substitute for lost narcissism of childhood, when the individual was his own ego-ideal. But it is not only this; the ego-ideal also contains the desire to be with one's loved object, which is never relinquished, and persists throughout life in the

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1. ibid., p.115. Jacobson is critical of Freud in his discussion of the relation of the ego and super-ego in The Ego and the Id. On the one hand Freud refers to simultaneous object relations and identifications with the loved object; and and the other, he asserts that the little boy's relations to his father originate in his identifications, Freud having said that identifications arise, as in melancholia, from the renunciation of the loved object.
   cf. also Norman O. Brown, Life against Death, p.161-3
2. ibid., p.94

struggle for oneness between ego and ego-ideal.[1] The ego-ideal is moulded from both the self-images and the ideal object,[2] representing the child's narcissistic moral perfectionist strivings.[3] Jacobson resists any attempt to separate the ego-ideal from the super-ego, and to make it a separate institution.[4]. She also resists those who would make it an ego-formation, and not part of the super-ego structure.[5] However, elsewhere she is willing to regard it as a bridge structure, connecting the two systems and belonging to both. In this role it permits the ego gradually to support and supplement super-ego functions.[6] However, this description does in a sense make it a separate institution.

2. The second component part of the super-ego formation during the pre-oedipal stage is "reaction-formation", where the child uses counter-cathectic processes to turn its aggression away

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1. ibid., p.96
2. ibid., p.110
3. ibid., p.124
4. ibid., p.149. She quotes Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, (1953) and Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity, who suggest that shame arises when we cannot live up to our ego-ideal. Guilt arises through the super-ego, hence they would separate the two; Jacobson linking the ego-ideal with moral demands will not allow this.
5. ibid., p.186. Bing, McLaughlin and Marbury, The Metapsychology of Narcissism,(1959) from the Psychoanalysis Study of the Child 15, p.26, suggested this, as did Erikson in'The Problem of Ego Identity'in Identity and the Life Cycle,(Psychological Issues). Guntrip also regards the ego-ideal as separate from the anti-libidinal ego, or the"internal saboteur".
6. ibid., p.187-8

from loved objects towards itself.[1] This involves its using some of its own aggression to cope with its own aggression. Rather than lose the loved object, the child will increase the aggression back against its own instinctual strivings, simply because it prefers security to pleasure.[2] The supreme examples of reaction-formation are the castration threat and super-ego formation. The former gathers together fears from earlier stages like separation, loss of pleasure, loss of support, and loss of bowels (through anal phantasies); also fears of being exposed, despised and rejected.[3] All these fears, and in particular, castration fears, do not arise from without, but from the child's own talion wishes based on retaliatory and irrational fears which are attributed to the parents by projection.[4] These fears are related to the Oedipus Complex, and Jacobson follows Freud in saying that the super-ego comes to life as a system taking over these fears - being in fact "the heir of the Oedipus Complex" as Freud said of super-ego.[5]

3. More closely related to reality than either of these two components is the "influence of the parents". There are two sides to this; on the one hand, there is the desire to be identified with the powerful parents whom the child needs; and on the other, the child's reaction to parental prohibitions and demands. We

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1. ibid., p.96
2. ibid., p.103
3. ibid., p.103-4
4. ibid., p.120
5. ibid., p.122

have seen that the child depends psychobiologically on his parents, and he needs support from them in the building up of his ego; he needs powerful parental images with which he can identify. But there is the hostile side of the relationship, in which the boy's hostility to the father is greater than to the mother, hence the identification is greater. The male super-ego, therefore, according to Jacobson, bears mainly the impact of paternal influences, where the female one bears partly that of paternal, but mainly of maternal influences.

Jacobson also deals with the internalized super-ego codes passed down from generation to generation, a matter which has been discussed when considering Freud. One of the main components here is sphincter morality, the concept of Ferenzci, where the child accepts the imposition of bowel training demanded by the parents. Only, however, at the end of the Oedipal phase do we have firm moral codes.[1]

Dr. Jacobson's description of the development of the super-ego within the psychic structure is given in considerable detail, but in the following quotation she admirably sums up her discussion.

> "Thus, the super-ego must be regarded as a momentous, comprehensive structure formation, developing in reaction to the child's oedipal and narcissistic strivings, to his forbidden sexual desires as well as to his destructive impulses. It represents a compromise in every direction. The oedipal conflict has been resolved, the ambivalence struggle has subsided, but

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1. ibid., p.119

> their vestiges reappear and continue in the inner conflicts between ego and superego. The limitless narcissistic strivings of the child have been curbed and modified, but they survive in the ego ideal and in the ego's ceaseless efforts to measure up to its standards."[1]

Jacobson also continues her arguments into the period of adolescence, and shows how through biological changes acting in the instinctual upheavals, through the powerful assault of these forces acting on the ego, the whole psychic structure is modified. The ego loses its grip on the id, and in turn the super-ego loses its grip on the ego. She relies largely on Anna Freud's work[2] on the emotional situation in adolescence. Anna Freud compared this period to mourning, and showed how the adolescent must yet again say farewell to loved objects in the parents, and to establish new object relationships, which involves, as Freud showed, an alteration in the ego. Therefore the adolescent's psychic structure is in a state of complete reorientation. Jacobson develops these ideas, emphasising that the defences established during latency may be so battered by the powerful assault of these instinctual forces that they may even break down. However, there is another side to adolescence; because of the great fluidity of the psychic structure, it can be a period of great creativity; but in the end the ego must re-establish control, as mediator between the institutions.

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1. ibid., p.129
2. ibid., p.159-60
   see Anna Freud, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, p.255-78

Jacobson's is the most up-to-date re-statement of the Freudian viewpoint at the present time. Like Freud himself, she never thinks of detaching psychology from its biological foundations. Guntrip, as we have mentioned and as we shall further see, criticises Freud for his psychobiology; he speaks of liberating psychoanalysis from its excessive psychobiological bias.[1] Anthony Storr on the other hand, in his essay on 'The Concept of Cure'[2] writes that although psychoanalysis has been accused of propounding a complicated hypothetical structure of the mental apparatus, it has always recognized that man's emotional experience is rooted in the body and that it is emotion which gives meaning to life. Hence man is a psychobiological entity and health consists in being in touch with one's instincts, without which there cannot be self-realization and self-fulfilment. He also says that psychoanalysis is "the only way of regarding human behaviour which, to date, possesses the twin advantages of doing justice to man's complexity, and at the same time, relating complexity to biological characteristics which make him part of Nature."[3]

If one accepts these statements of Storr as valid,then Jacobson's work, like that of Freud, comes to terms with the essentials laid down.

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, pp.55-86 and p.99
2. Storr, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.65
3. Storr, ibid., p.75-6



CE Central Ego.
IS Internal Saboteur.
LE Libidinal Ego.
RO Rejecting Object.
EO Exciting Object.
Cs Conscious.
Pcs Preconscious
Ucs Unconscious. ——→, Aggression; = Libido.

FIG 4: FAIRBAIRN'S ORIGINAL MODEL
"Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality" - P105.



FIG 5: GUNTRIP'S DIAGRAM OF FAIRBAIRNIAN ANALYSIS
"Personality Structure and Human Interaction" - P335.

CHAPTER IV

FAIRBAIRN'S RE-STRUCTURING OF FREUD'S THEORY

> "With Fairbairn, psychoanalysis ceases to be a psychobiology with an ego psychology tacked on, and becomes a psychodynamic theory of the person developing and fulfilling himself or being frustrated in his personal object relations."[1]

The above is the evaluation which Harry Guntrip places on his teacher and analyst. Fairbairn has been extremely fortunate in having in Guntrip a disciple who has been able to popularize his work[2], and to work out its place in the general system of psychoanalytical thought.[3] Throughout all Guntrip's writings, Fairbairn is tacitly assumed to be the absolute standard against which all others are to be judged. One is able to quote from either Fairbairn or Guntrip as we have here a single, unified and coherent system.

The twin pillars of Fairbairn's re-structuring of Freud's theories are (a) that the schizoid state is the basic position of the psyche[4], and (b) that there exists at birth a primary pristine ego, which although undifferentiated, is a unitary organization. When he speaks of the schizoid position, Fairbairn

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.278
2. Guntrip, Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls
3. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, and articles in British Journal of Medical Psychology.
4. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.8

is using the word "position" in exactly the same sense as Melanie Klein, but he regards his schizoid position as being more fundamental than either her depressive or paranoid position. (It was after Fairbairn had postulated the schizoid position that Klein came to incorporate his term into her "paranoid position" calling it the "paranoid-schizoid position".)[1] Fairbairn regarded the schizoid position as the most deep-seated of all psychopathological states, and held that it underlay a great variety of personality disorders and traits.[2] He gives a long list of these, so that one might think that we have here an "umbrella" or "omnibus" term; but he safeguards this by mentioning various common characteristics, e.g., an attitude of omnipotence, of isolation and detachment, a preoccupation with inner reality; the characteristic affect of this state, he regards, as a sense of futility.[3] The earliest psychopathological symptoms to manifest themselves are hysterical, e.g., the baby's screaming fits; but whilst the earliest <u>symptoms</u> are hysterical, the earliest psychopathological <u>process</u> is schizoid.[4] The cause of the baby's crying is the anxiety engendered by the condition of a schizoid, isolated, unrelated state.

Fairbairn compares his schizoid position to Jung's concept of the introvert; Jung has also related schizophrenia to introversion.[5]

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1. Klein, <u>Developments in Psychoanalysis</u>, p.293 footnote
2. Fairbairn, <u>Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality</u>, p.6
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.51
4. Fairbairn, ibid., p.130-1
5. Fairbairn, ibid., p.7

But Fairbairn prefers his term to Jung's as it is not merely descriptive, but explanatory in a psychogenetic sense. He also connects his term with that of Kretschmer's "schizothymic" - as against "cyclothymic" - but Kretschmer's are based on constitutional factors, Fairbairn's on psychogenetic ones.

To speak of the term "schizoid" as "explanatory in the psychogenetic sense" means that its significance is derived from the splitting of the pristine unitary ego[1], and Fairbairn relates this happening to the oral stage of development.[2] Fairbairn sees paranoid, obsessional, hysterical, phobic states all as "a variety of techniques employed to defend the ego against the effects of conflicts of an oral origin." When the child is orientated towards objects in a relationship which is emotionally unsatisfying, the whole objects are split into partial objects, and so is the ego which cathects these objects.[3] As the early oral attitude is one which is characterized by incorporation, internalizing or introjection, the child adopts these methods to cope with anxiety. This conclusion is similar to that of Klein; but Fairbairn's concern is with the fundamental schizoid state, where the child is faced with a frustration in which he has come to feel"(a) that he is not really loved for himself as a person by his mother, and (b) that his own love for his mother is not really valued and accepted by her."[4] The result of this traumatic

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.9
2. ibid., p. 10
3. ibid., p. 13
4. ibid., p. 17

situation is that his mother or rather aspects of her come to be regarded by the child as bad objects, because she does not seem to love him; and that his own love is bad; therefore to preserve his love and keep it as good as possible he tends to incorporate it (as incorporation is the main activity of the child at this period) and to retain it inside himself, so that his love relationships with external objects come to be regarded as bad, or at least precarious. "The net result is that the child tends to transfer his relationships with his objects to the realm of inner reality."[1] Winnicott approved of this aspect of Fairbairn's work.

> "Fairbairn's most valuable contribution is the idea that at the root of the schizoid personality is this failure on the part of the mother to be felt by the infant as loving him in his own right as a person."[2]

Fairbairn describes the crisis situation of the young child in the schizoid position as feeling that his love is bad because it is destructive to his libidinal objects; this applies not only to the child, but to the schizoid adult too.[3] Guntrip restates the situations as follows:-

> "Love made hungry is the schizoid problem, and it rouses the terrible fear that one's love has become so devouring and incorporative that love itself has become destructive. Depression is the fear of loving lest one's hate should destroy. Schizoid aloofness is

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.18
2. Winnicott and Kahn, Review in International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol 34, Part 4, p.331 quoted Guntrip Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.286
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.25

> the fear of loving lest one's love should destroy, which is far worse."[1]

The problem of the schizoid person is how to love without destroying by love; that of the depressive person is how to love without destroying by hate.[2] According to Fairbairn, the schizoid and depressive form the two basic psychological types into which everyone can be classified. They also form the psychological basis and content of the psychoses.[3]

Fairbairn is indebted to Melanie Klein for her theory of object-relations; however, he feels that whilst she undoubtedly instituted this valuable theory, she did not follow it through to its logical conclusion, which would involve a theory based solely on object-relations, "<u>because the ultimate goal of libido is the object</u>."[4] The aim of libido is not therefore pleasure through de-tensioning, but the object, i.e., personal relations. For Fairbairn, libido is the urge to good object-relations, the sex-drive being but one of its manifestations; it is "the basic positive all-inclusive life urge."[5]

We saw that Freud regarded libido as one of the two basic biological urges of the id, the other being aggression. According to Fairbairn the object in Freud was only the means for the

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1. Guntrip, 'A Study of Fairbairn's Theory of Schizoid Reactions', British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol.XXV, Parts 2 & 3 (1952) p.90
2. Fairbairn, ibid., p.49, See also Guntrip, <u>Personality Structure and Human Interaction</u>, p.282-3
3. Guntrip, ibid., p.313-4 states "Psychosis is a direct manifestation of infantile dependence, while psychoneurosis is a defence against that condition."
4. Fairbairn, ibid., p.31
5. Guntrip, ibid., p.259

person's instinctive gratification; it is not intrinsic, but utilitarian, says Guntrip, because any impulses towards the object are not the ego's own, but they are "alien intruders" coming from the id, through the ego.[1] This is where the theory diverges most from Freud, for Guntrip and Fairbairn regard an instinct theory as necessarily biologically orientated, whereas a psychological theory should be an ego theory. Fairbairn solves this by removing the instincts from the id and distributing them throughout the whole psyche, making it have dynamic structure. Guntrip does not deny that there are instincts; but he feels that such concepts belong to biology and not to psychology. They can be taken for granted, and need have no further place in psychological theory, which must stand as psychology in its own right.[2]

This Fairbairn-Guntrip theory would exclude impulse psychology completely, as being biological, it is therefore incompatible with ego-psychology; Freud's mistake according to this theory was that he developed his ego psychology on the basis of an unquestioned instinct theory. Starting from Klein's object-relations, Fairbairn would carry it to its conclusions on the ground that the object is the ultimate aim of all libidinal striving.[3] He achieves

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1. Guntrip, ibid., p.30
2. Fairbairn also criticises the Freud-Abraham theory of development named by the various zones of the body - oral, and genital, for the zones are only channels by which the libido may seek the object. (P.72) They are not the primary determinants of libidinal aims but servants of the basic aim, which is the psyche's, through the ego dealing with objects.(pp.162 & 138) He prefers to re-interpret Abraham's phases in terms of techniques resorted to by the ego in its aim of object seeking. (p.143)
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.29

this by ceasing to tie the instincts to the id as a source of energy for the whole psyche, which meant that the ego to perform any function, had to borrow its energy from the id to do it. The whole structure of the psyche is now, as it were, diffused with the energies which were confined to the id by Freud. This is what is meant when the total structure itself is said to have dynamic structure. Fairbairn refuses to think of impulses in the psyche existing apart from the structure which they energize; there is no divorce between impulse and structure for impulse is "inseparable from structure" and represents simply the dynamic aspect of structure. Freud was following the thinking of the physics of his day when he regarded the ego as having no energy of its own, and having to be supplied with energy from the reservoir of the id. Fairbairn replaces this notion with that of dynamic structure.[1]

The difficulties inherent in Freud's structure are apparent if one looks at the model of Anna Freud (Chapter I, p.93). There one sees first the two organised structures at the top; they are structures without energy; they are only capable of possessing energy if it is borrowed from the id. But at the bottom there are the two drives which make up the id; they are unorganised, psychobiological drives without structure. A further difficulty in Freud's structure lies in the fact that any instinct theory

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.167

is a de-personalized theory, a "process theory", after the manner suggested by Brierley, and this, according to Guntrip, cannot be reconciled with a personal theory,[1] But in this respect Brierley did not originate the difficulty; it stems from The Ego and the Id, where personal ego psychology was wedded to impersonal id, and although attention was diverted from the repressed material to the repressing agent, the biological id remained. Fairbairn will not equate the repressed material with id notions; "what are repressed are neither intolerably guilty impulses, nor intolerably unpleasant memories, but intolerably bad internalized objects."[2]

We have already mentioned that Fairbairn preferred his own term "schizoid" to Jung's term "introvert", because it was not merely descriptive, but explanatory in a psychogenetic sense, and because the essence of the term "schizoid" is that of splitting, referring to the splitting of the ego. He argues that it is not only bad objects that happen to be repressed, but also parts of the dynamic structure, of the ego itself split off with them, thence to form the repressed unconscious. He gives a lengthy account of a single dream and of how he analyses the several characters in it, into the various categories of his new structural formulation.[3]

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.63
   See Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.101-5
2. Fairbairn, ibid., p.62
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.100-1

To found a theory on one dream, would of course, be a very slender basis, a precarious foundation for any theory; but, this dream no doubt is used because it provides all the examples together in one place, which Fairbairn had found dispersed throughout his other clinical data.

We return therefore to the second of the two main postulates of his theory - that the ego, a pristine, personal, unitary ego is present from the beginning.[1] This unitary, dynamic ego is "motivated by its primary libidinal need of good-object relationships."[2] The ego is split in three ways. First, this central ego which is able to remain tied to good object relationships, and is largely conscious or pre-conscious. The frightened, angry part of the ego which has been aroused by an aggressive, rejecting parent image is repressed to form in the unconscious a subsidiary ego called at first by Fairbairn, the Internal Saboteur, later to be re-named as the Anti-Libidinal Ego, and tied to this is the parent image which Fairbairn calls the Rejecting Object. This is the part of the self which sabotages all spontaneous, creative self-expression, and is close to theFreudian-Kleinian idea of the sadistic super-ego. There is also the Libidinal Ego, which is "the needy child craving for attention and love,"

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1. Guntrip, ibid., p.278.
   Fairbairn naturally rejects Freud's idea of the ego being formed on the surface of the id; he also rejects Glover's ego-nuclei theory, of nuclei which synthesise into a unity.
2. Guntrip, ibid., p.322

which is repressed along with the aspects of the parent which excite him and do not fulfil, but rather deprive him, and this aspect Fairbairn calls the Exciting Object.[1] This libidinal ego is like Freud's id, but Fairbairn would insist that it is personal and not like an id in Groddeck's sense.[2] The basic endopsychic structure is produced by the splitting of the ego, and these split-off parts of the ego are taken down into the unconscious along with the repressed objects. Models of this structural schema are to be found in both Fairbairn's own book[3] and in Guntrip.[4] (See Figs 4 and 5) There is, however, a further split in Fairbairn's theoretical formulation of the psyche's structure. He argues that the nucleus of the original object, shorn of its over-exciting and over-frustrating elements, assumes the status of a de-sexualized and idealized object and is retained by the

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1. Full accounts to be found in Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.102-112 and Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.321-335
   For more popular accounts see Guntrip, Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, p.81ff. C. Edward Barker's Psychology Impact on the Christian Faith, p.29ff. Barker speaks of a "central self" and "hungry self", and a "condeming self". He, however, omits the subtilty of Fairbairn's argument where object and part-ego are repressed together, so that he might as easily have spoken of the more familiar "id" and "super-ego".
2. Guntrip, ibid., p.265 where Fairbairn's views are expounded by Guntrip.
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.105
4. Guntrip, ibid., p.335 sets beside Fairbairn's a very inadequate model of Freud. He ought to have been more accurate and at least have used the model which Freud himself gives in New Introductory Lectures, p.106, which is much more subtle. (Compare Figures 2 and 3.)

central ego as an ego-ideal[1], forming a "rational conscience" uncorrupted by the Internal Saboteur. It will be noted that Guntrip in his model does not make provision for this Ego-Ideal structure to have contact with the Anti-Libinal Ego or Internal Saboteur, for it is quite separate from it.[2]

The main features of Fairbairn's developed theory of psychic structure are as follows:-

1. He assumed a central unitary pristine ego from the beginning.
2. When any object is repressed the part of the ego which cathects it is split off and repressed along with it, and this is what forms the unconscious.
3. The whole structure possesses energy, as the ego itself can repress by the use of aggression at its disposal; and once it has performed the repression, it keeps the two subsidiary egos repressed, as well as the objects to which they are tied. (One presumes that the part of the ego which does the repressing is the unconscious part, for repression is not a conscious device.)

Fairbairn naturally regarded his new structural scheme as an improvement on Freud's. What are the advantages of it as

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.178-9
2. Guntrip, ibid., p.335

compared with the older scheme?

1. Fairbairn claims that Freud worked out his structure in The Ego and the Id from a background of melancholic depression, which to Fairbairn is not the basic psychopathological position; the fundamental position is the schizoid one. Fairbairn argues that if Freud had stuck to his studies of hysteria and had come to his final theory from that study, his structural formulations would have been very different.[1] He argued that underlying the depressive position, with its feeling of badness and guilt, there is a schizoid condition, which is the real cause of the trouble. He would almost reduce much of what is commonly considered as depression into schizoid anxiety and a sense of futility. This state requires a very different kind of endopsychic structure from that of Freud in order to make sense of the phenomena it presents. Fairbairn has a section called 'Back to Hysteria' indicating that this was the point from which Freud ought to have begun his theorizing. Orthodox Christians sometimes give a cry "Back to the Confessional!"; however, could not much of the repetitiveness of compulsive confession of sin be due to a basic trouble of a schizoid nature which confession leaves untouched and may sometime aggravate?

A typical example of this practice can be found in the relations which the poet and hymn-writer, William Cowper (1731-1800) had with his friend, John Newton (1725-1807) also a hymn-

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.90-2

writer, clergyman and ex-slave-trader, at Olney in Buckinghamshire. Newton was much criticised by Cowper's cousin, Lady Hesketh, for his too puritanical approach towards the poet's "melancholia". We should now diagnose Cowper's troubles as being basically of a schizoid nature, whereas Newton's were of a depressive nature. The Calvinist solution based on the depressive schema of sin and salvation through forgiveness worked with the depressive, extraverted Newton, but only made the introverted, schizoid Cowper much worse. Newton's "manic-defence" can be seen in the ways he suggested that every dark cloud of Cowper's ought to have a silver lining! It is interesting that both men lost their mothers very early in life, and both had suffered great deprivation; Cowper, however, had suffered the more.[1]

2. When we considered the id in Freud, we found that it was a term used to cover two kinds of phenomena. On the one hand, the biological urges - libido and aggression, and on the other, the repressed unconscious. The first is unorganized, the second organized according to its own laws, very different from the way consciousness operates. Fairbairn's theory of object-relations carries his theory into the structure of the unconscious itself. As Guntrip has said:-

> "It has fallen to Fairbairn to carry out object-relations into the structure of the unconscious

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1. Bernard Martin, John Newton, p.260
See also Lord David Cecil, The Striken Deer, and Erik Routley, I'll Praise my Maker! A similar comment could be made about Kierkegaard.

> itself, and to show that all our impulses can be understood only as reactions to objects, and that many of our impulses are reactions not to external objects but to objects that exist inside our very psychic make-up itself. The unconscious is to be understood not as a matrix of impersonal id-impulses, but as a repressed inner world, a continuous hidden drama of relationships between the ego and objects buried as it were within the psyche. This inner drama, with all the roles played therein by both the ego and objects perpetuate all the life of childhood that the individual has been unable to outgrow."[1]

This concept of "the child within" is used more and more in descriptive writings about the psyche. It is far from being a scientific description, but, as we shall see, there are some who regard a good metaphor in this field worth more "than the literal truth".[2]

3. One of the many advantages which Guntrip cites in favour of Fairbairn is his general attitude to science.[3] We are told that Fairbairn does not think it necessary for a psychoanalyst who desires to be scientific to adopt the particular method appropriate to physical science. He considers that the investigation of psychological research should "be conducted at the level of personality and personal relations. Fairbairn would regard science as an intellectual tool and nothing more."

> "The picture of reality provided by science is an intellectual construct representing the fruits of an attempt to describe the various phenomena of the universe, in as coherent and systematic a manner as the limitations of human intelligence permit, by means

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1. Guntrip, ibid., p.58
2. Nigel Walker, The Listener, October 6,1955, quoted by Guntrip Personality,Structure and Human Interaction, p.139
3. Guntrip, ibid., p.250-2

> of the formulations of general laws established by inductive inference under conditions of maximum emotional detachment and objectivity on the part of the scientific observer."[1]

Fairbairn states that the analyst is not primarily a scientist at all, but a psychotherapist, and this role involves " departure from a strictly scientific attitude."[2] The implication is that the psychotherapist cannot be emotionally detached, although he tries to be objective. Yet, Fairbairn claims to have adopted his own psychology of object-relations and dynamic structure because of the purely scientific reason (my italics) for its correspondence with the facts, and its greater explanatory power.[3]

4. In traditional psychoanalysis and in the formation of psychodynamic theories of the personality, much weight is placed on the Oedipus Complex and its resolution. Fairbairn has his own ideas on the Oedipal situation.[4] He goes behindFreud's traditional statement of it and regards it as the end-product of a constellation of factors which owe their origin to infantile dependence. Freud's conception of it was not the basic one, but the derivative of an endopsychic situation which had already developed, through the child's splitting the father as well as

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1. Fairbairn, 'Observations in Defence of Object Relations Theory of Personality', British Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol 28, Parts 2 & 3 (1955) p.144-156
2. For a description of this attitude to the Psychotherapist seeEric Wood, Contact, Autumn 1966
3. Fairbairn, ibid.
4. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.119-24

the mother into good and bad internal objects, and then fusing these into what are very complex structures. But for Fairbairn, the basis of the complex lies in a "situation built around the figures of an exciting mother and an internal rejecting mother." This means that the Oedipus situation does not owe its origin to the external situation of the child (the triangular relationship of mother, father and child), but to the internal situation of the child who constitutes the Oedipus situation for himself. At rock bottom, the exciting object, says Fairbairn, and the rejecting object are one and the same person, namely, his mother.

5. Finally, there is one aspect of Fairbairn's work which has met with general acceptance, and this is his concept of maturity. This is not equated with genital competence, which is but one element in the true maturity based on object relations. The infant at the beginning of life is dependent on the object (his mother) and is identified with that object. But this has to be abandoned in favour of relationships with differentiated objects. As the child develops, he has to surrender the identification, abandoning it in favour of relationships with other objects (people). He develops as he does this. "Development of the individual and development of relations proceed pari passu; and one cannot take place without the other."[1] According to Fairbairn, one does not move from dependence to independence, but from immature infantile dependence to mature dependence;

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1. A.Storr, Integrity of the Personality, p.45

maturity is seen to involve relationships and these in turn involve some sense of dependence. This conclusion follows logically from the object-seeking nature of the libido. Individuals cannot be considered apart from other individuals; a person in isolation is not a person, which is in accord with the teachings of many philosophers and theologians, who will be dealt with later on in the enquiry. Good ego development is a function of good personal relationships, which is another way of saying that maturity involves dependence.

We now turn to difficulties:-

1. Fairbairn naturally regarded his theory as an improvement on Freud's, and one of the claims he makes is that "Freud's theory admits the operation of two structural and two dynamic factors in all,"[1] The two structural entities of Freud possess no energy, and the two energic entities possess no structure. However, when he goes on to claim that his own theory of five structural with two dynamic factors permits a much greater range of permutations and combinations, one must ask if this is really a relevant argument. Does the possibility of making a number of permutations and combinations also make it a good theory in itself? Should not the validity of the theory rest on its capacity to interpret the facts it seeks to elucidate in a significant way? There is much to be claimed for Fairbairn's contention that Freud's theory

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1. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.128-9

has great difficulties by dividing structure from energy; but speaking of the possibility of permutations and combinations by itself could mean that the possibilities for speculations were increased, whereas a theory exists for elucidating empirical reality.

2. Fairbairn creates a second difficulty by only allowing the internalization of bad objects, as described under the principle of "Divide et impera".[1] The object being split into good and bad objects, the good is retained by the central ego as the ideal object and the bad object is repressed along with the part of the ego cathected towards it. Melanie Klein, as we have seen, does not agree with this. She regarded the child's activity as building up internal patterns on the basis of good object relations; we have also seen that part of the Kleinian super-ego is formed from kindly object relations; the benign aspects of the parents are internalized to form part of the super-ego. Winnicott has also said that it is best for an adopted child to be breast fed by his natural mother before being handed over to his adoptive mother who will have to bottle-feed him, for if he is ever to be analysed in later life, he will have this basis of good object relations on which to rest.[2] This statement surely implies the internalization of good objects, and other examples

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1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.112-115
2. Winnicott in answer to a question at theDavidson Clinic Summer School, 1964

could be brought forward to augment the argument.[1] Fairbairn, however, admits that he sees no reason why an infant should internalize the breast of the mother with whom he has a perfectly good relationship already. The milk proves sufficient to provide for his incorporative needs.[2] He admits, however, that good objects can be internalized later to defend the child's ego against bad objects which have been internalized already. His idea of the Ego-Ideal, (not to be confused with Internal Saboteur, or Anti-Libidinal Ego) is of such a good internalized object.

If only bad objects are internalized, then our dreams should consist of bad figures of threatening or exciting natures. But this is not the case; our dreams are often beautiful, and we loathe to be awakened out of them. Should this in itself not indicate the internalizing of good objects? If as Guntrip states (see p.121) that our unconscious consists of a repressed inner world of relationships between the ego and objects, is it <u>nothing but</u> that which the individual has failed to outgrow and is thus perpetuated within? Does it not consist of these factors, but also of good object relations which are also repressed? Our dreams would suggest that this is the case.

Moreover, there is a further consequence of Fairbairn's

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1. For example: on John Robinson and the once born Christian who is secure in his mother's love from the beginning. See E.N. Ducker, <u>Psychotherapy, a Christian Approach</u>, p.108-9
2. Fairbairn, ibid., p.93 and footnote

contention. Guntrip speaks of Melanie Klein's being charged with having produced a doctrine of Original Sin, because she regards infant sadism as innate, basing this on the Death Instinct of Freud. Guntrip says "It is Freud, not Mrs Klein, who gives us a doctrine of Original Sin."[1] He goes on to argue that the sadism and aggression of the child are post-natal, and result from frustration of need. However, our concern is with the Unconscious, regarded as a repository of Original Sin. If Fairbairn is right, and only bad objects are internalized, how else can it be regarded? Of course, internalization of objects is post-natal, as would be aggression arising from frustration; but introjection and projection are present from the beginning of post-natal life, so as to make no difference. At any rate, according to Fairbairn, what goodness there is to be found in the unconscious develops at a relatively later stage and is brought in to deal with the badness.

3. We have mentioned above that Fairbairn's views on sadism, and infantile aggression are largely in agreement with the frustration-aggression hypothesis.[2] Guntrip says that Fairbairn "regards aggression as unlike libido in that it arises as a secondary reaction to frustration"[3] of a libidinal nature. There is a great debate as to the nature of aggression; some claiming that it is primary and instinctive, and others, that it is, as

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.236
2. As for example in Dolland and Others, Frustration and Aggression
3. Guntrip, ibid., p.338-9

Fairbairn suggests, a response to frustration.[1] The recent work of Konrad Lorenz[2] would seem to regard it as an instinct in its own right, and that it has very valuable functions such as the preservation of the species, the protection of the young etc. Lorenz suggests that it is only in the highly aggressive animals that personal relations develop. Commenting on this Storr has said, "In other words love, at least in the sense of agape develops as a defence against aggression; and, if we were not aggressive, we should be incapable of close personal relations."[3] Lorenz believes that human behaviour, far from being determined by reason and cultural tradition alone, "is still subject to all the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted instinctive behaviour."[4] He regards aggression as innate in man, and that personal relationships, so favoured by Fairbairn, as a psychologist, by Macmurrary as a philosopher and by Buber as a theologian, as well as by others, is only possible because man is innately aggressive!

4. This following point arises not so much from the actual statements of Fairbairn and Guntrip, as from implications which could be drawn from their work, and not only their work, but the work of Winnicott and Laing. In writing of the origin of the schizoid position these authors claim that the child is faced

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1. Storr, The Integrity of Personality, p.55-6
2. Lorenz, On Aggression
3. Storr, Review in the Sunday Times, September 18,1966 of Lorenz, On Aggression
4. Lorenz, ibid., p.204

by a situation which causes him to feel that he is not really loved for himself as a person by the mother, and feels that his own love for his mother is not valued; this idea is supported by Winnicott. The implication that could so easily follow would be that the "parents are to blame"; failure in maternal support is the cause of the child's mental indisposition. This could well be true; but if a child is innately aggressive as suggested in the last paragraph, and if the child's world is dominated by omnipotent thoughts and wishes, even a"good enough" mother may find it difficult to meet these. The point one wishes to make is that the psychogenesis of mental indispositions results from the relationship between the two involved in the nursing dyad, and that the child has its part to play - and children differ considerably in this - as well as the mother. (This will be considered again in the next chapter when considering Laing's concept of "the double bind".)

5. Although Fairbairn's assertion that the fundamental psychopathological position is the schizoid one is among his most valuable contributions to psychodynamic theories of structure,[1] I would question the assertion that the <u>first</u> psychopathological process is schizoid. Prior to the baby's crying after birth, it has already experienced the trauma of being born in the constriction of the womb and the time spent during labour in the birth

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1. Jung, <u>Modern Man in Search of His Soul</u>, speaks of one third of his patients suffering from no clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and emptiness of their lives.

passages, with all the pressure against it that being born involves. This experience is claustrophobic in nature and paranoid in quality, as Klein suggested. Following birth the experience is one of unrelatedness, agoraphobic in quality and the anxiety is of a schizoid nature. This is the second psychopathological experience, not the first. It may, however, be the more enduring in its effects.

6. In Guntrip's model of Fairbairn's structure (Figure 5) it will be seen that the Ego-Ideal is placed as far aways as possible from the Anti-Libidinal Ego (Internal Saboteur) and the Rejecting Object, to which Fairbairn ties it.[1] This is in fact similar to the divorce between Ego-Ideal and Super-ego which Jacobson objected to. Guntrip, however, says that the total super-ego includes the Rejecting Object, the Anti-Libidinal Ego and the Ideal Ego.[2] One wonders if he is merely describing the Freudian super-ego in Fairbairn's terms, showing its composite nature, or acknowledging the fact that these three entities go to make up a fuller and more comprehensive entity. Is Guntrip following the practice of most psychoanalysts in trying to preserve the super-ego as a totality of these forces, when at the same time he separates them in drawing up his model? In theory, of course, this is what all moralists would like - to have conscience far removed from the irrational elements in one's

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.335
2. Ibid., p.331

make-up. But over against the theoretical refinements which can be postulated, one finds in one's psychotherapeutic practice that the various elements, rational and non-rational, sadistic and punitive along with reasonable are disastrously intertwined, so that one is forced to regard the phenomena presented as a single unified entity, separate from other material. The work of analysis consists of the freeing of these two which are so intertwined, and allowing the ego to make rational judgements without the dominance of the sadism of the infantile super-ego, or the Anti-Libidnal Ego, as Fairbairn would call it.

7. Fairbairn, and Guntrip following him, are very critical of Freud, because he has allowed himself to be influenced by the physics of his time, notably that of Helmholtz. There are others who would agree with this, for example, Wyss[1] and Jones[2]. Rieff[3] mentions that Freud had a heavily metaphoric cast of thought, and that he "translated somewhat too easily into metaphors the literally intended concepts of physical psychology." Where Helmholtz had talked of "neurological energy", Freud talked of "psychic energy", "using the quantitative term energy without any metaphoric reservations." At the very early period Freud attempted to convert psychology into physiology or biology, and may have felt that "human" science must follow the thought forms

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1. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.99
2. E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, pp.15,197
3. Rieff, Freud, the Mind of a Moralist, p.20-1

of "natural" science.[1] Kris thinks that he did not abandon this attitude until after his self-analysis as in The Interpretation of Dreams.[2] Fairbairn would no doubt argue that the ghost of 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' haunted Freud until the end, and that his separation of structure and energy was the hangover of Helmholtz's influence. To Helmholtz, the physical universe was conceived as consisting of "a conglomeration of inert, immutable and indivisible particles themselves."[3] Fairbairn, whose quotation this is, then continues to state that today the physical universe is conceived very differently, with energy and mass being wedded together, hence the absence of energy from structure would be unthinkable. Guntrip writes:-

> "Had Freud been trained in the post-Einstein physics of the present day, even if he still took the thought forms of physical science as the basis for his psychology, he could not have evolved a theory, in which psychic energy was conceived as an id separate and distinct from psychic structure conceived as an ego and super-ego, or as in his original scheme, psychic energy conceived as a dynamic unorganized instinctual unconscious, and instinctive tensions. This kind of dualism in basic concepts has become untenable."[4]

However, to prove that Freud was wrong to base his theories on the scientific concepts of his day, which have been subsequently outmoded, and then to proceed to bolster up one's own theories

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.63
   He quotes from Ernst Kris, Introduction to the Fleiss Letters.
2. Kris, ob.cit., p.44
3. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.126-7
4. Guntrip, ibid., p.148

on present day concepts is hardly convincing. For is this not tying one's psychological theory to the fashions of the physics of the day, and when fashions change, will not the theory become as invalid as Freud's is now made to appear? If modern physicists could not equate mass and energy, would Fairbairn's theory fall or not? If psychology was tied to the formulations of physicists, then it would; but the primary task of psychological theory, whilst being indebted to borrowed concepts from other disciplines, must provide models which elucidate the empirical data with which one is confronted.

8. Fairbairn not only objects to Freud's tying of his theory to physicists' concepts, he also criticises him for tying psychology to biology, so as to present a psychobiology. We have seen how Guntrip would prefer to keep instinct to biological conceptualization, and how psychology should be concerned only with psychological conceptions; those derived from natural science cannot understand motive, value and personal relations. We may compare and contrast this attitude with that of Anthony Storr who claims that psychoanalysis has always recognized that man's emotional experience is rooted in the body, even though it puts forward complicated hypothetical structures of the mental apparatus.[1] He agrees with Rycroft that the self is "a psychobiological entity which is always striving for self-realization and self-fulfilment,"[2]

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1. Storr, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.65
2. Storr, ibid., p.69, See also p.21

and that there is "an impersonal force within human beings from which in illness they come to be separated," and that cure consists of being in touch with instinct once again, by overcoming the alienation from it. Psychoanalysis does justice to man's complexity and relates this complexity to the biological characteristics which make him man.[1] Now in fairness, one must state that Guntrip does not deny that there are instincts, but he seems to wish to leave them to biology - or, does he deal with them by diffusing them all over the psychic structure? At any rate, whichever way they are disposed of, one can detect in Guntrip and Fairbairn a desire to cut psychology away from biology and to sever the connection completely. The same kind of attempt has, however, been made with regard to other disciplines, e.g., theology's attempt to cut itself off from philosophy and psychology. Alan Richardson's attempts to keep theology away from other disciplines because he is convinced of the validity of the categories with which he works, and believes that the subject matter with which he deals cannot be dealt with under any other kind of discipline; this subject matter is "revelation" and it is irreducible.[2] He also claims that theology stands or falls with the category of revelation. We are not concerned with his idea of revelation at the moment, that will be dealt with later in this enquiry; but one regards Professor Ronald Hepburn as right when he speaks of

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1. Storr, ibid., p.75-6
2. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, p.55ff.

the "charmed circle of revealed religion,"[1] into which none but the theologians may enter. Likewise this attempt to keep psychology apart from biology is deprecated here; for if this line were adhered to, this study would not be possible. Guntrip himself would accept incursions of psychology into another discipline, namely theology. He deprecates the lack of theological interest in psychology and welcomes the work of Tillich and Harry Williams.[2] Yet the logic of his position of desiring to keep psychology free from biology is identical with that of the theologian who desires to keep theology completely free from other disciplines. He would claim, as I have said, that his studies take biology for granted; but is it completely possible to work with purely psychological terms at all times? Need the matter be a question of either object-relations or psychobiology? One does not think so. John Wren Lewis has written, "The greatest advances in science take place through cross-fertilization from widely separate fields of discourse, sometimes from outside altogether."[3] Instincts, both libido and aggression as Lorenz has claimed make human relations possible, and therefore cannot be omitted from a psychology of inter-personal relations.

In conclusion, Fairbairn's is a highly original formulation of mental structure, certain aspects of which one feels could be incorporated into the more traditional Freudian structure with

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1. R. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2. Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind, p.125
3. Wren Lewis, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.93-4

with great benefit to the main body of psychoanalytical thought. Storr, as has been mentioned, is kindly disposed to many of Fairbairn's ideas, but they are incorporated into his general scheme which is eclectic in its sympathies. Apart from Guntrip one seldom meets the use of Fairbairn's specialized terms in psychoanalytical writing.

CHAPTER V

EXISTENTIALIST ANALYSIS

In our description of the structural models of the various schools of psychodynamics, we have seen that far from matters becoming simpler and more easily comprehensible, there has been a tendency towards complication and over-elaboration, towards more and not less "Metapsychology". This is particularly apparent in the case of Fairbairn, whose model is the most sophisticated so far considered. We noted then that one of the objections which Fairbairn and Guntrip levelled against Freud was that his "process" theory, which took its form after the manner of the natural scientists of the last century, could not really be reconciled with the "personal" theory of "internalized objects" as developed by Melanie Klein.[1] Guntrip regards Fairbairn's theory, based on object-relations together with dynamic structure, as an advance on anything yet devised.

When we turn to the Existentialists, however, we find them even more dissatisfied with Freud than either of the two above writers, for they regard <u>all</u> metapsychology as an encumbrance, a hangover from the mechanistic physics of the last century, an invasion of the natural scientific method into the sphere of the

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1. An "object" at first sight does not appear to be any more personal than a "process"; in the sense, however, in which Guntrip employed the term "object", it was more personal.

personal in which it is inappropriate. The Existentialists themselves claim, however, to have a scientific approach; but not scientific in the sense of the natural sciences, rather scientific in the phenomenological sense. The phenomenological method needs some description, and one cannot do better than quote the following:-

> "The phenomenological method stems from Husserl, who developed it in reaction against the scientific positivism which had begun to prevail at the end of the nineteenth century. He pointed out that the knowledge of nature gained by science never attains certainty or finality. It is subject to constant revision and correction. Further, the scientific method is not itself a piece of scientific knowledge. The scientist must make in his investigation of nature assumptions and presuppositions which science itself cannot establish. Husserl believed than certainty is attained when the attention is directed to the experiences of the self which stands outside nature, without raising the question of the reality to which these experiences are supposed to refer. The exploration of the experiences of the self consists not in reasonings but in descriptions of what shows itself, namely, the phenomenon."[1]

It will be seen that the phenomenological approach stands for the complete abandonment of all metapsychology.

In this country, existentialist analysis is know chiefly through the writings of R.D. Laing, whose book The Divided Self is a brilliant description of schizophrenia as seen from the phenomenological standpoint. Like Winnicott, he uses the concept of the"true" and the "false" selves. Like Fairbairn, he posits the schizoid position as the fundamental one. Moreover, he was

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1. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.35

trained as a Freudian psychoanalyst. His work, however, is much more than a development of these schools of psychodynamics; in fact it forms the introduction into Britain of existentialist psychoanalysis (Daseinsanalysis) which had been worked out earlier in Europe by Binswanger and Boss, and can also be found in the writings of Sartre.

We propose therefore to examine four schools of existentialist analysis, all of which are current at the present time; we shall follow this up by a discussion of the general position. The schools are as follows:-

1. The Continental School, represented by Binswanger and Boss.
2. The American School, represented by Rollo May.
3. TheBritish School, represented by R.D. Laing.
4. The "New Viennese" School, represented by Viktor E. Frankl.

1. BINSWANGER AND BOSS

We have seen how in R.D. Laing's work the writings of Fairbairn and Winnicott could be used along with existentialist principles. This was because Freudianism developed in Britain in ways congenial to existentialist analysis. However, when we come to regard the work of Bingswanger and Boss, we must realise that they work vis a vis orthodox Freudianism, which had not modified or expanded as it had done in Britain and in America. Binswanger, although he differed from Freud, was one of the few who remained

friendly with him to the end; and both he and Boss express their debt to Freud and his method. The difficulty arises with them partly over Freud's method, but chiefly over his theoretical constructions, and they believe that a fuller understanding can be achieved by the use of a completely phenomenological method (as in Husserl) together with the use of the Existentialia of Heidegger.

Boss says that Freud took over the presuppositions of the nineteenth century scientific outlook, forgetting that what were presumed to be pure facts, were by no means "pure", but were determined in advance by pre-scientific notions, concerning the fundamental character of the world in general.[1] He summarizes the pre-suppositions as follows:-

1. There is an external, real world, existing in itself, independent of man.

2. "Real" can only be what is measured, calculated and thereby established with certainty. Reality is the totality of those objects which constitute the world.

3. There is an unbroken chain of causal connection between particles of every object, as well as connections between one entire object to all other ones which is predictable by causal connections; thereby we have the unbroken chain of cause and effect.

The influence of Helmholtz, and more directly of Meynart and Brucke, grounded Freud in these specific lines.[2] The Existentialists represent Freud as one who was at all times anxious to be

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1. Boss, Dasiensanalysis and Psychoanalysis, p.28
2. E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Chapters 4 and 5 (Pelican, p.59-88)

"scientific"; if he had no categories into which his data could be placed, he was failing as a "scientist" - i.e., in the sense of the term as it was then understood. Binswanger quotes Freud as saying: "In our method, observed phenomena must take a second place to forces that are merely hypothesized."[1] According to Binswanger this remark represents the natural scientific spirit, for natural science never begins with just the phenomena; indeed its main task is "to divest the phenomena of their phenomenality as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible..."[2] The uniqueness of any phenomena is thereby absorbed by these hypothesized forces and laws. (In parenthesis, this practice does not appear to have held sway only in scientific circles; the method was applied to the teachings of Jesus by Harnach and the liberals, who tried to reduce them to a few general principles.)

Boss admits that this treatment of the phenomena produced a system which was logically self-consistent, but it was achieved "at the price of a tremendous reduction and mutilation of the reality of man and his world."[3] Binswanger says similarly that these "scientific" constructs were based on man's destruction of his knowledge of himself gained through experience.[4] He continues to make a very acute observation that when Freud represents the apparatus of the psyche, at first glance it compares to the

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1. Binswanger, Being in the World, p.156
2. ibid.
3. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Dasiensanalysis, p.131
4. Binswanger, ibid., p.165

diagrammatic representation of a bodily organ. I would go further and compare his model of the Psyche on page 106 of New Introductory Lectures to the actual drawing of a body organ! (See Figures 1 and 2) Binswanger therefore objects as much as Guntrip and Fairbairn to Freud's psychobiology, and further claims that Freud regards man as an object to be studied, which amounts to the fact that less than the whole man is being studied, for natural science cannot comprise the whole of man's knowledge of man.[1] There is also a further factor, that to use the assumptions and categories of natural science is to alter the subject matter and as a consequence to distort the results. Man overflows and bursts the bounds of the kind of psychological constructs which Freud set up; he is too big to be handled in this manner. Hence Binswanger appears to be using a similar argument against Freud which Freudians have used against academic psychologists.

Of the scientific presuppositions mentioned above, the first, that of splitting the subject and object, made by Descartes in the seventeenth century is the main object of the existentialist analysts' criticism. It is this cleavage which has bedevilled Western thought ever since. Joseph Needleman[2] argues that psychology is in very difficult position as it would examine that which has been ruled out of the field of study since the time of Descartes, namely the human psyche, for Descartes was

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1. Binswanger, ibid., p.170
2. Binswanger, ibid., p.42ff Introduction

responsible for separating the res cognita from the res extensa; the psychologist examines processes by which he conducts his investigations, so the subject-object distinction is most acute in this field. An example of the dilemma is well illustrated by the following quotation by an Oxford undergraduate, Mr Jonathan Dorling of New College.

> "The kind of psychology which I am studying is not particularly interested in 'introspection'. The reasons are quite simple; introspection has not led to results which are particularly intelligible, or sufficiently reliable - they depend far too much on the theoretic views of the person who introspects: the mind is an entity we do not mention because we are not sure what anybody means by 'the mind' - the phrase may have several different meanings, and we find that the use of this particular term tends to obscure our problems rather than clarify them.
>
> We are much more interested in the behaviour of humans and of animals, and in trying to discover the mechanisms underlying such behaviour. Our work is closely related to that of the physiologist...."[1]

He goes on to say that hypotheses are built upon the mechanisms, and then they are tested. This is an example of solution by avoidance of difficult data and adherence to strict Cartesian principles. How different are the words of a modern scientist, Heisenberg:-

> "Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in the interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of analysing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation. In other

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1. Ramsey, Religion and Science, p.49-50

> words, method and object can no longer be separated. the scientific world view has ceased to be a scientific view in the true sense of the word."[1]

Or, (to quote) the words of a modern theologian speaking about religion and science, of the part played by intuition in the search for invariants, for some order or constant pattern in the diverse elements of the spatio-temporal world around us, indicate how this involves personal participation:-

> "...the universe gives the physicist answers only in terms of the language which he himself feeds into it. But what is the fundamental implication of that, if not that science is, at its best, a dialogue with the universe, a personal interchange with what is revealed to us in a disclosure?"[2]

This digression shows how the subject-object distinction upon which "science" rested still lingers on in certain quarters, but it does not command the authority it used to have. The existentialist analysts have endeavoured to get behind the split of subject and object to the reality, (so they claim) which underlies both. This is achieved by using Husserl's phenomenological method as developed by Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein.

> "The first jump from phenomenology to existential ontology was made when Heidegger introduced his postulate of man's 'Being-in-the-world' and this brought about the radical change in the subject-object relationship...."[3]

We have mentioned two technical words of Existential analysis;

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1. W. Heisenberg, The Physicists' Conception of Nature, p.29
   Storr, Integrity of Personality, Pelican p.17-18
2. Ramsey, Religion and Science, p.24
3. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.392

the first is Dasein. Da - there, sein - to be; Dasein refers to a being whose essence is to be in the world.[1] Dasein, man, the self, involves "being-in-the-world", hence the second technical term. Existentialist analysis claims to begin with an observation of facts, with pure phenomena; without pre-conceptions and prejudicial characters; it is completely pre-supposition-less; it believes that man's essence consists of a primary awareness of "being-ness" as such.[2] Beingness is not an attribute of what man has; it is what he is. So we return to the tautological statement that Dasein means "being-there-in-the-world." This is anterior to the subject-object distinction.[3] The psychotherapist accepts Dasein without any following desire to objectify or reify; there is no compulsion to interpret or place the data into categories; it permits them to speak for themselves. When giving case histories,Freud, says Boss,[4] talked about experiences in ordinary phenomenological language; but he was always in a hurry to resume the role of the natural scientist, and to theorize in his own special language about his case histories. This language was always framed within a mechanistic system of thought, and in no way did it reflect the humane sympathetic outlook which Freud displayed towards his patients; rather it reflected his anxiety to be "scientific." So what Freud gained in his understanding of man in the therapeutic sessions was virtually

1. Needleman in Binswanger, Being in the World, p.67
2. Boss, ibid., p.35-6
3. Needleman, ibid., p.29
4. Boss, ibid., p.65

destroyed as he proceeded to embark on theoretic formulations and constructions. Boss therefore claims that Freud remained fixed in his fidelity to the natural scientific outlook of his day, which dealt with inanimate nature, and reduced human phenomena to that same level where it could be "quantifiable, calculable, predictable, producible and repairable" (!) as in the second principle stated above (p.139-40).[1] Boss in a rather grand eloquent passage says that Freud "was still a long way from the insight that each man's history occurs by way of a continuous disclosure of the particular beings which are sent to shine forth, to come to pass, in the light of the meaning disclosing relationships which constitute human existence."[2] Binswanger goes further and claims that by Freud's categorizing the self, objectifying it, isolating it and theorizing about it, into an ego, id and super-ego, Dasein is "driven out of its authentic sphere of being, namely existence, and ontologically and anthropologically suffocated."[3]

It follows therefore that the phenomological approach involves restricting analysis to that which is really found to be present in consciousness.[4] Needleman describes the process as follows:-

> "To understand an entity, phenomenon, idea or experience, is to approach the object to be understood on its terms, to see in it structures that

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1. Boss, ibid., p.103
2. Boss, ibid., p.66
3. Binswanger, ibid., p.171
4. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.389

> emerge from its side, and not from ours. To understand an object is to participate in it until it yields its own essence to us who are understanding."[1]

The whole emphasis is on adhering to the given objects of man's world and letting them speak for themselves, looking for no psychic structure "behind" what is perceived.[2] It is true that what is found in the observation of Dasein as "being-in-the-world" can be analysed into "existentialia"; but these cannot be detached from human existence, and "they do not float in some metaphysical world of their own." So by a combination of Husserl's phenomenological method which gives one insights into the essential structure of consciousness itself and of Heidegger's teachings, which takes the phenomenological method further to give understanding not only of consciousness and of human "being", but of Being itself, the existentialists claim to have found the most appropriate method for psychotherapy.[3]

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1. Needleman in Binswanger, ibid., p.38
2. Boss, ibid., p.59
3. Needleman, ibid., p.23. Needleman is at pains to show of how Heidegger's work ties up with that of Kant, and how it differs from his. He puts the claim of the method in the following: "...to confront the world from a preferred frame of reference is not to understand the world as constituted by the self, but is, in fact, to constitute, the world. Therefore, phenomenology is the method par excellence of apprehending that which is constituted by self in its immediacy, and therefore the method par excellence of apprehending the nature or form of that process of constituting."(p.25) Where Kant would have stressed understanding, Heidegger stresses human being, Dasein. Knowledge as developed by Kant is but one form of Dasein; one mode of "being-in-the-world." Existential analysis is concerned not only with "I am knowing", as with Kant, but with what "I am knowing-feeling-willing."(ob.cit.)

This completely different approach of the analyst to the patient is presuppositionless, save for the given structure of Dasein; together with a reluctance to categorize the material, always understanding the patient on his own terms, there follows a radical reappraisal of psychoanalytical concepts, especially the basic ones.

First, the Unconscious. According to Boss, Freud knew that the assumption of the Unconscious meant going beyond immediately observed phenomena; however, Freudians have always justified this on the following grounds, as stated by Fenichel:-

> "The existence of the unconscious is an assumption that forced itself upon psychoanalytical research when it sought a scientific explanation and a comprehension of conscious phenomena. Without such an assumption, the data of the conscious in their inter-relationships remain incomprehensible; with such an assumption, that which characterizes the success of every science becomes possible; to predict the future and to exert systematic influence."[1]

Boss argues that what had originally been a property of mental phenomenon became a psychic locality, assuming the stature of an independent entity with laws and properties peculiar to itself.[2] Freud regarded it as necessary because of the large gaps in consciousness which needed to be filled; and as legitimate, because the accepted method of inference of analogy is being employed in its postulation. Boss insists, however, that to argue back from successful procedures is not proof at all,

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1. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.7
2. Boss, ibid., p.85-88

and that nothing is gained by seeking to establish meaningful connections by interpolating assumed processes. Boss therefore claims that Existentialist analysis can dispense with the concept of the unconscious, because it is able to elucidate without difficulty on the basis of immediate experience alone, the phenomena which caused Freud to postulate the existence of the Unconscious. He sees no need of an inner psychic reality. "All we need to do is to talk of the concrete meaning, disclosing object relations in which, and as which, our Dasein exists at a given moment."[1]

Binswanger follows in much the same argument; he includes also the instincts, because of their reliance upon biology[2], and Freud's threefold structure of ego, id and super-ego.[3]

Boss also objects to the term "psychodynamics" for it relies on those forces which Freud assumed to be operating within the

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1. Boss, ibid., p.96
2. Needleman claims that the concept of instinct in biology is a hypothesis that connects and brings into unity phenomena of the highly complex thing, the organism (See Needleman in Binswanger, ibid., p.51 footnote.)
3. Binswanger (p.188) also sees a point of contact between Freud's ego, super-ego and id and that of Gressinger's ego (Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen Krankenheit, 2nd edition, 1961). Binswanger claims that Gressinger is more modern than Freud in that he understands what is "unassimilated" by, and oppositional to, the Ego not as an Id (and It), but rather as a human "Thou", whereby the genuine dialogical character of psychic conflict is more strictly preserved. Binswanger adds in a footnote (p.100) that when Freud wishes to represent the dialogical character of psychic conflict, "he takes care to abandon the role of the theoretician and relates a 'fairy tale'..."

psyche, e.g., instincts, and in doing this Freud was simply copying the natural sciences of the time in postulating forces within a mechanic frame of reference. Without a theory of instincts, psychodynamics is a vacuous concept. Existentialist analysis does not assume a causal energy, because it confines itself to what is immediately experienced, to the phenomena which show themselves with Dasein.[1]

Along the same lines, Existentialist analysis does not speak of emotions as things we have, but as what we <u>are</u> - we are our emotional states ourselves.[2] Likewise, terms, such as "resistance" and"repression" are dispensed with; instead of repression of thoughts and emotions into the unconscious, the situation is to be understood as inability of existence "to become engaged in an open, free, authentic kind of relationship to that which is disclosed in the relationship."[3] As expected, the Existentialists regard the transference in a similar way to that of Fairbairn-Guntrip, as a genuine relationship between the analyst and patient, disclosing themselves to one another as human beings; the analyst's task being to assist the patient to relate as fully

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1. Boss, ibid., p.108. Boss also argues that Freud was not quite sure about his instinct theory and quotes the well-known words from <u>The New Introductory Lectures</u>, p.124. "The theory of instincts is, as it were, our mythology. The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefiniteness." But Freud also said to Binswanger, on page 184, "Mankind has always know that it possesses spirit; I had to show it that there are also instincts." It would have to be on other grounds than Freud's supposed uncertainty that an objection to instincts would have to be lodged. (See Boss, ibid., p.105)
2. Boss, ibid., p.113
3. Boss, ibid., p.120

the blind spots of psychoanalysis. Binswanger in his depreciation of the scientific method did not seek for another technique but rather for understanding of the foundations upon which all techniques must stand.

> "Existentialism in short is the endeavour to understand man by cutting below the cleavage between subject and object which has bedevilled Western thought and science since shortly after the Renaissance. This cleavage Binswanger calls the cancer of all psychology up to now...the cancer of the subject-object cleavage of the world."[1]

May analyses the world "existence" into ex sistere, to stand out, to emerge. To exist is "to be", hence one uses the word "ontology" (Gk. ONTOS) the science of being. Existence, however, is not a static concept, but a dynamic one.[2]

Like other existentialist writers, May appeals to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. "Truth exists," said Kierkegaard, "only as the individual produces it in action." This idea of truth as relationship is confirmed today even by physicists like Heisenberg (to whom, May, like other existentialists, appeals). "The idea of a science which is completely independent of man (i.e., completely objective) is an illusion."[3] So the old scientific theory that the less we are involved in a given situation, the more we observe the truth, is no longer tenable. And this truth applies particularly to persons. May makes similar criticisms

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1. May, Existence, p.10 (See also May, Man's Search for Himself, p.70)
2. Could we speak of "psychodynamics" in this sense? The term would not depend on "mythical beings" like instincts, but on the very fact of human existence itself being dynamic.
3. May, ibid., p.25f. Heisenberg's address to Washington University, St Louis, October 1954.

to those which Binswanger and Boss of Freud for carrying the scientific attitude of his times into his system, thereby limiting the sphere of investigation in man to what fits the sphere of science.[1] May insists that technique and data must be subordinated to the person; the emphasis is on "Being". He quotes Marcel as saying that in Freud's analysis we have everything but being.[2] May does not leave us with this nebulous term "Being"; he defines it:

> "Being is that which remains. It is that which constitutes this infinitely complex set of deterministic factors into a person to whom the experiences happen, and now possesses some element, no matter how minute, of freedom to become aware that these forces are acting upon him."[3]

This rather poetic or prophetic description demonstrates how far existential language is from the usual scientific language. "Being" we are also told is a participle used of a person in the process of becoming something, i.e., becoming what one truly is. It therefore speaks of potentiality. May argues that because "Being" has this broad reference, the "ego" as conceived by Freud cannot carry the full meaning of "I am". It is merely the subject of the subject-object relationship.

May also reiterates the existentialist teachings that guilt and anxiety are ontological characteristics of man, rooted in

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1. In fairness, it must be admitted that Freud did go far beyond the strict confines of the science of his day in order to explain his findings.
2. May, ibid., p.40 quoting Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence.
3. May, ibid., p.41

his very existence. The very structure of Dasein involves one in such experiences.

He not only defines "Being", but also the world; but May is careful to stress that one cannot separate a person and the world, for they form a structural whole, and to attempt to separate them would be a capitulation to the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. Being-in-the-World is a structural whole - the self implies the world, and the world the self. "World is the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the design of which he participates." Nevertheless, May does give us his analysis of the world; there are three modes which are interrelated and simultaneous.[1] Perhaps we could regard this as an Existential Trinitarian pattern:-

1. UMWELT. The world of nature, of biological drives; the world around one, the "thrown world" into which we must relate and adjust.

2. MITWELT. The world of inter-personal relationships which includes the meaning which is dispersed by the inter-relations of the persons in it. e.g., love depends on commitment to other people. (In this sphere the writings of Buber and Macmurray would be applicable.)

3. EIGENWELT. One's own relationships towards oneself - this mode of relationship presupposes self-awareness. The person sees himself as subject and object at once; for a man, if he is to realise himself, must question his own being.[2] It is this self-conscious capacity which is the unique and basic characteristic of human existence, for with it goes the capacity for care.

(The above is similar to Erikson's triadic relationship of biological, societal and psychological influences.)

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1. May, Existence, p.61f
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.121 connects the first made to Freud's work, the second to Sullivan and the third to Jung's individuation.

In practical terms, Existentialist analysis therefore dwells much less on the past than does psychoanalysis, simply because this self-transcendence allows man to use the future to determine the past. Existentialist analysis protests against the over-emphasis of the past at the expense of the present and future. There is also less emphasis on technique and interpretation and more on presence in the patient-therapist relationship. May quotes Frieda Fromm-Reichmann,"The patient needs an experience, not an explanation."[1]

Existentialists have criticised the concept of the Unconscious for many reasons. We have seen how Boss regarded it as part of the given "being" which is indivisible; Sartre rejected it because people used the Unconscious as a means of escape, to rationalise questionable behaviour, and to avoid their own "bad faith."[2] May is less keen to cut out the concept. He argues that Freud's great achievement was to enlarge the sphere of human personality beyond consciousness as it was regarded at that time, to include the irrational, the unacceptable, all kinds of urges and hostile desires and unrecognized aspects of experience ad infinitum. Freud used the word "unconscious" as a symbol for this enlarged domain of the personality which is part of a given human being at any time. He would not accept the spatial "cellar" concept of the Unconscious used in orthodox Freudian circles, but

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1. May, Existence, p.81
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.123

he would never dispense with this aspect of the personality which Freud showed to the world for the first time with brilliance and clarity.[1]

3. IN BRITAIN - R.D. LAING

In speaking of R.D. Laing in the Introduction to this chapter, I mentioned that behind his work was not only the development of Freudian thinking in Britain, but that of continental existentialist writers like Binswanger and Boss, as well as Sartre. There is evidence in his work that he was also indebted to Martin Buber. Buber's best known work I and Thou can be looked at in various ways: as a study of human relationships, as a poem about existence, or as a generalized but penetrating analysis of the kind of relationship which should be found within the psychotherapeutic context. More specifically in his paper 'Distance and Relation in Psychiatry', Buber speaks of a two-fold principle of human life, where being is built up by a twofold movement based on, firstly, "the primal setting at a distance", and secondly,"entering into a relation."[2] "Distance provides the human situation; relation provides man's becoming in that situation."[3]

> "Man, as man sets man at a distance and makes him independent, he lets the life of men like himself go on round about him, and so he, and he alone, is able to enter into relation, in his own individual status, with those like himself. The basis of man's life with

1. May, ibid., p.90
2. Buber, Psychiatry, Vol. 20, 1957, p.97
3. ibid., p.100

> man is two-fold, and it is one - the wish of every man is to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become by men: and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow man in this way."[1]

In this paper, as in I and Thou[2] Buber stresses how human life and humanity come into being "in genuine meetings"; man is confirmed in his being by fellow men, when I and Thou are in relation, in meeting.[3]

This is the fundamental philosophy which permeates Laing's whole approach to psychotherapy. In mental indisposition, we are not studying individuals who are ill, in the medical sense, but those whose relationships are disturbed. Laing writes:

> "The science of persons is the study of human beings that begins from a relationship with the other as person and proceeds to an account of the other still as person."[4]

This naturally leads on to his criticism of Freudian theory; it lacks concepts to deal with how two human beings meet; it is unable to deal with more than one person at a time.[5] Laing argues that phenomenology is equipped to do this task as it is "in potentia,

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1. Buber, ibid., p.102
2. Buber, I and Thou, p.11
3. Buber, Psychiatry, Vol. 20. 1957, p.103
4. Laing, The Divided Self, p.21
5. Laing, in New Society, No.105, October 1, 1964, p.12. This contention would be debated by those psychoanalysts who have evolved group therapy out of Freud's original insights, e.g., Bion, Experience in Groups, and Foulkes and Anthony, Group Psychotherapy. The latter book says: "Our Bible, when we seek to understand these dictations and to effect their analysis, is Freud's book, The Interpretation of Dreams."(p.59) However, it does remain quite true that Freud's traditional approach is concerned with no more than one person at a time.

a primary discipline in the study of human relatedness."[1]

He sees other limitations in psychoanalysis. In his study of Sartre's philosophy, along with D.G. Cooper, Laing complains of the switch which certain psychoanalysts make from participation in a relationship to making judgements about the patient "from a point of complete exteriority in relation to a biological entity. The person disappears."[2]

> "The original project, always a relation of self to being, cannot be expressed in physicalistic metaphor and biological analogy without fatal confusion and ambiguity. Unfortunately, even the best psychoanalytical papers are written in these terms or fall back into them. Indeed, it is often unclear when a psychoanalytical writer supposes that he is being metaphorical or analogizing or attempting an explanation. Too often the latter appears to be the case, and the work becomes stultified with fetishized pseudo irreducibles."[3]

We are back to the old question raised again and again by existentialist writers that instead of a meeting of I and Thou, a single person is taken in complete isolation and his various aspects are conceptualized into "abstract like ego, id and super-ego." It is taking a relationship between two people and reducing it to a form of interaction of parts of the mental apparatus within one person.[4]

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1. Laing, Self and Others, p.15
2. Laing, Reason and Violence, p.24-5
3. ibid.
4. In The Self and Others, Laing criticises the postulation of entirely hypothetical processes (metapsychology) which tend to be confused with "attributions about action and experience." All effort on the part of the therapist to be "objective" may mean nothing more than a failure on his part to subject his diagnosis into "signs" and "symptoms" to a critical examination, regarding them as reliable and valid criteria for making attributions about the other person, when in fact the result is an impoverished and twisted view of the other persons. (p.119) Laing calls this "monadic psychology" and says that even if we could give an absolutely undistorted and objective account of a person, we still have the task of giving an account of what happens between two or more persons. (p.69)

Existentialists regard objectification and classification as a nineteenth century custom, and do not appear to be unduly worried with charges of subjectivity, for only by so-called "subjective" involvement can one come to true reality of the person and be concerned with him as he is. Francis MacNab whose work on schizophrenics in groups follows very largely the Laing thesis, describes this process as a reversal of the Platonic doctrine: existence comes before essence in the phenomenological approach.[1] Laing would even argue that his approach is scientific in the sense that it is "a form of knowledge adequate to its subject."[2] He also writes:

> "Physics and the other sciences must accord the science of persons the right to be unbiassed in a way that is true to its own field of study. If it is held that to be unbiassed one should be "objective" in the sense of depersonalizing the person who is the "object" of our study, any temptation to do this, under the impression that one is thereby being scientific must be rigorously resisted."[3]

He compares his method to that which Dilthey laid down as a conditioning factor for comprehending an ancient text: it requires

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1. Francis MacNab, Estrangement and Relationship, p.133. To show how close MacNab is to Laing, he writes: "The schizophrenic has lost the consistency of relationship both with himself and with his world. He no longer experiences a sense of mutuality as we know it in human relationships. He is sensitive and afraid. He fears relationships, yet longs for them." In his book MacNab describes the groups he attended and how he sought to relate to the schizophrenic patients and understand them.
2. Laing, in New Society, No. 105, p.14
3. Laing, The Divided Self, p.24

all the empathy and understanding we can bring to bear on the other; our view depends "on our willingness to enlist all the powers of every aspect of ourselves in an act of comprehension."[1]

> "My thesis is limited to the contention that the theory of man as a person loses its way if it falls into an account of man as a machine or as man as an organismic system of it-processes."[2]

To split man up and to divide him is a schizophrenic process in itself. Splitting and depersonalizing are psychopathological states, so why should they be regarded as normal for diagnostic purposes and as concepts towards healing? True psychotherapy is the opposite to splitting; it aims at wholeness; it is "an obstinate attempt of two people to arrive at a recovery of the wholeness of being human through the relationship between them."[3] Again he says, "The main agent in uniting the patient, in allowing the pieces to come together and cohere, is the physician's love, a love that recognizes the patient's total being, and accepts it, with no strings attached."[4]

Laing's description of the schizophrenic has by now come to be regarded as a classic. Like Fairbairn, he assumes the existence of an original self which is split, resulting in ontological insecurity, fears of engulfment, implosion and petrifaction or depersonalization. He shows how the schizo-

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1. Laing, The Divided Self, p.32, quoting Bultmann's essay 'The Problem of Hermenentics' p.234-61
2. Laing, ibid., p.23
3. Laing in New Society, No. 105, p.13
4. Laing, ibid., p.165. This saying is undoubtedly indebted to Ferenczi's well known words that it is the love of the therapist that heals.

phrenic tries to be omnipotent in his own being, without relationships with others and so reaching the paradoxical state, that the more he defends himself the more he is destroyed. In place of creative, spontaneous living, involving natural relationships, there is inner impoverishment. The schizophrenic may so come to regard his body as external to himself, as part of the world over against him. In his development of the "False self" of Winnicott, Laing speaks of the "double-bind" which a mother can inflict on a child by giving contrary injunctions. This "double-bind" has been tersely described by Alan Beckett as "polyvalent communications which do not allow the recipient to take unequivocal action and prevent him from leaving the field,"[1] and by Laing as a situation which is sealed off for the victim "by further unavowed injunction forbidding him or her to get out of the situation, or to dissolve it by commenting on it. The 'victim' is thus in an untenable position. He cannot make a single move without evoking a single catastrophe."[2]

Finally, what is Laing's attitude towards the Unconscious, that key concept of Freudian theory? Existentialists, we have seen, are wary of it. Sartre for example in Being and Nothingness explains how the notion of Unconscious thought is a contradiction in terms.[3] As we have seen, he also objects to the concept because people can use it as a means of escape, and they wish

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1. Alan Beckett, in Views, No. 8, Summer 1965, p.49
2. Laing, The Self and Others, p.138 e.g., Francis MacNab p.103
3. See Lomas in Psychoanalysis Observed, p.132

to avoid their own "bad faith"[1] by which is meant their self-deceit. One would expect therefore that Laing would follow Sartre and Boss. In The Self and Others, he has a long and penetrating discussion of Susan Isaacs paper on'The Nature and Function of Phantasy.'[2] Susan Isaacs regarded phantasy and the unconscious as inferred but necessary. Laing says wittily that with her phantasy has become both "the cause of itself as effect and the effect of itself as cause." He is also very critical of her working with antitheses, such as "inner" in contrast to "outer", mental to physical etc., which result in the working out of "an entirely imaginary problem." But he insists that this unconscious phantasy is recognized as a genuine experience which "antedates reflective awareness" and which persists through life with modifications. He does not regard it, however, as a separate institution cut off from consciousness and determining it. The idea of repression, upon which Freud built so much, Laing would like to replace with a concept more amenable to the phenomenological approach. It seems that broadly speaking Laing's attitude to the Unconscious is akin to that of May. He would not use the spatial concept as though it were an actual place in the mind where phenomenon having been repressed are stored; but he would use it perhaps for describing certain unrecognized experiences. Laing actually says: "What Freud and Jung called

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1. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.123
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.67-121
   Laing, The Self and Others,p.7-10

'The Unconscious' is simply what we are, in our historically conditioned estrangement, unconscious of."[1]

4. THE NEW VIENNESE SCHOOL - VIKTOR E. FRANKL

One wishes to draw attention to this writer, not because either he or his writings can contribute much in this enquiry, but because of his popularity, many regarding his contribution as the true example of existentialist analysis. The reason for this is not difficult to find, as his first book on the subject included - in fact consisted largely of - an account of his persecution by the Nazis, of death marches and two concentration camps which he survived. In this most moving document, he records how, in spite of most men sinking to an almost animal level of existence, some were able to find meaning for their lives. In these dark surroundings, he was able to work out a philosophy of life which enabled people to develop a "consciousness of responsibility", which is now called by the name of Logotherapy, and is practised in his clinic in Vienna. He goes as far as to call his school "The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy." The first was Freud's which concentrated on the <u>will to pleasure</u>; the second Adler's, with its motive, the <u>will to power</u>; and now Frankl's which speaks of a <u>will to meaning</u>, hence <u>Logo</u>-therapy. (LOGOS to be understood as "meaning".) The purpose of the therapy is to make the patient aware of the hidden logos of

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1. Laing in <u>New Society</u>, No. 105, p.13

meaning within his existence. He used special terms like, "Noögenic neurosis" and "Noö-dynamics". He claims that his method does not impose value judgements on his patients, and that he is neither preaching, teaching nor giving moral exhortation. However, one feels that the evaluation of Gerald Sykes on this first book of Frankl's is not only correct, but prophetic. "...his writing often seems like old-fashioned uplift, with not a few echoes of the pulpit."[1] Sykes also claimed that Frankl has a mind which sees things in black and white. These contentions seem to be borne out by the fact that in 1949 Frankl wrote a book Der unbewusste Gott (The Unconscious God) in which he endeavours to reconcile psychotherapy with Roman Catholic doctrine.

He concedes unity in the human being when he is centred around a single personality, which requires the unity of body, soul and spirit, all three together, before one can talk of an entity.[2] He follows other Existentialists in pouring scorn on Freudian structures, claiming that psychoanalysis concerns itself only with the animal attributes of personality and fails to deal with man's real spiritual and existential depth personality.[3] He denies Freud's contention on the origin of the super-ego, from the ego, claiming that:-

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1. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.126
2. Wyss, p.377. Der unbewusste Gott, p.27-8
3. Wyss, p.381. Der unbewusste Gott, p.24

> "What stands behind the super-ego of man is not the ego of a super-man but the Thou of God: for conscience could never be a word of power in immanence if it were not the word of Thou in transcendence."[1]

He goes on to argue that the super-ego is not an introjected father imago, for God is not a mere father-imago, but a father is the imago of God, God being "the original image of all fatherliness."[2] In view of the development of Frankl's thought, Sykes' words have truly been prophetic. Much of his writing is intuitive, and dogmatic, so it is difficult to include it in this enquiry.

5. COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS

Comments have already been made about some of the theories we have outlined and we wish to follow the same procedure here. However, we shall reserve the general comments to the last chapter of this section.

a) One cannot help but notice how much vaguer are the terms employed by the Existentialists compared with those in use among psychoanalysts. "Being-in-the-World", "Ontological insecurity" are in no way so clear-cut as such terms as "super-ego" and "ego".

Moreover, to what do these existentialist terms refer? Joseph Needleman, for example, speaks of a "meaning-matrix

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1. Wyss, p.382, Der unbewusste Gott, p.85
2. Wyss, p.382, Der unbewusste Gott, p.86-7

with the Being-in-the-World of the Dasein, which Being-in-the-World is anterior to the subject-object distinction." Now if we look at these terms psychologically, then do they not refer to the stage in human development before the differentiation of self and not-self, of subject and object, that of the symbiosis of the child with the mother, the "oceanic" state of undifferentiation so often associated with religion? Freud regarded this state as nothing but the survival of the primitive ego feeling which is normal to infancy.[1] One wonders therefore if such phrases as"Being-in-the-World" and "anterior to the subject-object distinction" do not refer to this basic underlying psychological state which is grounded in infancy?

One asks further, as to the status of the terminology employed. Gerald Sykes claimed that ontology is a:

> "Handy word which means almost the same thing as metaphysics, without having its disagreeable popular association."[2]

Boss, however, as we have seen, would disagree. He made the claim that the existentialia, the meaning and essence of directly observed human behaviour, "do not float in some metaphysical world of their own", and that existentialist analysis never attempts to find a psychic structure "behind" what is perceived.[3]

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1. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p.7-9 where he is answering an enquirer, whom Rieff identifies with Romain Rolland.
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.122
3. Boss, Psychoanalysis andDaseinanalysis, p.39-40

Which is the correct view?

Some existentialist analysts have sensed a problem here. For example, Rollo May senses the danger of generality in the existentialist approach.[1] Alan Beckett, writing on the psychology of R.D. Laing, has said that in their keenness to reform the mechanistic aspects of psychoanalytical theory, the Existentialists have moved towards "phenomenography - the uncritical acceptance of all experience as it is presented."[2]

Other criticisms follow different lines. One of the most severe comments made of the Existentialist viewpoint is that of Thomas S. Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness. Like Beckett he regards it as reaction against organic psychiatry which the Existentialists for good reasons regard as holding a dehumanized view of man. In this reaction, however, they have gone too far, and have abandoned not only medicine but psychosocial sciences, empiricism, and the philosophy of science. They have then turned to a view of human life which is mystical, relying on the writings of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, rather than on one based on scientific psychology. He quotes Reinhold Niebuhr that Existentialism is "a philosophic movement of dubious scientific and moral value"[3], and adds himself that it is "a ponderous and often pompous way of trying to make scientific

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1. May, Existence, p.90
2. Beckett, 'The Psychology of R.D. Laing', Views, No.8, Summer 1965, p.49
3. ibid., p.95

sense out of questions concerning the whys and hows of human living."[1]

I cannot think that ontology or "Being" of the Existentialists is anything other than a form of metaphysics. I accept the contention that the thinking of this school is to be aligned with the philosophical movement which stems from Hegel. Whilst this is not the place to go into details, there is a similarity between Hegel's idea of "pure spirit" and that of "Being" of the Existentialists; both can be described as "God-terms".[2]

I would therefore regard both the ontology of the Existentialists with their Existentialia, and the metapsychology of Freud, with his spatial structural as of similar logical status. The Existentialists may have claimed to put metaphysics and metapsychology out of the door, but they have returned by the window through the employment of ontological terms. Whichever system, however, is barred, the experiences which it purports to describe remain, like the grin after the Cheshire cat has departed! Laing in <u>The Divided Self</u>[3] gives two accounts or

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1. ibid., p.96. It should be noted that Szasz wrote from a very individual position. He regards mental illness as nothing other than personal social and ethical problems in living. (ibid., p.296) It is game-playing behaviour, a kind of language employed when all other forms of language have failed. It takes the form of cries for help in order to secure certain gains. He also criticises Freud, who, with Breuer, mistook hysteria for an illness, whereas it is a condition which uses language of illness to secure gains. (p.302)
2. Rieff, <u>Freud, the Mind of the Moralist</u>, cf. D. Jenkins, <u>Guide to the Debate about God</u>, p.98
3. p.106f.

interpretations of self-consciousness, in Freudian and Existentialist terms. The former is certainly more speculative, but is clearer. In the last resort one chooses that which is the most significant to us, which can be either, depending on ourselves. To use Ramsey's metaphors which will be employed later in the enquiry, it will be the one which "rings the bell" or "breaks the ice" for us.[1]

b) Laing in his work appears to have devoted his attention almost exclusively to schizophrenia, as have Cooper, MacNab and others. Now a schizophrenic state is almost impossible to classify or rather to categorize; even the Freudian may speak of it as a "fragmentation of the personal structure", a "dissolution of categories". They may perhaps speak metaphorically (which they have done already as the word "structure" as applied to mind is a metaphor anyway), as "the ego being flooded by unconscious phantasy"; and if that metaphor could be stretched we could deduce that it is impossible to draw maps of a district when everything is covered in flood water; one has to wait until the floods subside for an accurate mapping to take place. In such a way schizophrenia may prevent a "mapping" of the mind, so that wider, vaguer concepts such as those used by the Existentialists can cope with the "flooded" condition of this mental state, which obliterates structures, categories or institutions. What one is trying to say is that we may be involved here in

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1. Ramsey, Religious Language, p.49. c.f. Models and Mystery p.13f.

a circular argument; by the selection of patients whose indisposition involves an absence or destruction of structure, it is natural to conclude that structure is irrelevant for dealing with such patients. To this I would agree. But it is when this line of thought is generalized to cover all individuals, one must at least question this if not dissent from it. Are not the ends prescribed by a deliberate selection of patients, so that what is concluded from the argument is exactly what was inserted at the beginning, namely that being initiallly absent, there is consequently no evidence of structure?

c) One of the main arguments which occurs again and again in existentialist psychological writings is that the categorizing of patients' troubles is not reconcilable with their personal nature: it depersonalizes.[1] The patient is a "Thou" and the moment such categorization has begun, he is being treated as an "It". It therefore makes the laudable stand against personal "Thous" being treated as "Its". The logic of such writers compels them to regard the patient as a "Thou" and only as a "Thou", and therefore classifications cannot be applied. Personally I cannot regard this as a valid objection, for the analyst who tries to understand the patient in terms of categories, which to the existentialist means regarding him as an "It", may be doing so in order to understand him better as a "Thou". If categories or classifications are applied as a means to an end, the end being a better

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1. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p.113

understanding of the patient, then the application is completely justified. For by the method he may be able in the end to act in a more understanding "I-Thou" relationship than if he desisted; also it may be a more loving action. To have to deal with a person who is exceedingly difficult to help and resists help may be alleviated by making a classification - i.e., that the man is paranoid or that he has a harsh punitive super-ego. It would not be necessary for the analyst to tell the patient this! One would hope that he kept this concepts to himself as a sustaining fact: but having made the "It" evaluation, the analyst can then return to the patient with renewed resources and widened understanding, and so enjoy an even fuller "I-Thou" relationship.. Models and concepts can be used to further our understanding and to assist the "I-Thou" relationship; they are not meant to take the place of "I-Thou" relationships. It is not a question of one method or the other; the practice of categorizing can serve the existentialist approach.[1] The two <u>can</u> be combined.

d) There is a criticism which we have met, which the Existentialists and others make of Freud, regarding his tie to the

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1. A similar dilemma in medicine was raised by Mr Wilfred Mills of Birmingham at the Annual meeting of the Institute of Medicine and Religion, in a provocative address on the two possible approaches in medicine - "Computer or Samaritan". This is cartoon language; but it expresses the detached clinical approach which could be fed into a computer on the one hand, with the personal care and concern which brings with it such anxiety for the doctor who is carrying it out. He pleaded for a blend of both in the practice of medicine. (His address is in the Annual Report for the Institute of Medicine and Religion, 1966, p.22-3)

natural sciences of his time. It may well be true that Freudian metapsychology is an inevitable nineteenth century product, and that the strange language which he invented for his categories is part and parcel of his age. However, Freud's work cannot be disposed of so easily; for it took its initiative from the whole scientific method, which now as in Freud's day too, can be described as "a search for invariants, a search for some order and some constant pattern in the diverse elements of the spatio-temporal world around us."[1] Freud sought to discover invariants in the mind itself; he invented names for the ways in which the mental phenomena appeared to structure themselves in patterns which he could discern. The vital question concerning any postulates is surely not, "Is this fashionable? Is it new?", with one eye on the latest thatphysics or some other standard of reference can offer us for guidance, but "Is it significant to us? Does it help us to understand the mind of man and his behaviour?" Moreover, as we have seen above, how else can recurrent patterns be described except by the employment of some terms, which are metaphysical or metapsychological? We shall return to this in the next chapter.

e) Regarding one specific point referred to in the last chapter, Laing in his writing makes much of what he called the "double-bind" by which a parent can restrict a child. In some of his passages we get the impression that the child is a helpless

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1. Ramsey, Religion and Science, p.4

victim of the aggressive action of the parents or of the brothers and sisters. Sometimes one gets the impression that "the mother is to blame." However, one feels that it is in such situations that an existentialist approach, which accepts the phenomenon as it comes, needs some support from Freudian concepts, for example, the power of omnipotent thought and magical thinking, of which Freud elaborated in Totem and Taboo. How much of what is disclosed in the existentialist encounter is fact, and how much is phantasy? How much of the phenomena presented is reaction formation on the part of the patient, imputing to the parent that which the child in fact phantisied towards the parent, and consequently blaming the parent for the trouble? David Cooper[1] dwells on the intricacies of the relationship between the mother and the child, and shows how very easily relations between them can in fact go wrong. Laing[2] speaks of how the child from baby-hood may put the parent in untenable positions, and of how the mother cannot "click in" or "get through" to such a baby, and of how as a result she can become anxious and feel helpless as a mother. "She then withdraws from the baby in one sense, while becoming over-solicitous in another sense. Double-binds are usually mutual." This is very true, and well put; however, the total picture is not really dealt with until the omnipotent phantasies of the patient as a child are fully taken into account.

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1. Cooper, 'Violence in Psychiatry,' in Views, No. 8, p.18f
2. Laing, The Self and Others, p.140

Unless these are faced and surrendered, no therapeutic change can be effected.

f) In conclusion, I would wish to associate myself with the comments made by Peter Lomas in the recent book, Psychoanalysis Observed.[1] Whilst admitting that this existential approach has a theoretic orientation more suited to the study of persons than that of psychoanalysis, he adds however: "In this country its exponents are characterized by a preoccupation with schizophrenia, a tendency to support the under-dog, a leaning towards the philosophy of Sartre and courage - and have already made some useful contributions to an understanding of schizoid states and, especially, of the relationships within a family containing a schizophrenic member." But he regards the approach as limited and considers that some fruitful channels opened by psychoanalysis have been neglected, e.g., the transference interpretation, primary process and secondary process, guilt, mourning, depression, psychic-economy, child development and the fact that there are two sexes. In these criticisms, Lomas is undoubtedly right.

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1. Lomas, 'Psychoanalysis-Freudian or Existential?, esp. p.147-8

CHAPTER VI

JUNG

> "It seems unfortunately to be the case that Jungians and Freudians, like Liberals and Conservatives, are born and not made, and those who sympathize with the general viewpoint of one school are likely to find that of the other incomprehensible. The present writer may as well admit that he comes into the Freudian category, and gets much the same impression from reading Jung as might be obtained from reading the scriptures of the Hindus, Taoists or Confucians; although well aware that many wise and true things are being said, he feels that they could have been said just as well without involving us in the psychological theories upon which they are supposedly based."[1]

The above expresses my own outlook on the writings of Jung. It is said the Freudians dream Freudian dreams to please their analysts whilst Jungians not only dream Jungian dreams, but from time to time bring along to their analysts Mandalas they have painted! Is one therefore prejudiced from the beginning, having been invalidated, not so much from being born a Freudian, but by having a Freudian analysis and therefore being prevented from appreciating Jung's thought fully? However, his work in relation to the construction of the psyche, and on the Doctrine of the Trinity, is both profound and extensive, and no enquiry would be complete without adequate reference being made to it. On the other hand, it may appear to be superfluous to write about his work in view of all that has already been written by Jung and

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1. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.43

his excellent interpreters.[1]

So far in our enquiry, there has been some kind of development from each of the psychodynamic systems to the following one. To consider Jung, therefore, at this stage of the enquiry, may seem like retreating our steps back to the stage of metapsychologies. Yet whilst it is true that Jung has developed an elaborate metapsychology, if not a metaphysical system or a mythology in some respects, his work has affinities with the Existentialists. Firstly, as distinct from Freud, who modelled his metapsychology on the mechanistic scientific conceptions of his time, Jung, like the Existentialists, has turned to philosophical ideas and mystical thought to supply meaning for human behaviour and existence. Secondly, it will be seen that he does not look so much to the past as did Freud, but to the present and the future, as his chief concerns in therapy, which is also an Existentialist practice.

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1. The simplest introduction to Jung's thought is that of E.A. Bennet, What Jung Really Said; another valuable introduction is the Pelican book of Frieda Fordham; there is a section on Jung in Dieter Wyss' Depth Psychology; but the best of all introductions is that of Iolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung.
   Regarding Jung's religious writings, we have Victor White's two books God and the Unconscious, and Soul and Psyche. H.L. Philp's Jung and the Problem of Evil, and D. Cox's Jung and St Paul. Also R. Hostie: Religion and the Psychology of Jung. There are also Jung's own writings to which reference will be made. Definitions of Jung's terms are to found in the appendix to White's, God and the Unconscious, by Gerbherd Frei, and in the appendix to Jung's own Psychological Types where the definitions are in Jung's own words.

Jung claims the right to found his theories on empirical observations, and to draw conclusions from them. He has no use for the experimental method in his work, which because of its restrictive nature, cannot study the whole of man's psyche, but only those elements which are amenable to its methods. If psychology capitulated to the experimental method, it would sacrifice its raison d'être.[1] He begins therefore with the empirical method of phenomenal observation; but he does not stop there; Jung argues that it is right to create scientific hypotheses on the basis of his observations; therefore his postulates or categories like "libido", the Unconscious, and the psyche itself, which transcend empirical observation, are not only justified, but required as essential.[2]

> "No practical science can get along without its tricks of the trade (Handwerksregeln). That is the way to look at anything I may say about the structure of the soul. There is no question of my producing inconverterable truths - they are simply ideas thrown out in an attempt to bring a bit of order into bewildering conglomerations of psychic realities... All our present psychological theories are subjective assertions which we defend jealously, in a highly partisan spirit, because they echo powerful currents in the human soul...."[3]

That Jung's method cannot be experimental is claimed by Hostie simply because it aims at studying the whole of man's psyche, not merely those parts which can be studied experimentally,

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1. Hostie, Religion and the Psychology of Jung, p.8, 20
2. Hostie, ibid., p.20
   Jung, Modern Man in Search of his Soul, p.200f
   Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.103-4
3. Hostie, ibid., p.13 quoting Jung, Die Struktur der Seele, p.28

whilst ignoring the rest. Hostie claims that it is an empirical method, however, because it aims "to create scientific hypotheses on the basis of observed fact."[1]

With all the above argument,Freud would agree. But Jung goes further than Freud did in many ways. He argues for example that no one, either patient or analyst, can evade a philosophy of life, a Weltanschauung, to supply the meaning of human existence. This again brings us nearer to the Existentialists than to Freud, but in fairness it must be mentioned that whilst Freud disclaimed the right to deduce a Weltanschauung from psychoanalytical studies, he did make an attempt at one himself in his New Introductory Lectures, No. 35 which is largely a criticism of religion.

Turning now to the psychic structure as developed by Jung, we find that he accepts Freud's fundamental dichotomy between the Conscious and the Unconscious, although it is developed and elaborated quite differently. Consciousness is derived and developed from the Unconscious; which is similar to Freud's saying that the Ego is developed from the Id. "By consciousness I understand the relatedness of psychic contents of the ego in so far as they are sensed as such by the ego."[2] "Nothing can be conscious without an ego to which it refers."[3] Jung differentiates it from the whole psyche, which is much greater than the ego. Of the

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1. Hostie, ibid., p.20
2. Jung, Psychological Types, p.535
3. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.57

Unconscious Jung says:

> "The concept of the unconscious is for me an exclusively psychological concept, not a philosophical concept in the metaphysical sense. In my view, the unconscious is a psychological boundary-concept, which covers all those psychic contents or processes which are not conscious, i.e., not related to the ego in any perceptible way."[1]

Jung would agree that a baby has no awareness of an ego; it has to be developed, and that it is about the age of eight or nine before the child realizes "I am".[2] Likewise, Jacobi states: "At the beginning of life, he (the child) must fight his way from infancy, which is still wholly immersed in the collective unconscious, to a differentiation and definition of his ego."[3] The ego is defined by Jung as "A complex of representations which constitutes the centrum of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity."[4] "Ego" and "Consciousness" are almost synonymous terms in Jung's writings, but both are within the matrix of the Unconscious; as Frieda Fordham writes: "...the conscious aspect of the psyche might be compared to an island rising from the sea - we only see the part above the water, but a much vaster unknown realm spreads below, and this could be likened to the unconscious. The island is the ego, the knowing willing 'I', the centre of consciousness."[5]

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1. Jung, Psychological Types, p.613
2. Winnicott, whose life's work has been with children, as we have seen in Chapter III, put this very much earlier.
3. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.144
4. Jung, ibid., p.540. See also Wyss, p.228-9
5. Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.21

Bennet claims that Jung gave experimental proof both of Freud's theory of repression and of the fact of unconscious mental activity, through his word-association tests. "Jung was the first and probably only person to provide such proof."[1]

At first, Freud's theory of repression was a satisfying one to Jung, as it explained why the unconscious became unconscious, and showed that it consisted of only repressed materials.[2] However, as well as this personal repressed, unconscious material Jung claimed to find other material of an impersonal, universal nature, and this led him to postulate his well-known concept of the Collective Unconscious. This collective unconscious "lies below" the personal unconscious consisting of repressed material and belongs to mankind in general; the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution is claimed to be born anew in each individual, conveyed to him by the genes, and this is the collective unconscious.[3]

Jung also connects this collective unconscious with the instincts, by means of his concept of archetypes. In fact, both the repressed unconscious and the collective unconscious are similarly organized, the first consisting largely of complexes (a word now in current use in psychological terminology, but it owes its existence to Jung who introduced it.) The complex is a sort of "splinter psyche"; "...the complex has its ultimate

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1. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.34
2. ibid., p.62-3
3. Jacobi, p.34 quoting Jung, "The Structure of the Psyche, p.154

cause in the impossibility of affirming the whole of one's individual nature."[1] "Archetypes", into which the collective unconscious is organized, are described by Jacobi as "self portraits of the instincts."[2]

> "...the instincts (inborn, unlearned tendencies) form very close analogies to the archetypes - so close, in fact, that there is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves; in other words, they are patterns of instinctual behaviour. The hypothesis of the collective unconscious is therefore no more daring than to assume there are instincts."[3]

It is tempting to one with a Freudian background to reduce all Jung's terms to Freudian ones, regarding the archetypes as pictorial representations of Freudian instincts. But we meet here the danger of mixing models.

It has been suggested that the real reason behind the break between Freud and Jung was their differing concepts of the term "libido". Before Jung came to work with Freud, he had written a paper on Dementia Praecox (now called Schizophrenia) in which he refers to patients who have no "psychic energy" available, being totally withdrawn from the world. When he and Freud came

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1. Jacobi, ibid., p.38
2. Jacobi, ibid., p.43-4
   Note: The word "Archetype" was taken by Jung from the Corpus Hermeticum, where Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite is writing of the seal and the impressions or imprints which it is able to make. The term Ideae principles was used by St Augustine to denote stable forms, eternal and always the same, e.g., Plato's eternal ideas. Previously Jung had spoken of "primordial images", a phrase of his history professor at Basel, Jacob Burchhart.
   See Jacobi, p.39-40. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy,.83f
3. Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 9, Part 1,p.43-4 quoted by Bennet,p.66

together, Jung began to use Freud's term "libido" to cover that which he had meant by "psychic energy". Now Freud had always used "libido" basically as a sexual endowment, which could only be manifested in other ways, through the process of sublimation. For Freud, sexuality was fundamental, and libido was his expression of it; Jung, however, regarded general psychic energy as fundamental,using Freud's term to express it, which clearly altered its meaning.[1]

In his own definition of libido,[2] Jung states that it is synonymous with psychic energy; he also states that he does not regard it as a psychic force, nor does he hypostasize the concept of energy, but uses it as a concept denoting intensity or value. "Like the analogous term 'energy' in physics, 'libido' is employed as an abstraction expressing dynamic relations and based on a theoretical postulate which is confirmed in experience."[3] It is inferred, a hypothesis, and is not to be confused with any élan vital or general force.[4] One is not quite sure what Jung therefore actually means by this concept; at least one knows that it does not carry the Freudian meaning.

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1. See Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.167-8
   Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.17
   Vera van der Heydt, 'On Psychic Energy', Davidson Clinic Bulletin, No. 82 p.1f. Cf. Pfister, The Psychoanalytical Method, p.63 - for a description of Freudian sensuality as meaning the same as "Love", which reduces some of the differences between the two view-points.
2. Jung, Psychological Types, p.571-2
3. Jacobi, ibid., p.51
4. In this Grace Stuart in The Achievement of Personality is surely wrong in equating them. p.100-2

There are further differences which separate the Jungian from the Freudian. One is the use of the word "symbol" which in Jung is a very specialized one.[1] Freud used the term to describe something quite well-known though not recognized consciously; to Jung it represents something indeterminate of which we have no precise knowledge. J.A.C. Brown sees this usage as describing the partially known in terms of the totally unknown, the symbol no longer pointing from the general to the particular, but "from the particularlized symbol to the generalized idea in the Platonic sense of the word."[2] This concept of symbol enables the conscious mind to be united with the unconscious, so the Jungians claim. But to a Freudian, this is unacceptable.[3]

Another difference between the two is that Freud preferred to use causal concepts to explain his phenomena. Jung, on the other hand, used energic ones, where"the event is traced from the effect to the cause, on the assumption that energy forms the essential basis of changes in phenomena."[4] The use of the energic concept in place of the causal one meant a difference in psycho-

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1. See David Cox, Psychology and Symbolism in Myth and Symbol, p.51f. for a detailed explanation of Jungian symbolism.
2. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.44
3. Nigel Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p.77. "(Jungs) notion of 'symbolism' allowed him to interpret images from dreams and phantasies on the assumption that a given image always represents the same thing in the unconscious minds of different people.... This assumption that there is a universal symbolic glossary implies that our minds have inherited not only the trick of symbolising, but also the symbols themselves."
4. Hostie, Religion and the Psychology of Jung, p.27

therapeutic emphasis; Freudians look back to the past to find out "the cause"; Jungians , as has already been stated, look at the present and towards the future.[1] Jung, however, did not completely disregard the causal concepts, but used them along with the energic ones.

The concepts of psychic energy and of energic concepts to explain the psychic phenomena led Jung to postulate that there was a conservation of energy at work in the psyche, lying dormant in the unconscious. "...the energy charge of the unconscious increases in proportion as that of consciousness diminishes."[2] The mind to Jung is not partitioned; rather is it a Conscious/Unconscious unit,[3] in which a self-regulating "compensatory mechanism operates between the conscious and the unconscious,"[4] similar to the principle of compensation to be found working in the homeostatic mechanisms which impose a degree of self-regulation within the body.[5]

So far we have spoken mainly of the Unconscious in Jung's thought; it is now time to return to the ego-consciousness and its detailed analysis by Jung. In the first place, he postulated

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1. White, God and the Unconscious, p.168
2. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.54
3. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.106
4. Bennet, ibid., p.91
5. Nigel Walker in his paper 'Freud and Homeostasis' contended that this notion, which he found in Freud, anticipates the notion of cybernetics by a generation. Walker's article includes a detailed examination of the whole concept (British Journal of Philosophy and Science, Vol. 7, No.25, May 1956.)

the two fundamental types of human being, the two human attitudes, for which he is so well known - introversion and extraversion.[1] The differences between the two types are to be found in every summary of Jung's teachings.[2] But each of the two types can undergo sub-division. "My experience has taught me that individuals can be quite generally differentiated, not only by the universal differences of extraversion and introversion, but also according to individual basic psychological functions."[3] From this follow the four functions of consciousness: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition - each person's ego having a bias in one of these directions. F. Fordham describes the four functions as follows:-

> "Sensation, which is perception through our sense; thinking, which gives meaning and understanding; feeling, which weighs and values; and intuition, which tells us of future possibilities and gives us information of the atmosphere which surrounds all experience."[4]

She adds the following words of Jung as a footnote: "Intuition is perception via the unconscious."[5]

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1. This introversion - extraversion concept is one of the few concepts of depth psychology accepted by Eysenck, who has satisfied himself of its validity by experimental methods. See Fact and Fiction in Psychology, p.54f. Also Sense and Nonsense in Psychology.
   Bennet quotes Adler as an example of an introvert, and Freud of an extrovert, p.50
2. Jung, Modern Man in Search of His Soul, p.68
   Bennet, p.50f., Fordham, 29f., Jacobi, p.18
3. Jung, Psychological Types, p.13-14
4. Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.35
5. Fordham, ibid., p.35 footnote, quoting Jung, Psychological Types, in Collected Works, Vol. 6, p.568

Each of these four functions of consciousness can be further subdivided by their being introverted or extraverted. So there emerge eight different types.[1]

We may ask why Jung chose only four functions? E.A. Bennet is at pains to inform us that Jung has no special bias in favour of the number four.[2] We read, however, in Victor White: "A wit has said that what Freud did for sex, Jung has done for the number four."[3] Was Bennet replying to that "wit"? We shall find that when we come to consider Jung's religious writings that the number four has a great influence on his conclusions.

Having described the various functions of ego consciousness as postulated by Jung, we have to consider a further concept of his, namely that of the Persona. This is the part of the ego which comes nearest to the outside world, and forms a kind of cloak around, or shield to, the ego; it is a kind of compromise between the individual and society, hiding the true ego of the individual.[4] The word originates in the mask worn by actors in the Greek theatre to signify the role they are playing; perhaps therefore "role" would be a good description of persona.[5] Thus

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1. For the most elaborate description of these types on which most interpreters rely, see Jung, Psychological Types, p. 428f. and p.480f. They are also well described with illustrations by Jacobi, p.11-27
2. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.55
3. White, Soul and Psyche, p.95
4. See Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.26
   Drever, Dictionary of Psychology, p.203
   Bennet, ibid., p.115
   Fordham, ibid., p.47-8
5. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.48 speaks of the persona on "revealing and concealing the real self."

considered, it appears to be the outer "crust" of the ego similar to that described by Freud in the way in which the ego is formed on the id as a cortical layer. However, when Bennet considers it, he classifies it as one of the figures of the unconscious or archetypes.[1] David Cox draws attention to Jung's description of the persona as a grouping of conscious and unconscious components that are opposed to the non-ego and constitute the ego;[2] moreover Jung calls a chapter in his Two Essays, 'The Persona as a Segment of the Collective Psyche'.[3] From this we may conclude that there are unconscious elements in the persona, which is nevertheless part of the ego. This paradoxical situation is clearly reminiscent of Anna Freud's ego defence-mechanisms which form the unconscious part of the ego, and need careful analysing. A third similarity to the Freudian ego is found in this passage of Jacobi:-

> "...a properly functioning persona must take account of three factors; first, the ego ideal or wish image which every human being bears within him and on which he would like his nature and behaviour to be modelled: second, his particular environment's view of an individual 'after its own heart': and third, the physical and psychic contingencies which limit the realization of these ideals."[4]

This is very similar to a Freudian contention, that a properly functioning ego is the result of maintaining balanced relations

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1. Bennet, ibid., p.115
2. David Cox, Jung and St Paul, p.120
3. Jung, Two Essays in Analytical Psychology, Collected Edition, Vol.7
4. Jacobi, ibid., p.28

between the Id, the Super-ego and Reality.[1] Exact correspondence between the two systems is not possible; nevertheless, there are obvious similarities.

To Jung, the danger arises when a man identifies himself with his own persona, which means that he denies the rest of his personality, including his unconscious.[2]

Such is Jung's account of consciousness. It is necessary to continue the discussion about the compensatory relationship between consciousness and the unconscious; for example, with such statements as "where consciousness is extraverted, the unconscious is introverted,"[3] we are brought up against the fact of the "opposites". The task of psychotherapy is largely one of uniting these "opposites", of making the unconscious conscious, or of accepting unconscious factors into consciousness. Jungian analysts claim that there are two distinct stages in this process; first, a reductive technique is employed which aims at dissipating the repressed, personal unconscious and following this there is a synthetic technique whereby the patient learns to accept his collective unconscious. It is in this second part of analysis, that the Jungians contend to come upon the Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious.

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1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.154-5
   Cf. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.104 and 112.
   Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, p.64
2. For example as in Bennet, p.117 see H. Williams in Soundings, p.69f
3. Jacobi, ibid., p.19

One of these Archetypes which Jung uses a great deal to interpret the unconscious is The Shadow, sometimes employed to refer to everything outside consciousness, both personal and collective, and at other times, to refer to a factor in the personal unconscious, which stands for everything that is opposite to what our conscious mind stands for, for all the things we disapprove of, for everything our ego is not! Basically it consists of qualities which the ego cannot use and often denies, setting them aside as the ego develops. It is therefore similar to Fairbairn's Unconscious, which is produced by ego-splitting. The content of our shadow is revealed by our projections; the person we dislike violently represents an aspect of ourselves which we are disowning and fastening on to him, blaming him for our shadow. "Projections change the world into a replica of one's unknown face."[1] Jungians speak about the exposure of the shadow in a similar way to Freudians' speaking of the analysis of the defences of the ego; the ego has been painstakingly built up over against the rejected material, and to be aware of such knowledge is a threat to its structure. It appears that both schools of psychodynamics are speaking of the same phenomena but from a different view-point; theFreudians from the ego's side in the defence built up against the repressed unconscious; the Jungians from the side of the repressed unconscious itself, The Shadow.

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1. Jung,'The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,' Collected Works, Vol. 9, Park 1, p.8-9

The term therefore stands for the opposites which exist in our unconscious, i.e., opposites to the conscious ego.

Frieda Fordham states that a man's shadow is personified by a male, and a woman's by a female.[1] Jung also speaks of a complementary, rather than an opposed part of the psyche, which is different in sex to the individual - in the man, there is an Unconscious Anima, and in the woman an Animus. The Anima is the Unconscious feminine element in the male, as is the Animus the masculine element in the female." 'Every man has his own Eve within him', says a German proverb."[2] These figures arise after the shadow has been encountered and represent the second stage of individuation. At an even deeper stage one encounters other archetypal figures such as "The Wise Old Man", in a male patient's unconscious, and the "Deep Earth Mother" in a female's; the figures emerge after the anima or animus has been dissolved.

It is in these last two sets of Archetypes that Jung's theories become speculative; up to this point his thinking is comprehensible. For example, his constant stressing of the over-valuation of consciousness, and the need for consciousness to be able to accept the unconscious, the two being integrated in a union of opposites are perfectly significant concepts and have great therapeutic value. It is when Jung seeks to buttress his arguments by applying his great knowledge of Alchemy and Chinese

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1. Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.52
2. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.111

Philosophy, and claiming that, as in nature, so the opposites seek one another in the Archetype of Unity, that one can become quite lost.[1]

The final stage and goal of psychotherapy is that of the unity which emerges in the individual's psyche as a result of a successful analysis: this is called by Jung "Individuation." He describes the term as, "The process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual', that is a separate, individual unity or 'whole'."[2] When this happens a person becomes his full self; individuation is not achieved by conscious willing, for the ego no longer takes control of his life, but TheSelf, which is "a supraordinate totality embracing the Conscious and the Unconscious."[3] In the same paper, Jung speaks of the "self" as "an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves", and as "an unconscious pre-figuration of the ego."[4] The ego is assimilated in this wider personality, The Self, which unites consciousness and both the repressed and collective unconscious as well. As a result, one has a feeling of oneness within, and a reconciliation to life as it is, without.[5] This is because the opposites are united and are transformed into a third term or higher synthesis.

One regards the above paragraph as a statement which is

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1. SeeDavid Cox, Jung and St Paul, p.128 (quoting Jung Alchemy, p.30) Jung, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, p.275
2. Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 9, Part 1.
3. Jung, 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass', Collected Works, Vol. 11, p.273
4. ibid., p.259
5. Fordham, ibid., p.63

completely comprehensible. It is when Jung goes on to speak of a uniting symbol (using the word in his particular sense) of a Mandala, that again one loses touch. The Mandala is a symbol of a unified self which emerges naturally at the conclusion of a successful individuation, representing "the primal order of the total psyche."[1] A Mandala is a symmetrical religious symbol to be found in India, China and Tibet; it is usually a circle, mathematically divided into four, illuminated with pictures and elaborate decorations. Jung regards these as symbols of an integrated self, which forms the foundation of our psychic being. As we have stated, patients undergoing a Jungian analysis sometimes paint or construct a mandala, which is regarded by both analyst and patient as a sign of Individuation. One has yet to hear of Freudian patients doing this!

Jung claims more for the Mandala, and what it signifies, however, than even this. The Mandala is not only the uniting symbol and archetype of the self, but it is the imago-dei in man. We have now arrived at the frontier between psychology and religion. But Jung states his position clearly, or so it seems. He states that psychology must guard against over-stepping its proper boundaries by metaphysical assertions, and that when he speaks of the Mandala as the imago-dei he is speaking psychologically and not metaphysically.[2] In the East, God is supposed

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1. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.134
2. See Cox's discussions: Jung and St Paul, p.300-309

to lie behind the Mandala; therefore it is a symbol of God. Its function is to unify, both good and evil, darkness and light, "Ying and Yang". As all sides of the personality must be brought into a unified "self", so must all aspects be brought into the symbol of God. The idea of the inclusion of an evil component in the nature of theGodhead, has been discussed by all Jungian theologians (e.g., Victor White, Cox, and Philp). However, we shall have to return to this later, for the Mandala is a frontier concept for Jung, when he comes to consider the Doctrine of the Trinity and Jung's transforming it into a Quaternity. Our task now is to sum up our conclusions and evaluations on Jung's structure of the psyche.

I begin by considering a recent statement by a Jungian analyst, Baroness Vera von der Heydt who makes the claim that it was after Jung had expressed his own views publicly in his book The Psychology of the Unconscious thereby disagreeing with

> "a revered father-figure, that his libido flowed freely, and his own genius became apparent. This cutting of the umbilical cord which ties fathers and sons, and which has to be done by the son and suffered by the father, is an archetypal event (my italics)....Freud and Jung, both men, were caught up in an archetypal situation (also my italics); but Jung succeeded in liberating himself from the incestuous tie."[1]

She further states:

> "Archetypes are nodal points in the psychic make-up they can never be known directly, only indirectly

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1. von der Heydt, 'On Psychic Energy', The Davidson Clinic Bulletin, No. 82, p.3

> through their effects. Personified in outer reality they are projected onto people or things; in the inner world they emerge in dream or phantasy as people, animals or things. Archetypes represent the spirit in man, and the energy flowing between spirit and instinct gives rise to psychic processes."[1]

I have chosen this as a typical Jungian statement, which both illustrates the confusion that exists when ambiguous terms are used like spirit, instinct and energy altogether, but also the use of the term "archetype" to explain a phenomenon which can be explained in other terms. To the Freudian, the situation is understandable as a classical expression of the Oedipus Complex, which owes its origin to the environment, to the fact that one, as a child, usually has a father and a mother towards whom one has a variety of feelings. One therefore agrees with J.A.C. Brown when he argues that we have no need to describe such phenomena in terms of archetypes, when we already have sufficient information to describe it adequately from the facts we already know, namely that a child has an earthly father and a mother. He takes Victor White to task for speaking of "Archetypal Father", "Great Mother of All Living" and the "Puer Aeternus" as but another example of the Jungian practice of describing "the partly known in terms of the wholly unknown."[2]

Turning to the question of the Collective Unconscious common to all humanity, Brown mentions Freud's partial recognition of the idea of an archaic heritage and memory traces of experiences

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1. von der Heydt, ibid., p.3
2. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.44-5

of former generations, and adds that Freud did not believe that it played any part in the dynamics of the mind,[1] and made no use of the concept in psychotherapy. Quoting Geza Róheim in support of his argument, Brown contends that there is "the largely biological level of shared experiences universal to all mankind" to which the analyst comes closer the deeper he probes, but this could represent in a pictorial fashion the reaction to universal experiences of the earliest days, of being born of a woman, being dependent and having to be fed, and of coming face to face with grown-up adults towards whom the child has the variety of feelings, ambivalent or polyvalent. It is these feelings, not the Archetypes as BBaroness von der Heydt contends, that "in the inner world...emerge in dream or phantasy as people, animals or things." Melanie Klein has come closest in demonstrating their meaning without recourse to a concept like the Collective Unconscious, explaining them solely on the "experiences universal to all mankind." The so-called Collective Unconscious, which Jung contends appears in myths, which are universally found in various cultures, and in symbols which keep recurring and in phantasies of psychotic patients, can be explained as universal pictorial representations of universally shared human experience.

But this does not dispose of the Collective Unconscious for Jung, as we have shown, ties it up with the instincts, which are hereditary, as against experience which is environmental.

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1. I do not think this is altogether correct. See Part II, A, regarding Freud and his Totem and Taboo myth.

For Freudians, id and instincts are largely synonymous terms; phantasy being the mental expression of instinctual needs, the operating link between biological id impulses and the mechanisms of the ego, they are inferred. Is this not an alternative description of the same phenomena to that which Jung calls, more poetically, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious"? They seem to be similar, and both, moreover, are inferred from phenomena, and are largely intuitive and speculative.

As with the Existentialist descriptions, we are back again at choosing whatever concepts are the most significant to us; again the choice is a subjective one. Jung in his writings gives us much wisdom, and I personally find his work at its best when he is least speculative and when he employs a limited intuition on the basis of facts. As an example, I would quote an answer which Jung gave to Philp regarding Jung's seemingly depreciating consciousness through an over-evaluation of the unconscious:

> "The Unconscious is neutral rather like nature. If it is destructive on one side, it is constructive on the other. It is the source of all sorts of evils and also on the other hand, the motherground of all divine experience, and - paradoxically as it may sound - it has brought forth and brings forth consciousness."[1]

It is the further reaches of his conceptual thinking that one finds difficult to understand.

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1. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, p.12
   Cf. Frieda Fordham p.27-8, "The Unconscious therefore, in Jung's view, is not merely a cellar where man dumps his rubbish, but the source of consciousness of the creative and destructive spirit of mankind."

CHAPTER VII

WHAT IS PSYCHODYNAMIC STRUCTURE?

So far in this enquiry, we have outlined several theories of psychodynamic structure which have evolved as the result of psychotherapeutic practice. From these we are able to choose as follows:-

1. The original Freudian Theory of Ego, Id and Super-ego, as used by present day Freudians, following the theoretical developments of Melanie Klein.

2. The structural theory of Fairbairn following his re-systematization of Freud's work after Klein's object-relations theory, into his six different component parts.

3. The theories of Jung, with the Conscious classified into four functions and two types, and the Unconscious into Repressed Unconscious and Collective Unconscious, which is composed of other factors, such as Archetypes.

4. The Existentialist "protest" against structural models, where the Existentialia and ontology take the place of structural entities. This is a non-structural model.

However, it is one thing describing these schemes as outlined by their exponents; we need to proceed to ask, what are they? What is their logical status and their scientific status? While outlining each of these theories, we have seen how they have interpretative value to their adherents who use them in psycho-

therapeutic practice. They can become valid also to a reader if they "strike chords" in his own experience. But is the fact of striking chords not a too subjective criterion of judgement? It does not afford sufficient proof of the scientific status which Freud and others claimed for their work.

We have already considered the criticisms of Freud's scientific claims made by Fairbairn and the Existentialists, who regard Freud's metapsychology as a typical product of nineteenth century science. As Nigel Walker asserts, it is "an attempt at a reconciliation between his technique and his scientific beliefs."[1] To be faithful to the traditional practices of his time, Walker asserts, he had to construct categories into which his data could be placed with the result that the unique quality of any phenomena was lost when by objectification and classification they were subsumed under universal hypotheses and laws. Freud had to adopt this procedure in order to conform to the scientific expectations of his time. "His desire was always to find, in emergence, sameness; in the dynamic, the static; in the present, latent pasts."[2] To the Existentialist, this procedure amounted to destroying man's true nature by fitting him into categories and mutilating the reality of his "being-in-the-world". Laing claims that Freud's theorizing in his own special language was limited by a mechanistic system of thought; however, he also

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1. Nigel Walker, The Freudian Unconscious, (Thesis) para.7
2. Philip Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.216

claimed that the existentialist approach is scientific in the sense that it is "a form of knowledge adequate to its subject."[1] Fairbairn also claims that his theory of object relations and dynamic structure is, for scientific reasons, closer to the facts; but elsewhere he claims that the analyst need not be a scientist, but rather a psychotherapist, because he is not emotionally detached from his patient.

It is clear that there is confusion over the word "scientific", its being used in different senses. To claim, as Laing does, that a system is scientific and then to use vague words like "being" is surely laying oneself open to criticism like that which Szasz made of the Existentialists.[2]

The scientific status of psychoanalysis and the other depth psychologies is a subject of great controversy, and has engaged the minds of many. Freud has received most of the criticisms, largely because his work still stands as representative for this whole movement, and because of the claims which he made. If the Existentialists regard him as being inappropriately scientific in the nineteenth century sense, Eysenck and some experimental

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1. Laing in New Society, No.105, p.14. See also Chapter 5, p.160 where we saw that they use the word "scientific" not in the sense of the natural sciences, but phenomenologically. It is interesting that a similar definition of scientific has been given by Prof. Torrance. Speaking as a Barthian theologian he says that science is "the kind of knowledge we get when we seek to know something strictly in accordance with its own nature and activity", and that each science is bound to its own field because of its chosen object. Central article in The Scotsman, February 10,1964
2. See Chapter 5. Criticisms (a).

psychologists claim that he is not scientific at all!

It is not necessary to go into Eysenck's arguments at length, as they are so well known and so much has been written about them. His three well-known Pelican books claim to take their stand on an objective psychology, experimentally based and capable of being factorized statistically; he sets Freud against this absolute standard, and naturally, he falls short. In his first Pelican book, Uses and Abuses of Psychology, whilst he criticised Freud considerably, he did agree that Freud was offering insights which helped to understand people, while Eysenck himself was offering a psychology which explained behaviour. They were concerned with different spheres, different approaches to the study of man.[1] But Eysenck has not left the matter there; more and more has he been seeking to discredit Freud for not providing experimentally testable hypotheses,[2] and providing instead "anecdotal evidence collected in a relatively haphazard manner from individual case histories."[3] It must be admitted that by using the word "scientific" Freud and other depth psychologists lay themselves open to this kind of criticism; but one must also admit that at times, one cannot avoid being impressed

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1. See chapter on psychoanalysis in Uses and Abuses of Psychology where he speaks of psychotherapy not as a substitute, but as an adjunct to his more fundamental methods. p.219
2. Sense and Nonsense in Psychology, p.262
3. Fact and Fiction in Psychology, p.106

by the almost over-determined desire of some of Freud's critics to denigrate his work.[1] Guntrip mentions the emotional hostility which has been displayed by the critics towards psychoanalysis since the earliest days,[2] and states that Eysenck himself seems stuck fast in the "natural science" philosophy of the last century.[3]

Another critic of Freud who writes extensively about him is Brian A. Farrell. He questions the validity of the therapeutic technique because of lack of objective criteria, and claims that psychoanalysis asks us to assume the validity of the very technique whose validity we are investigating, which is to beg the question.[4] Analysts' statements are transforming statements[5] so their interpretations have no truth criteria. In his introduction to Freud's Leonardo,Farrell says that "...the analyst will see

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1. This has been well put in a critical notice by Dr. Alistair Forrest in The British Journal of Medical Psychology (1965) 38, 181. Reviewing two books on conditioning therapy, he writes: "One is impressed by the emotional need exhibited by many of these authors to denigrate Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis." He speaks of one section reading "more like a political smear than a critical comment." (p.181) Forrest also writes: "These books have all the appearance of being scientific, but none of the appearances of being humane, and there is a feeling all the time in reading these different papers that the subjects are rats and not human beings." (p.184)
   Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind, p.141-176, and Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, p.166f for two further criticisms.
2. Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind, p.159
3. ibid., p.172
4. Farrell, 'The Criteria for Psychoanalytic Interpretation', The Aristotelean Society Supplementary Volume, XXXVI, 1962 p.90.
5. ibid., p.97

in the material the sort of thing he is on the look out for."[1] Analysts are "so maimed psychologically by their training as to be incapable of and/or interested in, investigating the truth of their theory."[2] So he regards psychoanalysis as not so much a tool of observation and discovery, but as a technique of human transformation, like religious conversion and brain washing,[3] and asserts that "it will be difficult to bring analysis satisfactorily within the world of medicine, or the universities, or research institutes or the like, as long as strong suspicions remain that their method of training resembles techniques of indoctrination rather than those of education."[4] He indulges further in naming psychoanalysts as queer and insecure fish "whom society cannot house, and who do not know themselves where they belong."[5]

This is emotive language, over-determined rather than reasonable. Farrell also is very critical of Freud's metapsychological structure; he speaks of it as topographical mystifying talk, but says that we cannot object to psychoanalysis because it uses a model; other sciences do the same. But the model of psychoanalysis is a bad model which crumbles under scrutiny since it is so crude and naive. He compares it more to myth, and quotes

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1. In Freud, Leonardo, Introduction p.77 (Pelican edition).
2. In New Society, No. 38, p.12, column 1.
3. In New Society, No. 39, p.12, column 2
4. ibid. Se also Introduction to Leonardo, p.74
5. ibid.

Karl Popper in support.[1] However, Farrell says that to imply that this unscientific theory is irrational is to perpetuate a howler, adding that this may be embedded in some of Eysenck's criticisms of psychoanalysis. But he admits that Freud may nevertheless have made important discoveries (Farrell actually says "on to something") because psychoanalysis explains sets of phenomena that it was not originally designed to explain.

Bearing in mind the fact that many of these quotations come from a popular journal, one cannot fail to notice the emotive tone of the writing.

The idea that science is an objective discipline conforming to a causal, deterministic scheme, is no longer accepted for what it used to be. In the digression we made in Chapter V, p.160 we saw that strict Cartesian principles of subject and object could no longer be held. "Science has shifted its ground, and is beginning to be more interested in the subjective determinants of the patterns which scientists project upon the world."[2] Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle that observation alters the behaviour of atoms is but one example. Science also uses assumptions and presuppositions which are unchecked; they are regarded as valid

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1. Karl S. Popper, 'Philosophy of Science', A personal report in British Philosophy in the Mid Century, edited by C.A. Mace. p.161-2. "And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Superego and the Id no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories from the Olympus. These theories describe some facts but in the manner of myths. They contain most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form."
2. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.19

as they are able to inform the scientist about the subject in which he makes his enquiry. They are tools which begin their life as subjective assumptions or concepts in the mind of the scientist; they are not entities, e.g., the wave or particle mechanics of light. Many writers have pointed to the fact of personal participation in scientific endeavour.[1] Macmurray speaks of the so-called scientific view as often "the uncritical response to the success of science in its own field, which response is emotional."[2] As we have already mentioned, he maintained that the physical sciences came first because the material world is less highly charged with emotion than the field of organic and personal life.[3] All this means that the observer's participation can no longer be ruled out. Although, of course, whilst every attempt is made in experiments to exclude the influence of the experimenter, his part is acknowledged as a factor in the procedure. Rieff therefore writes:-

> "And if determinism and the hope of perfect prediction must be qualified in physics, with all the precision of its quantitative data, how much more likely are they to prove impossible in the case of the physician observing the intangibles dredged up by human self-scrutiny."[4]

It is true that Freud, whilst maintaining the scientific status of Psychoanalysis, never included one fundamental claim of modern

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1. Among them, Polanyi in Personal Knowledge, and Prof. John Macmurray in The Boundaries of Science.
2. Macmurray, The Boundaries of Science, p.21
3. ibid., p.56
4. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.115. Cf. pp.26 & 28

science, namely the power of prediction. It is retrospective, not predictive.[1] The power of prediction seems to be applicable or assumed to be applicable in the "central" field of scientific studies, (although David Hume has shown that it cannot logically be taken for granted or assumed to be operative in the future as it has appeared to be in the past.) The more impersonal the phenomena studied, the more reliably "objective" will be the result in that predictions can be assumed to be made; but the more we approach human behaviour on the one hand, and the atomic physics on the other, the less do these strict criteria apply.[2]

Facts which emerge, however, from the study of science today are that it cannot be considered as existing apart from man, that a large part is played by man's insight, intuition and imagination, and without these there would be no science at all; moreover, this participation cannot be excluded from consideration in the results of scientific endeavour.

One further matter is clear, however, namely that psychoanalysis cannot meet the rigid standards of scientific theory;[3] it "is not, and probably never can be, an exact science."[4] What is it then? We could return to the admission which Eysenck made that it is a humane study offering insight and understanding to people, regarding the meaning of certain phenomena about themselves

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1. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of the Moralist, p.117
2. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.44 and Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, p.107
3. Rieff, ibid., p.26
4. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.19

whereas the experimental approach is one which explains how people behave. So here we have two different disciplines. But as they concern the same subject matter, namely human beings, it is natural that man should strive after unity and integration. The scientific attitude which demands correct experimental evidence has not been dismissed out of hand by all psychoanalytical adherents, for in America and elsewhere there is now a serious study of psychoanalytical principles by experimental methods. These moves are to be welcomed, for it would not be desirable, for the sake of ultimate truth, if two disciplines dealing with the same basic phenomenon should keep apart from each other, remaining within their respective "charmed circles". In this enquiry we have maintained that an openness between disciplines is desirable; that psychology should not cut itself off from biology on the one hand, or that theology should not cut itself off from psychology on the other. How much more is this valid when dealing with two studies both called by the same name, psychology, and both dealing with the same phenomenon.

I would agree with Ernst Kris, that experimental verification of psychoanalytical principles is necessary, not so much to keep psychoanalysis respectable as to establish unity in the field of psychology.[1] He even speaks of a movement of "Experimental Psychoanalysis" by which many of the largely intuitive propositions of psychoanalytical theory are moving into the field

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1. Kris, 'Psychoanalytical Propositions', Psychological Theory, ed. Marx, p.341

of commonsense psychology. Yet Kris is doubtful whether any experimental method will ever be able to provide scientific confirmation of all the psychoanalytical propositions. One is always up against "the elusive nature of the subject matter."[1]

One who has engaged in "experimental psychoanalysis" is Robert S. Sears, who is known primarily for his learning theories. He admits that much of the behaviour with whichFreud dealt is not amenable to the methods of experimental psychology; we should not, however, continue to rest content with independent kinds of concepts, those of academic psychology and those of psychoanalysis, but that, through experimentation, the latter's concepts can be resystematized in terms of those of the former.[2] Sears concludes that psychoanalysis, by the criteria of the physical sciences, is not a good science, but that its value lies in the fact that it deals with many other things that science ignores. Its methods and techniques do not permit repetition of observation, and all these are "tinctured to an unknown degree

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1. Kris, ibid., p.337
2. Sears, Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytical Concepts. He quotes experiments done on several aspects of Freud's work, e.g., infant sexuality, in which he claims that Freud was mistaken in deducing cultural universals. He also quotes an experimental study of object-choice, based on questionnaires; but could not Freud have argued that this procedure only dealt with conscious material, while Freud himself was dealing with unconscious material available only in the analytical session; and here we depart from objective data required for experimental work and enter the more subjective field.

with the observer's own suggestions."[1] Whilst the procedure may be beneficial for the purposes of therapy, it fails to uncover the kind of psychological facts that are required for objective evaluation.

The conclusion of the experimental psychologist's criticism of psychoanalysis seems to be polarized in a choice whether one remains strictly "scientific" in a limited field, dealing with those aspects of human beings which are amenable to experimental psychology, or departs from the strict canons of science in order to cover the total field of human phenomena. Here we are presented with a choice of adhering strictly to either the method or the problem. The Existentialist by his phenomenological approach is able to concentrate on the problem, the encounter, and forget all about scientific theories and dynamic structures and the like, and although this method is called scientific by Laing, it is clearly a use of the word different from that employed in the physical sciences. But if "scientific" means only to be interested in those aspects of human behaviour which can be analysed statistically, this does involve a severe limitation within a very restricted range of endeavour, outside of which one cannot depart. It must disregard such human phenomena as dreams, inner beliefs of mankind available only through introspection, which is as much a part of human activity as those selected by the experimental psychologists for their study.

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1. Sears, ob.cit. p.133

Ian T. Ramsey speaks of philosophers, who in earlier days, allowed objects to have shapes but not really "colour", because they maintained that there is a mathematical treatment for shape in geometry, but none for colour; so they concluded that colours do not really exist. Ramsey regards them as "silly" in the learned philosophical sense.[1] To understand all aspects of human life, the subjective must be included; it is "silly" to exclude it. The attempt therefore to find unity in the field of all psychological disciplines is to be commended, and the search for invariants must go on. Nevertheless, it is logically impossible to include in the study which claims to be objective, that which is by nature subjective in character, and cannot be altered. The matter is well put by Storr:-

> "In their efforts to be scientific and to restrict what they have to say about human nature only to such facts as can be proved by experiment, the academic psychologists have been forced to omit so much of what is obviously important about human beings that to many people their findings appear sterile. But even the experiments of the most laboratory-minded psychologist rest upon unproved hypotheses, and are bound to do so; and whereas the laboratory worker is free to restrict himself to limited aspects of human nature, the psychotherapist must deal with the whole man, and may have to work with hypotheses which are not only unproved but probably unprovable.[2]

Therefore the meta-psychology of Freud, and the other theories of psychodynamic structure may be, as we suggested in the Introduction to this enquiry, "not only unproved", but "unprovable"

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1. Ramsey, Science and Religion, p.35
2. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.13

hypotheses, constructed by man.

Nowadays psychoanalysts are not so keen to press the claim that their discipline is a "science". In the recent book of essays Psychoanalysis Observed, Charles Rycroft, himself a psychoanalyst writes:

> "What Freud did here was not to explain the patient's choice causally but to understand it and give it meaning, and the procedure he engaged in was not the scientific one of elucidating causes but the semantic one of making sense of it. It can indeed be argued that much of Freud's work was really semantic, and that he made a revolutionary discovery in semantics, viz. that neurotic symptoms are meaningfully disguised communications, but that owing to his scientific training and allegiance, he formulated his findings in the conceptual framework of the physical sciences."[1]

> "To my mind, one of the merits of the semantic view of analysis is that it completely undercuts the Eysenck-Psychoanalysis controversy by showing that both parties are not only, as Eysenck himself has said, arguing from different premisses, but from the wrong premisses.[2]

This view is very near to that which Eysenck first held; actually Rycroft's statement comes at the conclusion of a long debate, in which mainly philosophers have taken part. Stephen Toulmin[3] claims that the kernel of Freud's discovery is the introduction of a technique in which the psychotherapist begins by studying the motives for, rather than the causes of neurotic behaviour. It appears that the trouble over psychoanalysis has been that we have thought too much of it on the analogy of the natural sciences where causal explanations are the custom. Antony Flew

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1. Psychoanalysis Observed, p.14
2. ibid., p.15
3. 'The Logical Status of Psychoanalysis'. Chapter 6, 'Logic, Psychoanalysis and Morals, in Philosophy and Analysis, ed. Margaret MacDonald, p.137f.

following Toulmin claims that in practice Freud was concerned primarily with the motives for neurotic behaviour, whereas when he generalized or theorized about his work, it could be thought that he was dealing with something quite different, namely the alleged efficient causes of such behaviour.[1] Flew points out that when Freud is close to a case he talks of finding the motives or purposes of obsessive acts, or of ways of interpreting their meaning; but when he starts to generalize and speak theoretically, he writes "as if he had inferred the existence of something concealed, as if he had discovered the unconscious mind 'in a way' as Mr Toulmin has it, 'strictly comparable to Columbus' discovery of America...'"[2] Flew therefore says that psychoanalysis is not a rival explanation to neurology and physiology, but provides an altogether different kind of explanation in terms of motives, purposes and intentions and not causes. Toulmin adds to the discussion on his and Flew's paper that what they are concerned with is the divergence between Freud's case reports and metapsychology, which has given rise to many philosophical misunderstandings.

On a similar line of criticism, Nigel Walker[3] points out that Freud rarely used straightfoward descriptive language to describe his mental phenomena, but that most of his statements,

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1. ibid.
   Flew on 'Psychoanalytic Explanation,' p.139f.
2. ibid., p.140
3. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh University, The Freudian Unconscious.

even the very general ones are about his own model.[1] Perhaps one can find a reason for this; when writing his Studies in Hysteria, Freud apologized because his cases read so much like novels, that "one might say they lack the serious stamp of science."[2] His later works sought to rectify his self-accusations of being unscientific by his statements being in terms of his model. Walker will not agree that Freud's psychic entities were largely metaphors to help patients to visualize how their minds functioned; they are more like bodies which interact according to laws that closely resemble physical laws,[3] i.e., they are cast in a scientific "mould".

Walker follows Toulmin in The Philosophy of Science that in present day science there are two kinds of statements to be found, either descriptive, based on observations, or explanatory.[4] The former, Toulmin argued are to be found in "natural history statements", the latter in physics. Walker maintains, as do Toulmin and Alastair MacIntyre[5] that psychoanalytical statements are descriptive statements and should not be mistaken for explanatory laws. Freud's case reports are descriptive but his metapsychology is explanatory, and it is in this that we find the determinism by which motives and reasons are converted into

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1. ibid., para 135
2. Quoted by Rieff, p.9 (ref. to Freud SE II p.160)
3. Walker, Thesis, para 176. Cf. Rieff p.20-21
4. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p.6-7
5. A. MacIntyre, Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volume XXIX, 1955, p.43f. See also his monograph The Unconscious, Chap.3

causes. Walker concluded that The Unconscious, which is essentially a descriptive term has become "a piece of advice for the would-be explanatory psychologist."[1] It may have a facilitating role in psychotherapy, but it is not a logically essential one.[2] Walker also distinguishes between science and techniques, and points out that many professions call themselves sciences, when they are in fact techniques using sciences.[3] Psychotherapy is not even a technique, but a sub-technique; it is "in itself nothing more than a semantic group of remedial techniques for treating psychogenic disorders."[4] This brings us back to Rycroft's statement.

Another writer who has emphasised the difference between description and explanation in Freud's work is A.C. MacIntyre, who in his book The Unconscious argues that both Freud's psychoanalytical techniques and his doctrines are theoretical and explanatory rather than descriptive. Both technique and theory are all made to interlock with the central concept of the Unconscious (used as a noun, not as an adjective); they are all explicable in terms of one another, therefore one is faced with a closed system. All kinds of behaviour are explained by the Unconscious[5] so that we do not have descriptions of reality, rather they are always re-presented in terms of Freud's own

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1. Walker, Thesis, para 311
2. ibid., para 356
3. ibid., para 336
4. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p.166
5. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p.16

model.[1]

MacIntyre maintains that although Freud himself abandoned the neurological explanation of the mind quite early in his studies, he nevertheless "preserved the view of the mind as a piece of machinery and merely wrote up in psychological terms what had been originally intended as neurological theory." MacIntyre quotes the phrase of James Strachey: this "highly complicated and extraordinary ingenious working model of the mind as a piece of neurological machinery."[2] A scheme of explanation derived from neurology is brought to the psychological phenomena with which Freud is occupied.[3] Following the above writers, MacIntyre regards the Unconscious as used by Freud not only as a descriptive term, but as an explanatory concept.[4] Having dealt at length with the difference between describing and explaining, MacIntyre suggests that "an essential part of Freud's achievement lies not in his explanation of abnormal behaviour but in his re-description of such behaviour."[5] He therefore follows Wittgenstein in that "what Freud has done was to give not an explanation, but a 'wonderful representation of facts'."[6]

MacIntyre sums up Freud's achievement as follows:-

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1. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p.18-19
2. ibid., p.22
3. ibid., p.23
4. ibid., p.49
5. ibid., p.63
6. ibid., p.73

> "If I am right, then Freud's indispensible terms are 'unconscious' and 'repression' used descriptively; except in so far as illuminating descriptions may count as a kind of explanation, their place as explanatory terms is highly dubious. That Freud used them in this dubious way is not surprising. All his theoretical work has a kind of creative untidiness about it. He never presents us with a finished structure but with the far more exciting prospect of working through a number of possible ways of talking and thinking. One result of this is that his conceptual errors and unclarities are usually far more interesting and suggestive than the careful precision with which so many writers on psychology equip themselves only to find that the data of human behaviour and experience are far richer than the conceptual framework into which they want to see the data forced.[1]

Similar criticisms to those already examined are to be found in the paper of H.J.H. Home called The Concept of Mind. Mr Home trained as a psychoanalyst, but is dissatisfied with the language and concepts of his discipline. He complains that very often psychoanalysts present their cases in the language of "the literature", i.e., in the terms of Freud's own model, which he compares to a practice in religious writings or in Communist theory. To speak in such terms as "the level of libidinal cathexes of the self" is meaningless as is much else of the language of Freudian metapsychology, and the trouble lies in a lack of clarity in the kind of matter being discussed. Freud's basic discovery, Home argues, was that the symptom had meaning, but because Freud used mechanistic medical terms, the symptom came

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1. ibid., p.79. MacIntyre, however, makes a similar remark about R.D. Laing. "Perhaps Laing's confusions are not too high a price to pay for his insights." The Observer, January 29, 1967 reviewing Laing, The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise.

to be regarded as a fact, and a fact as the product of causes:

> "In discovering that the symptom had meaning and basing his treatment on this hypothesis, Freud took the Psycho-analytic study of neurosis out of the world of science into the world of the Humanities, because a meaning is not the product of causes but the creation of a subject." [1]

In short, science deals with causes, the Humanities with reasons and motives. We have these two different kinds of thinking, and they are both appropriate when correctly applied. If either mode of thought is inappropriately applied, we have the result in the production of meaningless theories. Home criticises Marx for creating a science of history, and for using such nouns as Feudalism, Capitalism and Communism as if they stood for actual objective events. Marx pointed out that there were unconscious determinants of historical events in much the same way as Freud did about the unconscious determinants of behaviour. Home regards that Marx's mistake was to "treat History, which is an artifact of man, as if it were a fact, as if the behaviour of people could be accounted for solely as a direct consequence of causes." He sees Freud having fallen into a similar fallacy when he proposed his instinct theory and his theory of the Mind in terms of id, ego and super-ego. For neither history, nor the Mind is a fact or event such as scientific method can investigate.

Home argues that if we speak about the mind as if it were a thing, we speak metaphorically; but if we forget that we are

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1. J. Home, 'The Concept of Mind', International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1966, 47 p.42-49

using a metaphor and speak literally about the mind as a thing, we have created, according to Home, a metaphysical fact. Now metaphysics helps to impose an order on data, but unlike real facts, the meaning of the metaphysical terms can change with use or with some new experience. Home points to a parallel in the early Christian Church and its difficulties with heresy in the days when doctrine was being defined.

Home then argues that as meaning is the function of a spontaneous living subject, which is known to us through identification, it cannot be investigated by the scientific method as it only applies to a dead object or to an object perceived as dead. But, one asks, what of biology? Is Mr Home not pressing his case too far? What he is stressing is the fact that psychoanalysis speaks in clinical practice of a free association and of a spontaneous subject, and on the other hand, "it reifies the concept of Mind and elaborates a scientific type theory in terms of causes. To reify is to deify...." The result of reification is the dead language of metapsychology. Freud set psychoanalysis in a scientific framework without asking whether it was appropriate or not; Home argues that to do justice to the concept of a spontaneous subject, an unscientific logical framework is required.

We have considered the work of the above writers in some detail, as their contributions lie behind and lead up to the position of Rycroft, with whose quotation we began this section. We could summarize their arguments as follows:-

Psychoanalysis should be considered along with the Humanities and not with the Sciences, for its concern is with meaning and understanding, not with causes; i.e., the symptom has meaning and is not to be considered as a product of causes. The nature of psychoanalysis is semantic and not deterministic,[1] for it deals with reasons and motives behind the symptom, the symptom being a disguised way of communicating these, rather than being caused by determinants in an iron chain of necessity. Mr Home regarded the concept of mind as the meaning of behaviour preferring this to any metaphysical expression. Therefore psychoanalysis is essentially descriptive in nature (as Freud showed when he was giving case reports which read like novels), and not explanatory (as Freud tried to be when speaking of all phenomena in terms of his model, thereby "divesting them of their phenomenality").

Some of the above criticisms of psychoanalysis we have already encountered. Boss, for example, drew attention to the two languages of Freud - the "novel" language, and the "model" language, the former displaying human sympathy and understanding, the latter Freud's desire to be "scientific".[2] Jung, early on in his relations with Freud dissented from the causal scheme of explanation because creativity could not be explained by it.[3] Jung, however, did not abandon the causal concept altogether; he used it along with his energic principles.

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1. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p.166
2. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p.65 (see above Chapters V and VI.)
3. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.63-5

In Mr Home's paper one can discern the inhibition concerning metaphysics which has become a feature of modern philosophy.[1] One can appreciate his concern over the mis-use of metaphysics and his timely warning against the creation of "metaphysical facts" by the employment of a multiplicity of theoretical terms, which could be regarded as additional to empirical data. Metaphysical terms and empirical data differ in logical status and therefore cannot be used together in the hope of making a meaningful sentence or statement. They can be used in place of data, but not in addition to data or alongside of. Data are always fundamental, but this does not exclude the use of metaphysics for the purpose of bringing some order into the data, as we shall hope to show.

Mr Home's desire to preserve the concept of a spontaneous-subject-concerned-with-motives rather than a subject who is a victim of causes, is a laudable one; for "motives" implies responsibility, "causes" implies determinism. Man would always prefer to believe that he is a free spontaneous agent, rather than a plaything, resulting from deterministic causation. There is, however, a paradox in the question of freewill in the sense that the person who is most free is the person who knows how much his conduct and behaviour patterns are motivated by "Unconscious" or previously unrecognised factors. The more he is able to come to terms with this aspect of himself, the greater

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1. As for example A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Chapter I.

will be his ability to make conscious choices in matters of behaviour. Of this paradox in Freud, Alastair MacIntyre writes:-

> "Freud is so often presented as undermining the rationalist conception of man as a self-sufficient, self-aware, self-controlled being, that we are apt to forget that although he may have abandoned such a conception as an account of what man is, he never retreated from it as an account of what man ought to be. 'Where id was, there ego shall be.' Freud's whole recognition of unconscious purposes is a discovery that men are more, and not less, rational than we thought they were."[1]

Freud seems to imply a notion of freedom which contradicts his deterministic constructions.[2] One wonders, however, if Freud was not nearer to the truth behind what we have termed that paradox of human freedom by holding the two sides together, than those reformers who would dissolve the paradox, coming down on one side or the other. Can the concept of cause be completely deleted from an understanding of human behaviour? Was Jung right to include it along with another? Is "meaning" a concept which can describe all the phenomena without remainder, so eliminating the possible use of the concept of cause?

Let us take practical examples. In an analysis the psychotherapist is dealing with a patient who, as a child, had to face some untoward, fortuitious circumstance, like the loss of a parent or parental rejection, and was up against such great odds that he was overwhelmed with anxiety. He has now developed certain symptoms for which he is seeking treatment. Would it be

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1. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p.93. The Freud reference is on p.106 of New Introductory Lectures.
2. Jarrett-Kerr, The Secular Promise, p.128

possible to find the meaning of these symptoms without at the same time knowing that there was some objective factor, i.e., independent of the patient, which contributed towards them? Could one not say that this objective factor was the cause, and the symptoms the consequence? Rieff[1] suggests in place of "cause" we speak of "meaningful antecedents". But are there not two sides to these meaningful antecedents: The objective event, and the individual's reaction to it?

We have already looked at Laing's concept of the double-bind,[2] and seen how easy it would be for us to see the patient as the helpless victim of causes beyond his control, without examining the other side of the matter, which is the reaction of the patient, the omnipotent phantasies or withdrawals which he produced originally to cope with this situation, and upon which he has subsequently relied. Now patients under-going analysis will very often spend much time describing what they have had to suffer at the hands of those who brought them up. To recall such episodes and live through them again in this one-sided manner does not produce a therapeutic change; one must also examine the phantasies which accompany the situation, and were produced to cope with high level of anxiety. The real analysis, therefore, which is of value, lies in the response. How far did the stimulus activate already existing phantasies? Home, Rycroft and others would say

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1. Rieff, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist, p.115
2. See Chapter V, p. 162, note 'e'.

that it is in the response that we find the meaning of the symptom or complex; but there remains the stimuli, the factors outside the patient's control and these may be decisive in the formation of the symptom, which could even be that of taking the form of complete absence of spontaneity.

Concepts such as stimulus and response can cope with simple psychological situations as in controlled experiments, but they are really totally inadequate to cope with the complex intricacies of the phenomena produced in psychotherapy. Even although the concept "cause" were to be kept for the idea of an objective factor outside the person, this would amount to an almost negligible use of it. Much more would need to be included in the concept of "cause" than a single outside stimulus or stimuli.

Analysts have spoken for a long time about looking for the cause of a certain symptom, or "of finding out the explanation" of some disorder; some would find it as difficult to surrender these concepts in favour of meaning and description, as it would be for an orthodox theologian to surrender the concept of revelation! I think, however, that the analysts may not need to do so completely.

Is there not some sense in which the word "cause" could be kept for legitimate use in psychodynamics? It is clear that it could not carry the identical meaning as it would in strict scientific experimental usage. I would agree with van Buren:

> "The word 'cause' is used in human relationships in a broader, less restriced way than in an experiment

in Newtonian physics."[1]

Similarly Alston has said, writing of those who would say that a reason is one thing and a cause quite another:

> "Of course a reason cannot be a cause nor can a cause be a reason. They exist logically in different realms. But that does not mean that a statement about reasons cannot have implications concerning causes and vice-versa."[2]

The basic trouble seems to arise from the fact that in science, like experimental psychology, the various factors can be isolated and kept out of the specific enquiries which are being undertaken. In actual life, which is the concern of psychodynamics, this cannot possibly be done. Psychodynamics is concerned with a multi-factorial situation which makes its practice largely qualitative rather than quantitative. Moreover, the phenomena and data studied require much more personal participation on the part of the observer in order to be understood, than in the case of one conducting an experiment in a detached manner. There are so many variables that it is almost impossible to predict with certainty an outcome, for there could be so many ways in which a situation could develop, and so many external and internal forces which could be brought into play which could alter any carefully worked out prediction. Yet, I do not think that the predictive factor can be ruled out absolutely, and written off as completely as even some Freudians would assert.

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1. The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p.125
2. Faith and the Philosophers, p.90

It is quite true that psychodynamics is concerned with quality rather than with quantity. This happens whenever a difference of degree becomes so complex as to be judged as a difference of kind, so that the subject studied has now come under the category of a "humanity" rather than a "science." Nevertheless, the motives which play such a great part in human behaviour can, together with the objective circumstances and the other determinants, be regarded as "causes", and explanations can be given about them. The words "cause" and "explanation" are therefore used along with "meaning" and "description" without carrying the same degree of precision as they ("cause" and "explanation") would do in the natural sciences.

Richard Peters[1] does not feel the need to distinguish so clearly between motives and causes as Toulmin and Flew do. Nor does Peter Alexander[2] who argues that whilst the therapy side of psychoanalysis may not be a science, there is a body of theory about the formation and removal of symptoms which may be scientific. Alexander also points out that in the Introductory Lectures of Freud on which Flew bases his argument for the distinction between motives and causes,[3] Freud uses motives and purposes simultaneously, (p.33) and that although psychotherapists' explanations are different, say, from those of a chemist,

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1. R. Peters whose paper follows Flew's and Toulmin's in Philosophy and Analysis (ed. Margaret MacDonald)
2. 'Symposium: Cause and Cure in Psychotherapy', Aristotelean Society Supplementary Volume XXIX, 1955, p.25f.
3. Introductory Lectures, p.234

they can still be causal. He pleads for a detailed elucidation of the methodology of psychotherapy. He adds, however, that if Freud was right that it is impossible to understand psychoanalysis without having been through a fullscale analysis, after this it may be impossible not to be convinced of the truth of his theory! (p.42)

It is quite true that analysis is a process whereby a patient learns why he needs the symptom, and of how various determinants, some of these unconscious[1] have entered into the symptom formation so that it comes to be understood as the result of certain motives and wishes which now have a meaning. One can look back, see the reasons and understand. Suppose that there is a chain of reasons behind the symptom, so that "one thing led to another", this chain could not be considered as strictly causal in the scientific sense, nor would it be a logical chain of reasoning as in the philosophical sense, but it would possess its own innate logic, being regulated by motives, wishes and responses of the person. Could these not, however, also be causes if we define the word carefully? It is quite true that in his early days Freud talked much about the wish; it is also true that he called his great book The "Interpretation" of Dreams, not The "Explanation"...,or The "Causation"..., for he regarded the

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1. Marjorie Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.96

dream as a wish-fulfilment.[1] Nevertheless, this does not remove completely the whole notion of cause or explanation as we have detailed it above. In practice, psychoanalysis is a means of dissipating symptoms and of demonstrating that there are reasons for them which can become meaningful to the individual undergoing analysis. This does not exclude the possibility of these reasons being also understood as causes in the limited sense. To return, therefore, to the paradox of freedom, that the man is most free who begins to recognize his underlying motives of which he has previously been unaware, that man may also regard these and the other determinants as the cause of his condition, and explain his condition on the basis of these new facts which, through analysis, has been made available to him.

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Important as the above argument may prove to be, it is even more important from the point of view of this enquiry to consider the logical status of Freud's structure of the psyche, remembering that in considering Freud's we are virtually considering the others, as the same principles apply to all psychic structures.

We have seen how Freud met the criticism that he was using pretentious jargon for very ordinary facts about the human personality which were already well know, and how Jacobson

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1. Binswanger has shown how Freud attached this on to the large psychic apparatus, the mechanisim of which was set in operation by "the wish". The wish is the "motive", and there are some would prefer to translate Trieb not by instinct or drive, but by motive, as in German there is another word for instinct, namely, Instinkt.

agreed that Freud's theories were tied to "significant inner experiences", the id to temptation, the ego to reason and the super-ego to conscience.[1] Was this procedure not similar to that of the seventeenth century medical profession when they allegedly "explained" events by constructing impressive names for them, so earning the criticism of Molière?[2] Frederick Ferré describes this as disguised ignorance of genuine explanations. Could not this criticism be made of Freud's psychic structure? Freud, however, met it in part by saying that his work consisted of a new way of looking at things, a new grouping of facts.[3]

At the same time as claiming ordinary assocations for his structure, Freud named it, however, as part of his "Metapsychology", which meant that it went beyond psychology, "part of the speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis", as Bowlby has described it.[4] Is it a sort of "psychological metaphysics", as Mr Home has regarded it, or is it a "myth" as Popper claimed, or a "model" as Walker and others have claimed?

In contrast to Professor Ayer who regarded the metaphysician as a kind of misplaced poet[5] who "produces sentences which fail

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1. Jacobson, The Self and the Object World, p.123 (See Chap.I, p.29) Cf. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.21 where he speaks of the trio of inner voices, id desiring, ego steering and super-ego exhorting, like the Old Miracle Plays.
2. F. Ferré, Language, Logic and God, p.22
3. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.82. Cf. Wittgenstein, who called Freud's work a "wonderful representation" of the facts. See MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p.93
4. Bowlby in New Society, Correspondence Column (No.41)
5. Ayer, Language, Logic and Truth, p.44 (19th impression)

to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant,"[1] Professor Dorothy Emmet regards metaphysics as starting "from the articulation of relationships which are judged to be constitutive of an experience or experiences in a significant way;" metaphysics is "an analogical way of thinking."[2] Professor Emmet's book is an exceedingly rich one, and any attempt to reproduce her arguments must necessarily be inadequate.

She argues that the formation of metaphysical concepts results from our minds being what they are; we possess two a priori mental faculties which contribute to the making of metaphysical concepts. The first is that we have an impulse towards the creation of forms in which the imagination can rest[3] and that this impulse towards the creation of form is fundamental, lying at the root of all mental activity.[4] Experience itself - and Professor Emmet uses the word "experience" while admitting that in some ways it is unsatisfactory - includes our forms of interpretation; not only have we feelings, impulses, intuitions and the like, for we always have along with these the thinking which seeks to find or create some significant order in them.[5] We just cannot get back to primary experiences, simply because we cannot think away all forms of interpretation, and

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1. Ayer, Language, Logic and Truth, p.35
2. D.M. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Preface, p.v.
3. ibid. p.2
4. ibid. p.189
5. ibid. pp.4, 19

"catch ourselves with some raw pellet of experience." To be aware is to have begun relating and distinguishing, which means that we are employing some rudimentary schema of interpretation. Gestalt psychology bears out this contention of Dr. Emmet's, that we all have our systems or "sets" for perception.

Her second assertion about a priori mental activity is that it is essentially symbolizing activity, and that it seeks to understand a thing by expressing or seeing it symbolized in terms of another.[1] That our minds possess an innate tendency towards symbolizing is an assumption of all depth psychologists, based on empirical evidence. Dream interpretation, whether it be by Joseph in the Book of Genesis or Freud in his The Interpretation of Dreams, emphasises the truth of a quotation which Dr. Emmet employs, that "man is an analogist." Along the same lines, Groddeck has stated:-

> "Symbols are not invented, they are there and belong to the inalienable estate of man: indeed, one might say that all conscious thought and action are the unavoidable consequence of unconscious symbolization, that mankind is animated by the symbol."[2]

Whilst one would not wish to press the assertions about the underlying unconscious which Groddeck makes in this quotation, it nevertheless asserts the truth that man is an analogist, and that symbolization is an a priori form of mental activity.

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1. ibid., p. 61
2. G. Groddeck, The Book of the It, p.43-44

Professor Emmet gives an analysis of the various kinds of metaphysical thinking, dividing these "illustrative analogies" into five categories: deductive, projective, hypothetical, co-ordinating and transcendent. She claims that it is the nature of conscious thought to go beyond the actual perception and attempt to translate a multiplicity of data into some definite form.

In speaking of the development of symbolical forms, Emmet draws on the work of Cassirer, who, in his Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, traces three stages in the developments of forms of speech. The first is the Representative Stage, where words have power in themselves and are a magical duplicate of the things they represent, possessing the potency of those things themselves. The second stage is the Analogical Stage, in which words are not duplicates of things, but held in some way to be structural models of things. The third stage is the Symbolic Stage, in which there is no natural connection or model relation between word and meaning, as in mathematics, where we can get rid of the "thing" concept altogether.[1] Emmet selects the second of these as illustrative of her idea of metaphysical activity, of relations within rationally connected experience described analogically to express indirectly the ways in which "things" may be connected in the external world. Metaphysical systems

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1. Emmet, ibid., p.73

to Emmet are not the same as those to which Professor Ayer objects, i.e., those assuming a knowledge of transcendent reality; they are systems of assumptions necessary in order to understand our observations and experiences.[1]

Emmet also includes mythical thinking as an a priori symbolic activity of the human mind, and therefore one of the irreducible ways of interpreting experience.[2] Following Cassirer, "myth thinking" cannot be looked on as a rudimentary and unsuccessful kind of scientific thinking: rather it is an alternative way of looking at the world complete within its own limits. She also described it as "an imaginative picture of the world shaped in terms of the powers and feelings of man's own inner life."[3]

This argument is carried into the realms of theology and history; the former springs from man's unwillingness to "rest satisfied with mere arbitrary mystery; we feel impelled to construct some coherent thought forms in terms of which we can order our experience and make sense of the world."[4] The idea of ordering experience is applied to history in the sense of the selection and grouping of facts, plus the interpretations; otherwise, a historian would be a mere chronicler.[5]

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1. For an answer to Ayer see Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p.266
2. Emmet, ibid., p.98 footnote quoting Cassirer.
3. ibid., p.100
4. ibid., p.116
5. ibid., p.162-6. See also Dodd, History and the Gospel, p.26f.

Emmet's conclusion is that we cannot escape metaphysics, as the experiencing subject inevitably interprets his experience through symbolic forms, this being an example of analogical activity.[1] Without this creation of intellectual form, nothing can be grasped; "there is a vague multiplicity of confused impressions." She regards these symbolic forms which man uses to order his experience as part of his proper study.

This conclusion, that metaphysics is necessary, is echoed in many quarters. For example, Professor John Wisdom writes:-

> "In order to grasp complex and unmanageable patterns we are always using models, other patterns which we have grasped. With every name we apply we compare one thing with another, with many others."[2]

or Professor Howard Root:-

> "Metaphysical construction, crude or polished, is natural to human beings."[3]
>
> "...the question is not whether men can or will do metaphysics, but only whether they will do it well or badly."[4]

These metaphysical constructs, however, are not statements about a transcendent reality in the older sense of metaphysics; they may be regarded as revolts against such systems, or "metaphysics from below."[5] In this sense, Freud's metapsychology could be regarded as justifiable and perhaps necessary as "metaphysics

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1. Emmet, ibid., p.191
2. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p.274
3. H. Root in Soundings, p.14
4. ibid., p.15
5. This phrase is found in a footnote in Colin Williams, Faith in a Secular Age, p.42

from below"; our concern here, however, is not with his total metaphysical construct, but with his structural model of the mind of man, which will be used considerably in Part II. What then is its logical status?

In his study of models,[1] Bishop Ian T. Ramsey points out that many disciplines which appear in isolation from each other have one thing in common, they make use of models. This most obvious kind of model is the scale-model or replica, the kind that Lord Kelvin revelled in. Ramsey calls these "picture models"; they enable the scientist and the theologian alike to be articulate about the subjects of their respective disciplines, and being replicas, they provide them with "reliable genuine descriptions."[2] But they have their limitations and deficiencies, which leads Ramsey to consider a new type of model which stands somewhere between a picture model and a formula (by "formula" he is referring to the "Symbolic" stage of Cassirer, as in mathematics, where the "thing" concept has been got rid of altogether.)[3] Ramsey calls this a "disclosure model" (after Max Black's analogue model), the dominating principle of which lies in what mathematicians call "isomorphism".[4] "The model echoes and chimes in with those phenomena in respect of which it is used and is incorporated, with them, in a disclosure." In so

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1. Ian T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery
2. ibid., p.5
3. ibid., p.18 in discussion of Emmet.
4. ibid., p.10 quoting Max Black, Models and Metaphors, p.222

doing, it forms a bridge between theory and fact, and at its heart lies a disclosure, or insight, about some mystery in the universe. In his earlier book[1], Ramsey makes much of disclosure situations, which lead to a particular commitment, when the penny drops, or the ice breaks. But a model in science should be able to do more than this; from it we should be able to yield possible verifiable deductions, over a wide range of phenomena. A theological model, on the other hand, stands or falls according to its success in harmonizing whatever events are to hand, no derivative deductions being required of it. "From theological assertions no verifiable deductions can be made; from scientific ones, they can and must be."[2] The theological model works more like the fitting of a boot or shoe rather than the "yes" or "no" of a roll-call. "It is judged by a question of 'empirical fit'."[3] Hence models for science make deductive experimental verification possible whereas models for theology make for empirical fit.

> "They each arise out of, and in this way become currency for, a universe that discloses itself to us in a moment of insight."[4]
>
> "Models, whether in theology or science, are not descriptive miniatures, they are not picture enlargements; in each case they point to mystery, to the need for us to live as best we can with theological and scientific uncertainties."[5]

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1. Ramsey, Religious Language, p.49f.
2. Ramsey, Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis, p.75
3. Ramsey, Models and Mystery, p.17
4. ibid., p.19.
5. ibid., p.21.

Ramsey also considers psychological models[1], but these are applicable to experimental psychology and not to psychodynamic models. However, he reminds psychologists that their models are fulfilled in insight, and that the topic of experimental psychology is persons like the psychologist himself![2]

Ramsey also considers similes and metaphors, comparing the former to picturing models and the latter to disclosure models, the disclosure being the "tangential meeting of two diverse contexts."[3] Metaphors are not just link devices, but the language of the second infiltrates into the first in a most selective and subtle way.[4] Models and metaphors, both being grounded in inspiration or intuition, enable us to be more articulate about an insight which we cannot fully comprehend though we may spend our lives trying to do so.

He speaks also of qualifiers to models, a subject which he dealt with in his Religious Language, claiming that they do not lead to "a death of a thousand qualifications",[5] but to

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1. Ramsey, Models and Mystery, Chapter 2.
2. ibid., p.29. See also Religion and Science, where he discusses the issues involved in cybernetics; he also mentions the limitations of physiology and psychology to give an adequate account of human behaviour. (p.61)
3. Models and Mystery, p.52. Cf. his discussion of the aim of parables in Christian Discourse, p.11
4. ibid., p.53
5. Antony Flew in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, p.97

"life by a thousand enrichments."[1] Qualifiers remind us of the inadequacy of all models: when dealing with mystery there is "no single inward track", and "no single outward road from the infinite." The aim of religious language is to ensure that the universe and ourselves come alive together in a cosmic disclosure, when the universe reveals itself to us.[2]

A discussion of religious models may seem irrelevant here, or at least premature in this stage of the enquiry. However, of all the models which Ramsey considers, the one most applicable to the models of psychodynamic structure is the theological model; if we regard the mystery which it seeks to elucidate as neither the universe nor the nature of God, but the mind of man, we see that the use of a disclosure model of the same logical status would enable our understanding of it to come alive in a disclosure situation, where the secrets of that mystery (which is

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1. Not everyone shares Ramsey's optimism about the use of qualifiers. Hepburn, for example, writes: "Theologians constantly declare that no analogy or image can adequately express God's nature. He is Father, but not in all respect like earthly fathers: he loves us, but with more than a human love...and so on. The best that can be done is to assert some analogy and then say, 'But no: he is not quite like that', and then another analogy, and largely cancel it in turn. No shot is a bull's eye, but the cluster of near misses manages to locate the target in a rough and ready fashion. More seriously; the progress towards knowledge of God includes the destruction of successive symbols, the endless pruning away of misleading associations. The aim of all this labour (to the Christian) is a knowledge of a God who in some sense is." - Christianity and Paradox, p.199
2. Models and Mystery, p.69. Professor John McIntyre in The Shape of Christology also speaks of the negative aspects of models. This however seems to have been answered in advance by Ramsey in Chapter 5 of Religious Language.

called the mind of man) reveal themselves to us. This we regard as a justification for our use of these models.

What Ramsey calls a disclosure situation is similar to what the psychotherapist considers as a therapeutic moment. If the therapist is not bound to any one dogmatic creed, he will use any model, or anti-model to effect a disclosure in which meaning can be imparted to the patient. The fact that we have chosen more than one model is perhaps inevitable. The mind of man, being of such a complex character is such that no one model could exhaust its mystery and explain to us all that we would wish to know without remainder. Even physics uses different models to explain one phenomenon: wave mechanics and particle mechanics are both needed to explain the phenomenon of light.

We would therefore draw the following conclusions to this part of the enquiry:-

1. As metaphysics ("from below")[1] can be justified as an inevitable consequence of the a priori workings of the mind of man in ordering experience in a symbolic manner, as explained by Emmet, so also can metapsychology be justified on the same grounds.

> "It was necessary to sift the enormous amount of material which the new method had collected and to classify it scientifically. Whether for good or evil, Freud had to formulate a skeletal outline for his theory, a construction which, though it has been altered, modified and remodelled many times, remains sound in its main details up to the present day. This

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1. See note 5, p.233

> construction is the so-called Metapsychology... every scientific theory is fantasy, and it is serviceable as such as long as it meets practical requirements and agrees with the facts of experience. Freud's metapsychological system does this fully."[1]

2. Ferenczi still thought of psychoanalysis as a science, as the above quotation shows. Ramsey's work on models has made it clear that the disclosure models which are justified in psychodynamics are not of the pattern of scientific models but of theological models.This is due to the facts that causal explanation is not fully operative and that prediction in any sense comparable with that of the physical sciences cannot be claimed. This clears up the misunderstandings expressed above by Ferenczi and below by Victor White.

> "Like every empirical science, psychology also requires auxiliary concepts, hypotheses and models. But the theologian, as well as the philosopher,is apt to make the mistake of taking them for metaphysical a priori assertions. The atom of which the physicist speaks is no metaphysical hypothesis, it is a model."[2]

No model, theological or otherwise, is an a priori assertion, although the making of models may be ultimately ascribed to the a priori activity of man's mind.

3. As deductive experimental verification is not required, these disclosure models are of a descriptive nature so as to impart meaning, and their success or failure, as Ramsey asserts,

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1. Ferenczi, 'Freud's Influence on Medicine, Psychoanalysis Today, p.3
2. God and the Unconscious, p.20. Cf. John Wren Lewis in Psychoanalysis Observed, p.92 speaks of science's concepts of matter, energy and force, not as discoveries, but intellectual models.

lies in their "empirical fit"; when "the bell rings", or "the penny drops", or "the ice breaks" the model does its work. This may seem a very subjective criterion; but once it is acknowledged that the psychodynamic model, like the theological one, works by meeting empirical needs in imparting meaning, there can be no other criterion than the subjective one. Having a subjective criterion to evaluate subjective material may seem like the blind leading the blind. However, although it is subjective, it is not purely personal, for its validity is constantly being tested in the therapeutic situation over and over again as the way the patterns of the mind, inferred from human behaviour, disclose themselves to us.

4. The Existentialist analysts would demythologize psychodynamic models in much the same way as the Existentialist theologians would demythologize the Bible and the creeds of the Church, reducing everything without remainder to simple Existentialia. Yet their anti-model serves as a theory behind their practice of therapy. We have seen that the strength of existentialist analysis lies in its ability to impart meaning to unstructured personalities, as in schizophrenia; but everyone is not schizophrenic all the time; therefore these metapsychologies of Freud, Fairbairn and Jung can supply meaning when those of the Existentialists cannot, and vice-versa. Each system is able to do something for us; none is complete or ever could be, because, as we have already stated, of the elusive, mysterious nature of the subject matter.

5. One cannot accept the contention that the application of analysing methods to a person necessarily depersonalizes him. Guntrip is right when he states that "when science begins to treat a man as an object of investigation, it somehow loses him as a person."[1] The Existentialists take this to its logical conclusion and dispense with structural theories. (That Guntrip does not do so may be due to his equating "Object-Relations" and "Personal Relations".) However, as I have agreed, I would maintain that one can hold on to an "I-Thou" relationship whilst analysing the material presented into "I-It" categories. It is not a matter of "Either/Or" but of "Both/And".

6. Finally, in spite of all the criticism made of Freud's biassed "scientific" outlook, one still finds in his work the most valued insights. It is a fact that without Freud's pioneer work such an enquiry as this could not be undertaken. Developments have taken place since his time as we have shown, but they have not rendered him or his contribution valueless. One would therefore subscribe to these words of Erikson:-

> "Freud used the thermodynamic language of his day, the language of the preservation and transformation of energy. The result was that much that was meant to be a working hypothesis appeared to be making concrete claims which neither observation nor experiment could even attempt to substantiate.
>
> Great innovators always speak in the analogies and parables of their day. Freud, too, had to have the courage to accept and to work with what he himself called his 'mythology'. True insight survives its first formulation."[2]

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1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.16
2. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p.58

We have now completed the first task of this enquiry which was to detail the various theories of psychodynamic structure which could be used in the examination of the foundations of the Trinity. We have also attempted to indicate the logical status and validity of these theories, and have answered criticisms made of them from various directions, as well as making our own criticisms. We would wish to state our particular preference, which is to work from a Freudian basis, whilst by no means excluding the insights from the other schools.

In Part Two we now turn therefore to the three component parts of Trinitarian dogma, to the "Three Persons", dealing with them in the following order: Father (or rather, Monotheism), Spirit and, finally, Son.

P A R T T W O

TRINITARIAN COMPONENTS AND PSYCHODYNAMICS

SECTION A

MONOTHEISM IN THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THE SUPER-EGO

INTRODUCTION

I would begin this section by considering the criticisms made of the Biblical idea of Monotheism by Freudians and others. I do so since I regard monotheism as the basis of the Christian faith which it inherited from Judaism, and upon this foundation it was built up. In this, I follow John Whale[1] rather than Claude Welch[2] who, following Barth, would regard Christ as the sole source of our knowledge of God, making the self-revelation of God in Christ bear the whole weight of the massive structure of Christian dogma.[3] Christianity was founded on the fundamental monotheism of the Old Testament. From the beginning many of the ideas of the Old Testament were built into it, for Hebrew religious faith formed the basis upon which Christ could operate his ministry. As T.W. Manson pointed out, Jesus when he spoke of God as Father, "was not presenting a new and revolutionary doctrine for man's acceptance; but rather taking up into his teaching something that had been part of the faith of prophets, psalmists and sages for centuries before...."[4] The early Christians used any relevant concept available to them to explain Christ's significance, and most of these came from the Old Testament. It would be unfortunate at this stage

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1. Christian Doctrine, p.112f.
2. The Trinity in Contemporary Theology, p.233
3. For a contemporary discussion see J. McIntyre, The Shape of Christology.
4. The Teaching of Jesus, p.93

to revive the Marcionite error of there being two Gods - one from the Old Testament and another from the New Testament. Therefore I believe any discussion on Trinitarian matters must begin with the idea of God in the Old Testament. If we may put the matter in a highly metaphorical way; we are beginning this study not merely at the "ground-floor level", but in the "basement"!

CHAPTER I

MONOTHEISM AND FREUDIAN CRITICISM

Freudians regard the super-ego as that part of the psyche which stands over against the ego, and consequently, it tends to carry strong convictions of objective reality. This notion of the super-ego has suggested to some writers that it forms the foundation upon which the idea of "God" came to be built. It could be argued that the ancient Hebrews, lacking the knowledge of psychodynamics which we now possess, projected their super-ego experiences, because of their inherently objective quality, and they gave these the ontological status of "God". Theologians usually have disregarded this claim of Freud, and have continued their theologizing without interruption.[1] It is our intention to examine the claims which the psychoanalytic critics have made in this direction.

This task, however, is far from easy, for as Alston has pointed out[2] there is no canonical presentation of the Freudian thesis, and we have to rely on scattered and relatively undeveloped remarks in Freud and his followers. To make a start I would quote these words of Dr. Winnicott:-

> "It has been pointed out that there is a parallel between the maturing of the superego in the individual child, and the development of monotheism in early Jewish history."[3]

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1. See David Jenkins, Guide to the Debate about God, p.75
2. Faith and the Philosphers, p.71
3. The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, p.19 to which reference has already been made in Part One, Chap.III p.82.

This claim is not only for similarities and parallels between the two systems as they are found in completion, but in their actual development. How far can this be said to be true?[1]

In his late book Moses and Monotheism speaking of the renunciation of instincts, Freud argues that the Jewish people effected such a renunciation at the instigation of their great leader, Moses (whom Freud regarded as an Egyptian). As a child has feelings of both security and pride when he achieves an instinctual renunciation out of love of his parents, the Jews found the same when they accomplished it for Moses. However, as the argument proceeds, Freud calls in the aid of his own myth from Totem and Taboo, which purports to explain the origin of religion. This myth tells of the brother horde slaying the primal father, an act which eventually led to instinctual renunciation in the forms of exogamy and the worship of the totem representing the father. He then compares this phenomenon to human development, where the authority of the child's parents, especially the autocratic father, threatening with his power to punish, calls on the child for a renunciation of an instinct, which decides for him what is to be allowed and what is to be forbidden. Later on , society and the super-ego take the parent's place. Freud regarded holiness, which lacks a rational basis, but possesses strong emotional tone, as a prohibitive factor;

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1. Being confronted with the same difficulty as Alston mentioned, I wrote to Dr. Winnicott, who replying "in a personal communication" directed my attention to Freud's Moses and Monotheism.

for the sacred is nothing else than the prolongation of the primal father. It was the father's will that demanded this kind of painful instinctual renunciation: Moses did this by making his people holy through the introduction of the rite of circumcision, being the symbolic substitute for castration, which the primal father "in the plenitude of his power" once inflicted on his sons. Therefore, Moses by his acts reserves the credit for impressing Israel's character and increasing their self-esteem through re-enacting the psychodynamic bases of this myth.

Now Moses and Monotheism is a book about which there has been endless controversy; its conclusions have not only been doubted by theologians, who find themselves unable to accept Freud's reconstruction of early Jewish history, which amounts almost to a complete re-writing of it, but also by some psychoanalysts.[1] The idea that there were two Moses, the first being an Egyptian who tried to impose monotheism on the Jews and was murdered for his efforts was taken by Freud from Sellin, who deduced his theory from the Book of Hosea.[2] Rieff is right to name Freud's work as "a triumph of psychological romance."[3] That Freud used history unhistorically, i.e., for his own

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1. For example, Maryse Choisy, Freud, A New Appraisal.
2. Alston describes Sellin as one of the "heterodox off-beat" Old Testament scholars. Faith and the Philosophers, p.70
3. Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.284. He also draws attention (p.282-3 footnote) to the personal identification which Freud made with Moses, evidenced by his long monograph on The Moses of Michelangelo, Collected Papers, Vol. 4, p.257-8

dogmatic ends, is a charge which cannot be refuted. Nevertheless, the book may not be altogether valueless. The imposition of a system of laws demands a renunciation of instincts by the super-ego, similar to that made by the child to the father; the rite of circumcision may be a symbolical form of castration. But as Alston points out, similarities in themselves provide no evidence for a causal connection; at best, they only furnish a clue.[1]

In addition, however, to his ignoring the careful study of Old Testament historians, there is a further and, to my mind, more serious objection to be made to Freud's claim in this direction; I refer to his use of the Totem and Taboo myth referred to above.[2] Naturally, Freud justifies his use of the myth, and its validity. Writing in Moses and Monotheism he says:-

> "In that book (Totem and Taboo) I made use of certain theoretical reflections of Charles Darwin, Atkinson and especially Robertson Smith, and combined them with findings and suggestions from psychoanalytical practice. From Darwin I borrowed the hypothesis that men originally lived in small hordes, each of the hordes stood under the rule of an older male, who governed with brute force, appropriated all the females, and belaboured and killed all the young males including his own sons...."[3]

Here we have what amounts to a confession that Freud selected his material from those writers whose work suited his theories

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1. Alston, ibid., p.72
2. See Totem and Taboo, p.140f. Useful summaries of this myth can also be found in Alston, ibid., p.67-8; R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.129-131
3. Moses and Monotheism, p.205-7

best. Even after all the criticism he had met on this account, he could write:-

> "I still adhere to this sequence of thought; I am not convinced...of Robertson Smith's errors.... Above all, however, I am not an ethnologist, but a psychoanalyst. It was my good right to select from ethnological data that would serve me for my analytical work. The writings of the highly gifted Robertson Smith provided me with valuable points of contact with the psychological material of analysis and suggestions for the use of it. I cannot say the same of his opponents." [1]

Here is the frank confession of the inventor of the myth; he selected his material from that which was available only that which suited his purpose and neglected the rest which did not fit. Moreover, it was selected not primarily for his analytical work, but for his dogmatizing in theological matters. To choose data and select only that which fits in with dogma is hardly a scientific pursuit. One must admit, however, that the status of any selected material is debatable. Does it represent a strict account of what it purports to explain or describe, or does it represent the presuppositions, prejudices or even phantasies of the inventor? No doubt both factors enter into the matter. It is, for example, virtually impossible to write history without some forms of interpretation, otherwise we would be faced with chronicles of facts which would be unrelated and meaningless. Some superimposed structure, presuppositions and selection are necessary.[2] When such writing, however, is carried through with

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1. ibid., p.207 (my italics)
2. See G.A.F. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.140 J. McIntyre, The Shape of Christology, p.42 speaking of Collingwood's The Idea of History.

one end in purpose, which is to make the history fit in with dogma already held, and when much which is significant is disregarded, then it is questionable whether the eventual result can be considered as valid, or universally applicable.

There is no doubt about one facet of this myth; it is Freud's own creation, even although he used the work of various anthropologists and ethnologists; therefore, it tells us about his own psyche. It is also a fact that the feelings which Freud postulated can come to the fore in group meetings when there is an attempt to de-throne the leader of the group. Rebellion, guilt, identification, and perhaps deification can all be revealed in the feelings of a group. The myth can be valuable, therefore, in imparting insight in such a situation. But Freud did not use the myth primarily for these purposes; it was not for imparting insight in psychoanalysis, whether individual or group analysis, but as the purported explanation of the origins of religion, even its explaining-away, which is a very different matter. The fact that Freud selected, and selected arbitrarily in both historical and anthropological fields, rules out this myth for use as an independent criterion of judgement.

It is unfortunate therefore that so many Freudian interpreters have felt it necessary to use the myth in their writings about religion. R.S. Lee, who is one of the most able interpreters in this field, makes an excellent protest against the over-identification of God with the super-ego, and he demonstrates

how conflicts can be kept recurring as a result of this identification.[1] "Freud says that the Superego is the seat of religion, and there is much truth in this contention."[2] He goes on to point out that this identification is inadequate because it ignores so much serious scholarship.[3] However, Lee asserts that the super-ego is not only the introjection of the father image, God being the ultimate Father-substitute, but that it is "the primal father image come back in a new form."[4] Lee claims that Freud did not base his psychological theories on this venture into pre-history,[5], but one would venture to question this contention: whilst Freud may not have based his theories on the myth, it was soon impressed into service by Freud as a fundamental concept rather than as an illustration. Lee says, "... the theory of the primal father corresponds very closely with what happens in the development of the mind through the Oedipus complex." But is this not tautology, as Freud based the myth on the Oedipus complex? The argument is in a circle. Lee also explains Freud: "...Freud thinks that the long period in prehistory, when human society was evolving through the primal father stage, has left its mark on the mind in a kind of racial memory, by which he means more than a simple pre-disposition

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1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.181
2. ibid., p.79
3. ibid., p.79-80
4. ibid., p.164
5. ibid., p.130

to the formation of conscience."[1] In Lee, therefore, we find an example of one who uses the myth in his arguments, as this surely forms an example of what Alastair MacIntyre has described as "already moving within the Freudian circle."[2]

We would, therefore, sum up the difficulties in this myth of Freud's as follows:-

1. Freud's arbitrary selection of material may be due to his analogical turn of mind, which caused him to move from psychological criteria to historical or pseudo-historical, "anthropological" material, without realizing what he was actually doing in mixing disciplines whose logical status was fundamentally of different natures. Alston[3] speaks of speculative extensions made by Freud by means of analogies, which at best are suggestive rather than evidential. Rieff[4] sees this procedure as one of Freud's deficiencies which he took over from nineteenth century anthropology in substituting "for historical documentation a logical history backward along the parallel lines or diffusional routes of cultural invention." He cites

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1. Whilst Lee is always explaining Freud's theories, it is sometimes difficult to discover which is Freud's theory as distinct from Lee's and how far Lee endorses it, e.g., when on p.148 Lee states that the super-ego was created to deal with the two primal crimes of parricide and incest, is Lee only expounding Freud or endorsing his viewpoint? Again on p.149, Lee speaks of "exposing the ego to destruction at the hands of the primal father", is this Lee's, as well as Freud's view?
2. Faith and the Philosophers, p.111 (ed. John Hick)
3. Alston, ibid., p.76-7
4. Rieff, ibid., p.205-207

the name of Bochofen as one who raided archaeology, mythology and poetry to discover pre-history; this method certainly prepared the way for Freud's conjectural constructions.

2. We have shown how Freud claimed that he was right to use the material he did for clinical purposes, but that in fact, the myth was used not as a therapeutic concept, but as a sort of clearing house, or reductionist machine, or a prehistoric "transformer" which automatically turned everything connected with religion back into its original psychological state. But the myth informs us not so much about religion, as about Oedipal feelings and group dynamics, as well as about Freud's own psyche. Alston regards it as perhaps "a mythical exposition of the unconscious complex which every individual gets from his own early relations with his parents."[1] But this evaluation assumes that the Oedipal conflicts are as universal as Freud claimed they were.[2]

3. In fact, Freud uses the Totem and Taboo myth in much the same way as traditional Christianity has used the myth of Adam and Eve, as the cause of "the trouble". Now the value of myths lies in their being able to give insights and interpretations of human problems, i.e., meaning to man's existential situation. They are, however, not now to be understood causally at all.

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1. Alston, ibid., p.71
2. Rieff also mentions that the basic theme of many of Freud's examples are not illustrative of parricide but of fratricide, e.g., the murder of Hamlet's father by Hamlet's uncle, and that the first murder in the Old Testament is of brother by brother. Also in the Abraham myth (which will be considered later) the father would kill the son, and not vice-versa.

Freud speaks of "the deed" of which the myth speaks as leaving ineradicable traces in the history of mankind,[1] leaving its mark on the mind as a kind of racial memory. But when he speaks like this, he is in fact using the myth as proof, and in so doing Freud is, in fact, committing himself to something like Jung's concept of the Collective Unconscious, although he may have disclaimed such a contention. Traditional Christianity, however, following the Augustinian tradition is in no better position in explaining man's fallen state as a result of Adam's fall; if we are inheritors of Adam's primal sin, is our inheritance conveyed biologically by the genes of the body? It would appear to from such statements as "being born in sin". This is but another example of treating myth as proof, basing a spurious causal argument upon it. The myths of both Freud and Genesis are illustrative and descriptive; when more than this is claimed, they are being used illegitimately.[2]

However, having stated our inability to accept the myth of Freud as it stands for use in any of our arguments, we find

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1. Totem and Taboo, p. 154
2. Perhaps along with the myth, we would wish to exclude Freud's application of the principle of "the return of the repressed" to the history of the race; the concept is perfectly understandable in the case of an individual, who, during adolescence has religious experiences in which he transfers to God the positive (and perhaps negative) feelings he has had towards his father, but which he has repressed in early childhood. When this is applied to the history of a race the concept becomes more dubious. It is, however, tied up with the idea of the primal father, which is itself part of the myth, so both these notions stand or fall together.

that much still remains which is of value,

For example there is the fact that a set of commandments is related to the super-ego, which, by being the super-imposition of an external authority, supports the super-ego and demands instinctual renunciation. This fact forms one distinct parallel between the two systems, of super-ego and the Jewish acceptance of the Law as from God. The latter appeals to and reinforces the super-ego orientation; this is the permanent value in this rather chaotic book, Moses and Monotheism.

If we look at the earlier writings of Freud, we can see that he adhered to much the same sort of arguments as he propounds in this later book. Although his first specific writings on religion came in 1907[1], he wrote in 1904 in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life:-

> "As a matter of fact, I believe that a large portion of the mythological conceptions of the world which reaches into the most modern religions is nothing but psychology projected into the outer world. The dim perception (the endo-psychic perception, as it were) of psychic factors and relations of the unconscious was taken as a model in the construction of a transcendental reality, which is destined to be

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1. 'Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices', Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.25-34

> changed again by science into psychology of the unconscious."[1]

He writes in the next paragraph of transforming metaphysics into metapsychology.[2]

In his study of Leonardo da Vinci, written in 1910, Freud returned again to the intimate relation between the Father Complex and belief in God.[3]

> "Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with the intimate connexion between the father complex and belief in God; it has shown us that a personal God is, psychologically, nothing other than an exalted father..."[4]

Therefore the idea that the root of religion lies in the parental complex is to be found in Freud prior to re-structuring of the psyche (1923) which included the super-ego. The same basic argument underlies Freud's discussion of Kant, in which he focuses his attack on the kind of religion which is identified with authority, "the apprehension of our moral duties as divine commands."[5] Writing of Kant, Freud states:

> "The philosopher Kant once declared that nothing proved to him the greatness of God more convincingly than the starry heavens, and the moral conscience within us. The stars are unquestionably superb, but where conscience is concerned God has been guilty of an uneven and careless piece of work, for a great many men have only a limited share of it or scarcely

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1. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p.166
2. Freud's own italics throughout. For discussion see Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud, his Life and Work, Vol.III, p.377
3. Leonardo, p.168-9 (Pelican edition)
4. ibid., p.169
5. Rieff, ibid., p.297

> enough to be worth mentioning.... Conscience is no doubt something within us, but it has not been there from the beginning."[1]

Later on in the same book, writing about "A Philosophy of Life", Freud said:-

> "The third main point of the religious programme, its ethical precepts, can also be related without difficulty to the situation of childhood. In a famous passage,... the philosopher Kant speaks of the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us as the strongest evidence of the greatness of God. However, odd it may sound to put these two side by side - for what can the heavenly bodies have to do with the question whether one man loves another or kills him? - nevertheless it touches on a great psychological truth. The same father (the parental function) who gave the child his life, and preserved it from the dangers which that life involves, also taught it what it may do and may not do, made it accept certain limitations of its instinctual wishes, and told it what consideration it would be expected to show towards its parents and brothers and sisters, if it wanted to be tolerated and liked as a member of the family circle, and later on of more extensive groups.... This whole state of affairs is carried over by the grown man unaltered into his religion...the religious Weltanschauung is determined by the situation that subsisted in our childhood."[2]

The ethical implications of Kant's dictum, as well as Freud's criticisms are considered at length in Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, where he quotes Kant as speaking on the one hand of the business of conscience as a business of man with himself, but also that man "finds himself compelled by his reason to transact it as if it were the command of another

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1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.84. Freud, however, did not quote Kant correctly, Kant said "the moral law within" not conscience.
2. ibid., p.209-210

person...God."[1]

Thus Kant's teaching on this aspect of God, orientated around a super-ego bias, whereby duties were regarded as divine commands, has been noted by other thinkers too.[2]

We have made this lengthy digression on Kant for two reasons. Firstly, because his identification of God with Lawgiver and Creator comes very close to the central ideas of the Old Testament conception of god. Secondly, because it demonstrates that Freud can carry through such criticism without any recourse to his myth. It therefore becomes clear that the myth is not really essential to Freud's basic argument; in fact, it is expendable - the most expendable part of all Freud's writing, as far as religion is concerned.

One Freudian writer, who has contributed considerable work to our understanding of the super-ego, and to whom we have not

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1. Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, p.336f. quoting from Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, Part II, Section 13, p.271-2, the above being Lehmann's translation. Lehmann argues that Kant prepared the way for the fall of conscience which was accomplished by Freud, ibid., p.342. Freud gives another example of his relating Kant and the super-ego in'The Economic Problem in Masochism'in Collected Papers, Vol. II, No. XXII, p.255-268:

> "The superego, the conscience at work in it, can then become harsh, cruel and inexorable against the ego in its charge. The categorical imperative of Kant is thus a direct inheritance from the Oedipus Complex." ibid. p.264

2. H.H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion, p.146 who maintains that the moral imperative "shines in its own light, and stands in its right, independent and autonomous;". Cf. J. McIntyre, On the Love of God, p.227 that there is a corresponding suspicion of the inclinations in the Kantian tradition. Likewise Clement Webb in God and Personality (1918) emphasises the aspect of duty towards God, and shows that there is no place in Kant for any love of God. p.118-120.

yet referred in this enquiry is J.C. Flugel in his book, Man, Morals and Society. Of this book Marjorie Brierley has written that it is:-

> "...almost a super-ego encyclopaedia, since it includes practically everything that has been formulated concerning super-ego development and function."[1]

That we have delayed the consideration of his contribution until this stage in our enquiry may seem strange; however, our purpose is served by the fact that Flugel draws parallels between the various components which he claims are part of the internal super-ego and refers these to its projection "on to the external figure of God, as the notion of the all-seeing eye of God."[2] More than this, however, although he mentions Freud's myth, he does not employ it in his basic argument.

Before, however, we look at Flugel's special contribution, it may be wise to gather together the main conclusions reached about the super-ego in Part One. There we found that it was a highly complex formation, involving inter-relations of various functions in many directions. The following summary, in view of the above, makes no recourse to the myth of Freud.

In the first place, we noted four parental influences:

a) Identification with the father or the more powerful parent. It has been suggested that the child identifies with the parent who frustrates him the more, this identification

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1. Trends in Psycho-analysis, p.167
2. Man, Morals and Society, p.319

being a means of mastering our anxiety engendered by the frustration.

b) The super-ego of the child is not really built up upon the model of the parents, but upon that of the parents' super-egos; in this way the child takes over the same content, which act enables him to become a vehicle of tradition, so that moral standards are passed down from generation to generation.

c) The direct parental demands and prohibitions can be internalized or reacted to. In this classification one would include Ferenczi's concept of "sphincter morality".

d) The kindly, benign or gentle aspects of the super-ego result from the internalization of "good objects", usually emanating from the mother, which means that the super-ego is not only a source of guilt, but also an object of love and trust.

In the second place, we noted the contribution which the child himself makes to the formation of his own super-ego.

a) The Ego Ideal, this idealized image of the self has narcissistic origins. Some psychodynamic writers, we saw, would separate this from the super-ego, but generally the tendency has been to keep it as part of the larger institution. Jacobson regarded it as both part of the super-ego, and as a bridge between the ego and the super-ego.[1]

b) Inturned Aggression, the process whereby the child turns

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1. See also the discussion in T.S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, p.172-3

its own aggression against himself, is carried out to master the anxiety generated by his original aggression and libidinal desires; the child thereby places a form of taboo on his own destructive impulses and forbidden sexual desires. Fairbairn called this aspect the "Anti-Libidinal Ego", or formerly, the "Internal Saboteur".

c) Distortion by Phantasy is closely related to Inturned Aggression. As the phantasy life of the child becomes involved, the parental influences as detailed above in (a), (c) and (d) can be distorted, and in the end bear little relation to reality. A male child, for example, may have severe castration fears, which are attributable to the parents, but in reality have resulted from the projection of his own talion wishes.[1] Inturned aggression and distortion by phantasy can together cause the severity of the super-ego, its punishing and irrational nature, which, as we have seen, may not be due to experiences of the child in reality, but to the way the child copes with these two factors.

Turning now to Flugel, we find that he takes the above argument further and relates the internal super-ego and its

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1. Melanie Klein equated the above with the child's own innate fear of death. R.S.Lee follows her:

> "Death in the Unconscious, which is infantile in its nature, is the equivalent of castration, feared by the infant son at the hands of the jealous father." Freud and Christianity, p.167

We have, however, argued against the concept of an infantile death instinct.

formation to the notion of an external God. He employs the term "Nemesism" for the aggression which is turned inwards against the self, which forms that unadaptable, archaic part of the super-ego. He goes on, however, to see similar qualities in certain concepts of God, and in ethical behaviour required in religious systems of those gods, such as ascetic sacrifice.[1] Related to this is "Taboo", defined by Flugel as "a prohibition that carries a supernatural or social sanction,"[2] and is likewise found in both the superego and religious systems; it forms a basic factor in moral control, but like Nemesism, it can be primitive, archaic and irrational.

In addition to Nemesism and Taboo, there is also the "Polycrates Complex". With the setting-up of the super-ego, a sense of guilt can arise, which is a state of anxious tension between the ego and super-ego and which must be resolved. Guilt, we have seen, arises in the depressive position, and the ability to experience guilt can be regarded as something of an achievement. It is a feeling akin to that which results when love is withdrawn.[3]

When love is withdrawn and psychological well-being has vanished, the super-ego causes the child to feel himself responsible for his unpleasant condition. One way of solving the

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1. Man, Morals and Society, p.94f.
2. ibid., p.151.
3. The psychopathic personality does not experience guilt and is unaffected by punishment, because, not having experienced the love originally, he is not able to understand the meaning behind its withdrawal.

situation and thereby ending the anxious tension, is to seek out punishment or to provoke suffering, after the endurance of which, the individual secures relief. Those who desire such punishment as a means of expiation exhibit, according to Flugel, what he calls, the Polycrates Complex. In reality one may be guilty of nothing, but one <u>feels</u> guilty, owing to feeling being equivalent to the actual deed in the unconscious, and one desires to end the state of tension.There are, of course, more creative ways of ending tension of this kind, by reparation, restitution or confession, but these are not chosen by the person who has this complex.

A mild parent figure fails to meet the needs of those who suffer from this complex, as these people provoke punishment on themselves, and search out for a harsh authority to serve. If they are religious, they will feel uneasy and dissatisfied with a rational preacher who proclaims a God of love, with corresponding ethical virtues like meekness and gentleness; rather will they seek out a "Hell-fire" preacher who will present a message of a God who is jealous of any pleasure or success of mankind, and who signifies his disapproval by means of disasters and the like which are interpreted as his judgements.[1]

In this connection, R.S. Lee[2] points out that such people select from the Gospel picture those elements which fortify

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1. <u>Man, Morals and Society</u>, p.176f.
2. <u>Freud and Christianity</u>, p.171

the quality of their super-ego, "or have even read into him their own preoccupation with the wrath of God and the virtues of suffering and obedience." Following this he speaks of the castration complex in this super-ego religion, the savage super-ego which lashes the guilty, punishment-seeking ego.[1] Flugel speaks of man being as much a punishment-seeking animal as a pleasure-seeking one.[2]

The contention that people whose psychic state exhibits this complex turn to the more severe conception of God is no doubt correct. When they do this, and posit a God of strict justice, they may supplement the Godhead with the addition of some figure of love, like Jesus, or like the Virgin Mary; or conversely, if they hold to the idea of God as love, they may set between God and man a kind of "moral order" which copes with punishment and wrath, which is posited, no doubt, to cope with the urges of the punitive super-ego. To satisfy all the demands of the super-ego is not an easy matter, and one must conclude that a deity which would meet the needs of every believer's subjective state is almost an impossibility.

The final aspect in Flugel's work to which I would draw attention, is the fact of"Distancing"(my name) between the ego and the super-ego. Flugel does not work out its correspondence

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1. Lee, ibid., p.172
2. Similarly, Karl Menninger in Man Against Himself provides innumerable examples of this phenomenon, but he relates it to the Death Instinct, which we refuse to do.

to religious beliefs and practices, but I believe that it has most important theological implications and helps us to understand many theological anomalies. Following on ideas from Freud's paper on Mourning and Melancholia[1], Flugel points out that a patient can feel very guilty and unworthy in melancholia; he is depressed and distressed with doubts about himself, or states that he has committed the "unforgivable sin" so that God will not ever forgive him. In this pathological state, God is very far away and distant from the person, so that he feels "bad". The "empirical" distance, Flugel would argue, is psychological, and lies between the ego and the super-ego, "God" in this case, being a projection of the latter. By contrast, in times of mania and creativity, the person feels "good"; there is a fusion of ego and super-ego; their unity leads to harmony and power, a sense of exaltation and well-being. In such times, it would be appropriate to speak of the "nearness of God." Optimism and confidence therefore depend on a closeness between these two institutions, the ego and the super-ego.[2]

This concept of "distancing" (as we will call it) is, of course, a spatial model or metaphor; the whole idea is inferred from phenomena which Freud originally encountered in his clinical practice. Nevertheless, it is a valuable one, as theologians

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1. Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p.152-170

2. Flugel's argument has been condensed from pages 67-8, 220, 282 of Man, Morals and Society.

and the men of the Bible make use of similar models and metaphors.[1]

In his discussion on the religious significance of the super-ego, Flugel also cites the need for vicarious punishment of guilt which could be felt by divine victims. He concluded that God is the most suitable figure for all man's projections of the super-ego. He can be like our parents, loving and protecting, but also frustrating and punishing; but as his ways are regarded as inscrutable, he is able to absorb all these ambivalent feelings. His way may be arbitrary; but it is never for man to question them. Flugel therefore concludes that in God, the prohibitive, punitive, aggressive aspects of the super-ego can reside, as well as the protecting, kindly, omnipotent ones.[2]

We have now, I believe, examined enough material from the side of psychoanalysis to demonstrate certain distinct similarities between the super-ego and certain concepts of God which can be found in the Bible. These arguments employed, however, have all proceeded in one direction; i.e., from psychodynamic theory to "God". It would be logical and perfectly possible to continue in the same way, by working through the Old Testament in order to find corresponding ideas in specific passages to the claims made by Freudians and others on this matter. However,

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1. For an illuminating theological study of "distance" see Clement C.J. Webb, God and Personality, p.139f.
2. ibid., p.320. Cf. Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.45, who claims that it can be equally argued that the super-ego is an unconscious introjection of God. Viktor Frankl, as we saw in the examination of Existentialist Analysis in Part One, made a similar contention. But one asks, how can this be, when it is to be found in those who have no religious pretensions?

one fact is clear: rarely, if ever, do those who advocate such similarities take account of the serious scholarship which has been carried out by Biblical scholars on the text of the Old Testament. Freud's bad example of choosing only what suited his purpose is the extreme case of a procedure which can only lead to distortion of the truth.

Therefore, rather than follow this course, trying to link up these concepts and notions with the Old Testament, I would prefer to turn to contemporary Old Testament scholarship to see first what contribution it can make to our understanding of the problem.

CHAPTER II

OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

As indicated in the last chapter, so many psychoanalytical critiques of the Old Testament move in one direction only - from psychoanalysis to the Scriptures, paying scant attention to the work and interpretation of Old Testament scholarship. Scholars have been mentioned, but these are chosen because their views fit in with the preconceived notions and hypotheses of psychoanalysis.

To remedy this, we now turn to a consideration of contemporary Old Testament scholarship, which must perforce be selective; we trust, however, that the selection made is broadly based as well as being relevant to our central purpose. Our contention is that the origin of Christian belief in God, which eventually blossomed into the Doctrine of the Trinity, lies in the monotheistic faith of the Old Testament. To this we would now turn, before proceeding any further with psychoanalytical theories.

We begin with two specialized studies of the Old Testament on the Trinitarian Faith, and after comments, proceed to a statement of the present trend in Old Testament studies, and followed by an evaluation of the same.

a) TWO TRINITARIAN STUDIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

As the subject under enquiry is Trinitarian thought, it would seem appropriate to consider firstly two particular studies which claim to have a direct bearing on the origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament. The second of these also represents the standpoint of one particular school of contemporary Biblical theology.

The first is Aubrey Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God, who begins by considering certain aspects of Hebrew anthropological thought, particularly the nature of personality. He claims that to the Hebrews the idea of personality is by no means a fixed unitary one, but it can be extended in various ways, for example by a blessing (as in the story of Isaac's blessing of Jacob)[1] or by one's household[2], or by one's property.[3] This concept of extension can be applied in matters relating to individuals and groups, in that the individual is never thought of as an isolated unit, but lives in constant relations to others; the whole group can also be conceived as a person under the concept of corporate personality.[4] In Israelite thought, there was no sharp distinction between the community and the individual members of it: there is an oscillation between the concept of the social unit as an

1. The One & the Many in the Israelite Conception of God, p.7
2. ibid., p.8
3. ibid., p.10
4. This follows Eissfeldt.See article in Supplement to Old Peake's Commentary, p.12 col.1; in this country it has been developed by Wheeler Robinson.

association of members (with the result that plural forms are used), and as a corporate personality (where the singular form is used). This oscillation and fluidity are to be observed particularly in the Psalms.

On the basis of the Priestly School's affirmation that man was made in the image of God, Johnson applies his anthropological notions of Hebraic personality to the conception of God, where Yahweh's personality can be extended by His Spirit, His Word and His Name (or rather, The Word and The Name).[1] These extensions allow Him to have a mysterious influence upon mankind; but Johnson argues that the sort of extension of personality as applied to God can go further, embracing a social unit so that a plural form is used of the deity. So in God also there is an oscillation between the One and the Many. He regards this fact as a means of providing a new approach to the New Testament extension of Jewish Monotheism in the direction of later Trinitarianism.

> "...we can see how it was possible for a Jewish Christian to relate His Messiah closely with the divine Being as to afford a basis for the later (and Greek) metaphysical formulations of the Doctrine of the Trinity."[2]

This approach, therefore considers the Trinity in respect of a social, rather than a psychological model.

Even more positive is the approach of George A.F. Knight as in his monograph A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the

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1. Johnson, ibid., p.21
2. ibid., p.41

Trinity, which is the second study to be considered.[1]

Knight takes over where Johnson leaves off, accepting Johnson's contention that the Hebrews used a personal model for the understanding of the deity. "The Hebrews daringly posited the statement that man was made in the image of God; that being his hypothesis, he naturally took the step of picturing God in terms of his own nature."[2] "How else," asks Knight, "after all, can we picture God except in terms of what we know it means to be a human personality?"[3] He reminds us that the Bible "is not afraid of using the argument from the human to the divine."[4] Therefore, we need to have an adequate knowledge of Hebrew anthropology in order to understand the theology.[5] However, Knight's primary concern is the inversion of this, "the revelation from the divine to the human."[6]

Knight accepts Johnson's idea that the image of God is posited, as is the nature of man, as being One and Many at the same time.[7] He also accepts the idea of "extensions", although he speaks of "The Name of God" and "The Word of God" as phrases

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1. Some of the ideas presented in this paper are amplified in his larger work, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament.
2. A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity, p.10
3. ibid., p.36
4. ibid., p.62
5. Cf. Christian Theology of the Old Testament, where on p.22 he works out similar arguments urging the need for an understanding of the basic Hebrew anthropology.
6. p.53 of "Trinity monograph".
7. ibid., p.26,37

which describe the "alter-ego" of God; he includes "angels" in this category.[1] He is, however, careful to stress that The Name and The Word, etc., are not separate metaphysical entities of their own, or hypostases existing in their own right apart from God Himself: they remain pictorial expressions, so they do not disturb the unity of the being of the deity: Knight uses Barth's concept of God repeating himself; so again a social theory of the Deity is found in the Old Testament which could be an embryo of the Trinity. Knight claims that The Holy Spirit led the Hebrews to think in terms of angels, because of the truth which lies behind them, which "is indeed a communion with Himself, an organism, a Trinity."[2]

It is clear from the last statement that there is much more in Knight's contention than in Johnson's. Knight admits that the Trinity is not a Biblical doctrine, but is a just interpretation of what we find in the Bible; like Johnson he claims to look at the concepts underlying the doctrine of the Trinity, as they can be discovered from Old Testament thought; but he adds, "All the theologizing we have to do, all the theologizing we must do as rational beings, must be based on the Old Testament."[3]

By the Old Testament Knight means nothing other than the Hebrew Bible, the Masoretic Text. He claims that God chose the

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1. ibid., p.24
2. ibid., p.28
3. ibid., p.59,(his italics)

Hebrew language, which implies that it has a special significance; He also chose Israel's thought forms as well. In the Masoretic Text we find a Doctrine of God "which is consonant with that which flowers in the full Christian concept of the Holy Trinity."[1] The Hebrew language possesses, in its own right, a certain theological status. He regards it as a tragedy that at the time when the basic doctrines of the Church were worked out, there was great enmity between the Christian Church and Synagogue with the result that the Christian theologians were deprived of studying the scriptures in the original Hebrew text, but had to rely on the Septuagint which is more of a paraphrase than a correct translation. The Church, therefore, deprived itself of the Word of God in the language in which God intended it must be transmuted to the world.

This leads Knight to compare and contrast the Greek ways of thinking with the Hebrew which follows traditional lines. Hebrew thought is dynamic, whereas Greek thought is static; Hebrews were concerned with history, Greeks with Being or Unchanging Reality; the Hebrews were concrete in their thinking, there being few abstractions in the Hebrew language, but Greek

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1. ibid., p.5
2. This antithesis between the two systems of thought goes back to Ritschl, who claimed that Hellenistic influences on the Gospel brought about the transformation of Hebrew dynamic thought into the speculative metaphysics of the Greeks, so that the thought world of the Fathers was very far from the Bible. See Paul van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, pp.33 and 45.

thinking is abstract.[1] The Hebrews thought in terms of actual objects in experience, the Greeks in terms of abstractions from that experience; and so on.[2] Knight contends therefore that such terms as "eternal generation of the Son" and "consubstantiality with the Father" are impossible to visualize and are therefore unbiblical in form.

His central thesis lies in the following statement: "...the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not entirely hidden from the minds of God's people even before His coming to earth in Christ,"[3] and in his assertion that the revealed nature of God in the Old Testament is "a priori possibly that of a Trinity, and not that of a Monad."

It is difficult to be satisfied with Knight's development of Johnson's thesis. In particular, the whole theological standpoint which Knight represents is very far from that held in this enquiry. I would therefore endorse very much of the criticism which Barr makes in his Semantics of Biblical Language. He argues that the claim made by Knight and others for the Hebrew language does not rest upon the actual examination of the language at all! The methods such advocates use are unsystematic and haphazard, and the philosophy behind the idea that Biblical language "corresponds to or coheres with the inner thought of the Bible, is a reproduction on another level of the idealist picture of

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1. Knight, Trinity, p.8
2. The above summary also relies on James Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, p.10-34
3. ibid., p.33

reality or spiritual power bringing forth its own expression in language."[1] Barr also severely criticises the strain placed on individual words in Hebrew, whereby in order to get away from propositional truth, the smaller unit the word, becomes loaded to relate it to the inner world of thought. In place of proof texts, we have proof words. The message of the Bible is not conveyed by such individual words, but by larger units such as sentences: therefore it is in terms of these larger linguistic complexes that the relation between Biblical language and theology must be considered, i.e., by the things which the writers say, and not by the words they use to say them. Barr also indicates a point to which we shall pay much attention, namely, that in order to be objective this whole approach neglects the mental, psychological aspects. In "Biblical Theology", Barr sums up, the interests of dogmatics have been allowed to dominate over responsible exegesis.

The inhibition of subjective factors in so-called objective Biblical Dogmatic theology, and the preference for an unpsychological theology may themselves be subjective facts. Writing in Twentieth Century Religious Thought, John Macquarrie states:

> "...a purely dogmatic theology which disclaims any connection with philosophy may nevertheless carry its own hidden philosophical implications."[2]

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1. Barr, ibid., p.29
2. p.15

If we substitute "psychological" for "philosophical", I believe that the statement would still be true. What are the hidden psychological implications? Without hesitation, a Freudian would say that the desire for objectivity in the form of some infallibity, which can be regarded as authoritative, satisfies our undying omnipotent wishes. Therefore in many cases where theologians claim to exclude psychological factors, we may be guided to most significant psychological material; we must pay attention to the very matters which the dogmatic theologians deliberately exclude. Yet the Freudian criticism is not wholly valid, as conclusions which conform to Freud's concept of omnipotent thought may be correctly reached by perfectly logical means and can be valid therefore in their own right.

To return to Knight; there are further questions one may ask as a result of his position. If God, as Knight contends, had intended The Word of God to be transmuted to the world in Hebrew, then why did He allow His Son to speak in Aramaic, and His Son's followers to transmute the Gospel into Greek? They fell short of Professor Knight's high standards. Moreover, even if there were extensions to God's being - one could almost add the Hebrew language as one of these extensions - had there only to be two others? Why a Trinity? Neither Johnson nor Knight show us why the religion of the Old Testament is actually Trinitarian in nature. They only suggest possible extensions to the being of God. As Arthur W. Wainwright has pointed out, neither of the

writers shows that there was any development from the trinitarianism which they see in the Old Testament to the actual formulation of the doctrine.[1] In all fairness, however, Knight would claim that this might have taken place if only theFathers had had an adequate knowledge of the Masoretic Text and not the Septuagint; but Wainwright points out that the Septuagint retains the very texts upon which the argument for plurality is based.[2] Therefore Knight's argument in this matter falls.[3]

We have paid attention to these particularized, specialized studies in the theology of the Old Testament because they refer to the subject under enquiry; however, the lines opened up by these scholars do not help, except that they give insights regarding the personal model being applied to God, and, negatively, that the exclusion of psychological factors may point us in the opposite direction towards their inclusion.

We now turn from the particular, to the general trend in Old Testament studies today.

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1. The Trinity in the New Testament, p.19
2. ibid., p.23
3. R.P.C. Hanson in God - Creator, Saviour, Spirit, p.91 speaks disparagingly of the "utterly futile labour expended upon dressing up a number of wretchedly flimsy pieces of evidence to look like forshadowings of the Trinity" in the Old Testament by the early theologians, which has "occasioned modern theologians to press far beyond their much restricted limits, the evidence provided...in the Old Testament."

b) PRESENT DAY OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES

1. General Trend

One striking feature of present day Old Testament scholarship is that the idea of development of religious ideas, which played such a prominent part in the studies of the last century, emanating from scholars like Wellhausen and Herder, is no longer to the fore. Scholars do not spend so much time on getting the documents in the right order so as to understand the historical process, or dividing out the components of, for example, the Pentateuch, into J,E,D, and P, regarding P, the Priestly editors, as the selectors and combiners of the various strands. This situation has no doubt arisen because the former certainties about the actual dating have been questioned.

The result is that the emphasis has moved from history to theology. J.H. Schofield, whose writing is much influenced by continental scholars, like Eichrodt and von Rad, has stated that the concern of Old Testament students should be with the finished product rather that with the sketching of its development.[1] We should look at the book in its final form regardless of the use of archaeological and historical research; the dating of Biblical material does not affect the import of its message.

> "A wall should always be dated by its mortar, the date when it was built, not the date when its stones were formed in the bowels of the earth, or hewn from

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1. Introducing Old Testament Theology, p.7

> its quarries, not the date when its latest additions or repairs were made."[1]

Therefore in present-day Old Testament writing, the emphasis has undoubtedly moved its direction from history to theology. The titles of some present-day books show how the wind is blowing.[2]

The writers of the Old Testament were continually using the older traditions over and over again, impressing them into fresh service in order to bring out new and contemporary meanings; therefore, it is argued, it is more important to discover <u>why</u> a story was told, than to know about its date, its origin and its historicity.[3]

One consequence of this approach is that it inhibits us from pursuing a study of the development of monotheism, side by side with the development of the super-ego in the infant, as suggested by Winnicott's quotation made earlier in this section. Present-day Old Testament studies cannot be utilized in this way. However, one does not wish to use some other Old Testament studies, as those of the past century, in order to "prove" a

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1. <u>Introducing Old Theology</u>, p.23-4. If this kind of argument were applied to this present undertaking, it could not be undertaken! The difference lies in the fact that we have much more historical evidence available to know accurately the various developments, component thoughts etc., whereas with the Old Testament studies, much more inferential work is needed to separate them out, and it cannot be done with the same certainty as was assumed previously.
2. Eichrodt, <u>'Theology' of the Old Testament</u>; von Rad, <u>Old Testament 'Theology'</u>; Schofield, <u>Introducing Old Testament 'Theology'</u>; Knight, <u>A Christian 'Theology' of the Old Testament</u>.
3. Schofield, p.9-10

theory. This procedure would be virtually similar to Freud's selection of the data which suited him. We wish to indicate, therefore, the present-day conclusions and see what can be deduced from them.

2. "Saving History"

It may seem rather strange to speak of history at all, after having shown that it is no longer a major emphasis in Old Testament studies. But if one turns to von Rad's two volumes, one finds that the Old Testament theology is laid out in an historical setting. Moreover, von Rad does not capitulate completely to an absolute theological outlook, in seeing the Old Testament as a dogmatic unity, its theology all being in one piece. "I very much doubt whether the main task of an Old Testament theology is the understanding of Israel's legacy as a unity."[1] and he affirms that all conceptions of unity which are not fully authenticated by the material itself should be avoided. He uses as his basic theme "Saving History", which is not "history" in the older sense of separating out the various strands and placing them in various periods in a chronological scheme.

He regards it as impracticable to give a history of credal statements of Israel in the form of a chronological sequence[2] for the Israelite writers were always trying to make new attempts

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1. Old Testament Theology, Vol. I, p.427
2. Von Rad, Vol. I, p.vi

to present the past divine acts as meaningful and relevant to each new age. Old ideas were discarded and fresh interpretations were placed on the old stories to provide new meanings.[1] In the Sinai tradition, for example, we are presented with a whole cluster of traditions made up of many strands, out of many ages, for the material has been worked over again and again. Von Rad also warns us that we may think that we are reading history when in fact we are reading about cultic traditions, or confessional statements clothed in history. There is a mounting up of tradition in a continuity of historical writing which makes precise dating a highly speculative matter. In this process, however, one can discern what von Rad calls "Saving History".

Many writers have previously pointed to the fact that the Hebrews were pioneers in the art of writing history.[2] There is no older example of series of events which are coherently related in a historical pattern than that of the Old Testament. The Hebrew writers looked back and saw the acts of God in the past, and also looked forward into the future, contemplating what God might do, and from this their eschatological thought developed. It was their looking back and reading into the events the acts of God, or rather as seeing them solely as acts of God, which enabled them to look forward and speculate on the future

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1. A similar comparison is to be found in the respective treatments of the Arthurian legends by Mallory, Tennyson and T.H. White.
2. My former teacher, Professor Marsh of Cambridge laid great stress on this.

from the basis of their faith in God. But a religious faith to be passed from generation to generation needs some embodiment in institutions, some forms of organisation around religious observance. For the Hebrews themselves, the writing of history was a by-product of their faith in the Living God, a God who acts in history and saves according to His purpose. But an idea of God and faith in Him, it can be argued, is not sufficient to explain why this remarkable phenomenon is to be found in Israel alone. This idea of historical continuity, which made Israel's contribution unique, was integrated according to Eichrodt by the single religious concept of "The Covenant", to which we presently turn.

3. "The Covenant"

Whereas von Rad speaks of "Saving History", Eichrodt speaks of "The Covenant" as the fundamental concept, not only for understanding the "interior attitude" which Israel possessed towards history, but also towards understanding the Old Testament as a unity. As distinct from von Rad, Eichrodt does see the Old Testament as "a self-contained entity" which despite all the changes which come about through history demonstrate a "constant basic tendency and character."[1] Eichrodt also stresses, however, that it is impossible to reduce the whole realm and variety of Old Testament thought into a handbook of dogmatic instruction

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1. Eichrodt, p.11

without doing violence to it.[1] Nevertheless, his general emphasis is along dogmatic, theological lines.

"The Covenant" concept gives cohesion to and integrates the whole corpus of the writings of the Old Testament. Basically, it is a free act of God which raised Israel to the rank of being a people of God, giving the nation a sense of cohesion, as well as a unique dignity; it is within Israel that the will of God is revealed.[2] The Covenant is not just a doctrinal concept, but refers to a living process, which continued through history.

All processes, however, have to have a beginning; Eichrodt finds the beginning of the Covenant concept in the Sinai story with Moses: bearing in mind von Rad's contention that it represents a whole cluster of tradition out of many ages, it may seem a rather insubstantial foundation on which to build. Eichrodt, however, regards it as an original element in all the sources, "founded on a primal act in history."[3]

A Convenant is basically an agreement between two parties. The word Berith is found in the story of Jonathan and David (I Sam. 18.3). We read that Jonathan "made a covenant with David because he loved him as his own soul." The content of this

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1. Eichrodt, p.28
2. ibid., p.14
3. ibid., p.36. Von Rad in Vol.I, p.6, claims that "Israel" is a term which cannot be applied until after the settlement: Schofield (p.45) doubts Eichrodt's assumption, here arguing that there was no decalogue before the time of Jeremiah. G.A.F. Knight, however, sides withEichrodt. "The Sinai event must have been historical." (A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.141)

covenant was of love, "wonderful, passing the love of woman." (II Sam. 1.26). The agreement was a mutual one, each party having equal privileges and responsibilities, based on that love which formed the bond between them.

When the term, however,is applied to Yahweh and Israel, it is naturally two-sided, but the partners are not equal, the burden being unequally distributed between the two contracting parties.[1] The dominant partner is the Divine Lord of the Covenant.[2] He, this absolute transcendent God, who out of his freedom has chosen Israel, breaks in on his people in his dealings with them and moulds them to his will, giving them knowledge of his being, and this creates an act of trust. Porteous[3] claims that this absolute transcendence of the one partner makes it possible for him to lay down the conditions and to demand obedience which will express itself in certain ethical patterns of conduct, by the other partner. God is always the strong partner, and He imposes the conditions which must be carried out; but he enables Israel to carry these out by his grace. "We may say, in fact, that the God of the Old Testament evidently loves covenant-making with his people Israel."[4] The Covenant therefore is a gift of God: He has entered into it freely, He can dissolve it or annul it at

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1. Eichrodt, p.36
2. Cf. Barth, Dogmatics, I/1, p.235, on the inequality of our relationship with God.
3. New Peake Commentary, p.153
4. Knight, p.189

any time. Only He can do so; Israel cannot.[1]

4. Quality of Covenant Relationship

Even within this extremely unequal relationship, the quality of the Covenant-relationship can vary. It can partake of the warmest qualities known in human relationships or be almost inhuman and impersonal in character. I would illustrate this from two of the scholars we are considering.

> "The berith, then, the covenant bond, was but the outer husk of the nut. Inside there lay the covenant fellowship as the real inner kernel of the union between God and Israel. Now, this inner heart of the bond was known by the Hebrew word hesedh."[1]

We may compare this following statement made by Eichrodt:

> "It is the manifestation of power with which Yahweh preludes the actual covenant-making which gives the Yahweh worship of the Mosaic period this character of trembling prostration before the jealous God, who will admit no derogation from his majesty.... The terrifying power of God, who will turn his weapons of leprosy, serpent and plague (Cf. Ex. 4.17; Num. 21.6f; Num.11.33f.) even against his own people, leaves men in no doubt that the covenant he has created is no safe bulwark behind which they can make use of the divine power to prosecute their own interests. The covenant lays claim to the whole man and calls him to surrender with no reservations."[2]

Now there is all the difference between these two covenant relationships. The first implies a close, loving quality; in the second, God is outlined as a "distanced", menacing, almost sadistic, figure. The paradoxical nature of the character of God as both loving and just, merciful and angry, has occupied

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1. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.195
2. Eichrodt, p.45

man's thought in all ages.

The prophets sought to make the people realize that the quality of the relationship depended on their conduct, that their link with God was, in some way, conditional on obedience to His will; for above all else God demanded fidelity and loyalty to him alone. There are dangers in this doctrine that adversities and misfortunes which fall on people in life are to be regarded as punishments which God inflicts upon his people because of their transgressions; one great question mark was raised against it in the Book of Job. Another danger is that of legalism, for when the will of God is embodied in laws and codes, the code becomes all-important and the relationship is forgotten: the one who raised the voice of protest against this was Jeremiah. Perhaps it was due to this latter reason that the prophets were shy of the term "covenant" and preferred to speak of the relationship between God and his people in more personal metaphors.[1]

In one writer in the Old Testament, however, we find the use both of personal metaphors and of the Covenant concept side by side. In the book of the prophet Hosea, the paradox of loving and a just God finds its most vivid expression. Eichrodt speaks of "the quite emotional power of love as the ultimate basis of the covenant relationship."[2] Hosea compares Israel to Yahweh's wife (Hos. 2), to his favourite child (Hos.11.i) and perhaps to

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1. See Eric Heaton, Old Testament Prophets, p.63
2. Eichrodt, p.251

a pet animal trained to plough (Hos. 11.4). But the dominant model used is that of the intimate, personal union of marriage which has broken down, one drawn from his own experience. It is this tender love of God, who wooed Israel which cannot let the disobedient nation go: it prevents him from drawing the darker conclusions of the earlier prophet, Amos, who could see nothing but disaster coming to Israel. Amos was detached and showed no feeling of sympathy towards those whom he denounced; Hosea was involved, implicated and could not go so far. Yahweh loves Israel and cannot let Israel go.

> How can I give you up O Ephraim!
> How can I hand you over, O Israel!...
> My heart recoils within me,
> My compassion grows warm and tender.
> I will not execute my fierce anger,
> I will not again destroy Ephraim:
> for I am God and not man,
> the Holy One in your midst,
> and I will not come to destroy. (Hos.11.8-9)

Here is identification in suffering of one whom he regards as dear. The dominant word is hesedh, which is steadfast, devoted love, which "corresponds to some extent to the New Testament word agape."[1]

But Hosea has also strong words to say about the breaking of the Covenant. (6.7-10; 8.1f.) He is horror-stricken at the priesthood, and claims that the people have no knowledge. (4.1; 4.6-8; 5.1; 6.9) Lying, stealing, killing, committing

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1. Porteous, New Peake Commentary, p.156

adultery are to be found in place of knowledge of God.[1] Hosea claims that people do not know Yahweh because they seek after the right cultus and forget right conduct. As with the other prophets, the meeting of the ethical requirements of God, of recognizing his works and acknowledging his demands is knowing him.[2]

One can conclude, therefore, that when a man or a people sins, God withdraws his hesedh, and the covenant is suspended.[3] There is always a reason for God's suspending, abrogating or annulling the Covenant, and that reason is to be found in man or in Israel. ThenGod is no longer near to his people; he becomes "distanced" and menacing, wholly other and transcendent.[4]

The distance is reduced or diminished by the knowledge of God, which is obedience to him. Therefore along with hesedh, which speaks of the loving kindness and almost feminine, maternal character of God, there is rahamain which means compassion and is derived from the word meaning "womb", so again we have the

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1. Obedience to the will of God as the condition of knowing him, is also developed in Jeremiah, in the well-known passage where he denounces Josiah's ne'er-do-well son, Jehoiakin, and says of Josiah: "He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? saith the Lord." (22.16)
2. See Heaton, Old Testament Prophets, p.66, p.115-123
3. See Jer. 16.5
4. This will be dealt with later when considering the myth of Adam andEve.

emphasis on the mother-love of God.[1] Also linked with Yahweh's hesedh is His mishpat, his righteousness, his right behaviour, which requires in man a similar response as to God's hesedh, in right behaviour and conduct.[2]

These intimate qualities, however, become lost, when man, or rather Israel, sins himself into the wrath of God. Knight asserts that "the attitude of the all-holy God to sinful Israel is that of wrath against, not the sin, but the sinner."[3] Eichrodt also affirms:-

> "This connection between God's anger and human sin is a standard element in the religious beliefs of all civilized people among whom the Deity is worshipped as the guardian of justice and keeper of laws."[4]

Eichrodt admits, however, that unlike holiness and righteousness, wrath is never one of the permanent attributes of the God of

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1. See Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.196 and Schofield p. 100. Schofield says that to express the sentiment, "to believe in God" or "to put your trust in him", the word aman is employed, which is used in Hebrew of the child taking in food trustfully at the breast - relying on God as a baby relies on his mother. See Schofield, p.40-1.
2. Eichrodt points out that this word was not originally a formal concept as iustitia distributiva (p.239), but that later Judaism interpreted it as such, as the impersonal allocation of rewards and punishments according to the standards of the law. In origin, mishpat was not impersonal at all, but referred to a quality of personality which transcended all laws and standards, an essentially religious quality; and this is how Deutero-Isaiah develops it.
3. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.122 Knight quotes: Exod. 32.9-10; Cf. Jer. 12.8
4. Eichrodt, p.259

Israel, and can only be understood as a footnote to the "will to fellowship of the covenant God." He would argue, with Knight, that it is never impersonal.[1]

We have considered the fact of different qualities operating within the inherent relationship of the Covenant. One must mention one of its finest achievements, in addition to the "interior attitude to history" already dealt with, and this is the sense of unity which was given to the nation through the imposition of a common law and religious system. Whether this was done by Moses or not is a matter of debate. Perhaps the welding of the tribes was not accomplished until the time of Saul and David, and the "laws" came even later than that. How far these laws were original or borrowed from the religious systems of other nations, or from secular thought, scholars must decide. If we look at the "wall", rather than the "stones", a magnificent edifice was built around the concept of Yahweh as Legislator or Lawgiver. Law, however, does not mean simply legalism but has a much wider connotation, for torah meant instruction and much besides.[2]

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1. This differs from the argument in Dodd: "Romans" who would see wrath as an inevitable process of cause and effect in a moral universe, and would not wish to attribute to God the irrational passion of anger. (p.24) Dodd would not see it as a personal action; cf. A. Hanson, The Wrath of the Lamb. Eichrodt, however, would say that whilst God's anger operates in individual act, it is his loving-kindness and righteousness which are permanent.
2. See G.A.F. Knight, Law and Grace, p.51-4; Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.75f., where he asserts that torah is the authoratitive basis of the whole religious life and thought of the Jewish people. (p.77) See also Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, p.25-41

5. Other Attributes in the Old Testament Conception of God

a) The Holiness of God, with which is associated the "Numinous", the mysterium tremendum et fascinans as developed by Otto, is regarded by Eichrodt as the marvellous power which removes God from common life and is shared by other near Eastern religions.[1] However, in Hebrew thought holiness is ascribed more to the deity than to sacred objects, and it had, for example in Isaiah, a moral, ethical quality, signifying dedication to God's will. Thus the system of taboo is pressed into the service of a higher God. This aspect of God's inapproachability and perfection was stressed by the Priestly editors - Yahweh's complete wholly otherness and utter transcendence as compared with all other created things. But his inapproachability, inaccessibility and hiddenness are also found in the Sinai narrative, which suggests that von Rad's contention that it is a cluster of traditions from many ages is correct.

b) Related to this wholly-otherness of God, Eichrodt quotes Archbishop Søderblom of Uppsala, who speaks of God not as a loving father or as a judge of sin, but "that sense of God, characteristic of a Luther or a Pascal, which struggles on the edge of an abyss of despair." Eichrodt adds:-

> "A Christianity which has ceased to be aware of this ultimate fact of the opposition between God and his creatures would have lost that note of absolute urgency without which the Gospel entrusted

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1. Eichrodt, p.270. Otto, The Idea of the Holy

> to it can never be other than unthinking and superficial."[1]

We have here the Kierkegaardian "infinite qualitative distinction" which is the starting point of so much of modern dialectical theology.[2]

c) To this aspect we need to add the other "commonly accepted 'natural' divine attributes" as Knight calls them - God is eternal, (Ps. 90.2), unchanging (Ps. 90.4)(Mal.3.6), omniscient (Isa. 40.28), omnipotent (Isa. 40.15, and Ps.139.12) and as Creator (Isa. 40.26; Gen.1.1 etc.).[3]

6. The Practice of Sacrifice

Although we have considered largely the theology of the Old Testament with reference particularly to the nature of God, something must be said about the practice of sacrifice. There has been argument whether sacrifices were intended to be propitiatory, in the sense of their efficacy depending on changing the mind of God, or expiatory, in the sense that any change should be in the mind of the worshipper.[4]

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1. ibid., p.276-7
2. See Barth, Epistle to the Romans, (English translation) Preface to the 2nd edition, p.10. "God is in heaven and thou art on earth." Regarding the Old Testament, Knight, p.89: "God's essence is divinity, while man's is only personality." Knight quotes the chant of the angels in Isaiah's vision,(Chap.6) as an example of God's being utterly other than his created world, utterly transcendent.
3. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.94-6
4. Cf. Dodd in Romans, p.54-5 on hilasterion (Gk.) and Vincent Taylor in Jesus and His Sacrifice, p.51-2 on Kipper (Hebr.)

There are certainly texts where it appears that God's attitude could be changed by sacrifice, e.g., Gen. 8.21, where God, as a result of Noah's sacrifice says that he will never again destroy every living creature; also, in II Sam. 24.25 where the Lord heeded a sacrifice and turned away the plague (cf. I Sam. 26.19). It seems therefore that both ideas are present.

7. Summaries.

For summaries of the Old Testament conception of God, Knight says that He is "sovereign Lord of all, as King and Creator of the ends of the earth."[1] Eichrodt regards the picture of God in ancient Israel as "the attempt to hold together the ideas of a divine power without limitation and of a divine act of self-limitation in the establishment of the covenant - an act whereby God makes himself known as sovereign and personal will."[2] He adds that "the ultimate secret of divine personhood is manifested as love concealed in wrath, redeeming righteousness, the loving-kindness that remains constant despite the instability of the covenant."

8. Conclusions.

In so short a review of current Old Testament studies, there are bound to be many omissions and deficiencies. Nevertheless, in this statement one cannot fail to observe the similarity between its presentation and the current dogmatic trends in

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1. A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.95
2. Eichrodt, p.286-7

continental theology. It is not merely descriptive, but, as Barr has said "descriptive-authoritative". Barr also, whilst admitting that this synthetic approach to the Old Testament is necessary, regards it as a mistake to assume that this is the final approach or the highest or deepest stage in Biblical study. From our point of view we must also endorse Barr's criticism that it disregards the psychological and subjective factors, and that the interests of dogmatics dominate.[1] Little reference is made to the borrowing by the Hebrew writers from other systems of thought; to admit this would no doubt detract from the idea of Revelation which is fundamental for most of these scholars, even if it is not mentioned specifically. Revelation is a concept which has been taken for granted in theology until recently; in view of this, a digression on the idea of revelation may not be out of place at this juncture in the enquiry.

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1. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, p.274-5 and elsewhere. Barr adds that the interests of dogmatics dominate "over responsible exegesis." This I am not qualified to judge!

CHAPTER III

REVELATION

INTRODUCTION

It may seem rather odd to have a chapter on the subject of Revelation at this stage in the enquiry, when our primary concern is monotheism in the Old Testament. However, Revelation happens to be a concept which is used so widely in most theological writing today, that it is impossible to ignore it. Among the Biblical dogmatic theologians it is particularly conspicuous, where often it is used as an autonomous concept operating in its own right, resisting the interference of disciplines other than theology. When one comes up against revelation, as in an enquiry such as this, one is therefore confronted with a stumbling stone which can appear to block further progress. Revelation concerns God, we are told; it is its own criterion, it has nothing to do with man, only in so far as God discloses himself to man. To make psychodynamic inroads in face of such a concept seems an impossibility. However, I believe that this stumbling-block can be removed, and that we can see much more of the activities of man within this concept than his being a mere passive receiver.

We would point out that the concept does not always mean the same thing in the hands of different theologians; too often it is taken for granted and used without definition. Now it is an impossibility to review all usages by the writers, so a

selection is necessary. To make an arbitrary beginning, I turn to my own theological teachers, H.H. Farmer and C.H. Dodd, who with John Baillie and Leonard Hodgson can be regarded as moderate in expression. We shall then considerBritish scholars whose position displays a hardening in their use of the term, due no doubt to the influence of Karl Barth. We shall then proceed to detail Barth's position at some length, and then it will be critically examined from three angles. After this we shall pass to two views of Revelation which are in the main acceptable to us, Wheeler Robinson and Tillich; finally, we will draw conclusions.

THE PROBLEM OF REVELATION

In his book, The World and God, H.H. Farmer would have revelation clearly distinguished from discovery, as with the latter there is activity on one side only, and it deals with impersonal objects which cannot convey themselves to us. Revelation is a two-term personal relationship, and refers to an activity of impartation. In religion, revelation implies the action of the living God entering into personal rapport with the soul, as holy will, or absolute demand, asking obedience and guaranteeing that through it the soul will receive its ultimate succour. It is a personal experience, not a revelation of propositional truths, and the proper response to it is faith, which involves obedience and trust.[1] Similarly C.H. Dodd regards revelation as a meeting of man with God in and through the world of things and events, the initiative lying with God, who speaks to us from beyond this world. He too would distinguish revelation from discovery. "The Word of God", a phrase which Dodd regards as a metaphor which is a meaningful one, comes as both judgement and the power of renewal, and calls for a response from man which is obedience. One difference between Dodd and Farmer is that the former ties up revelation with history. Dodd also sees the act of revelation as more than a psychological

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1. The World and God, p.65,85

experience; the psychology deals with the mechanism, but is unable to say anything about the validity of the experience or the truth of the interpretation of life which it conveyed.[1] Dodd argues that the "test of revelation lies in the fact that if the thing which they think they received from God acts creatively in human life", then we must conclude that those who received the revelation were not deceived.[2]

Leonard Hodgson is another theologian who uses the concept extensively. For revelation to take place, there must be "both the divinely given revelatum and also the psychological predisposition to appreciate it on the part of the human recipient."[3] Hodgson distinguishes between propositional statements and the revelatum, the former bearing record to the latter. Hodgson regards the doctrine of the Trinity as a product of rational reflection on the self-revelation of God; but it could not have been discovered by man's reason alone apart from revelation.[4]

John Baillie both in his book on the subject[5] and in other writings, follows similar lines; he quotes Caird[6] that "the

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1. The Bible Today, p.99,101; The Authority of the Bible, p.84
2. The Authority of the Bible, p.274
   Farmer also develops the concept of revelation in his Gifford Lectures, in which he follows largely Brunner in claiming that God uniquely and savingly gives himself "personally to man in his sinful darkness and perversion.", Revelation and Religion, p.40-1.
3. The Doctrine of the Trinity, p.28-9
4. ibid., p.25,35
5. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought.
6. The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, 1899, p.39.

primary organ of religious knowledge is not reason but faith," and Oepke[1] that revelation is the "self-disclosure of God", and not the communication of supernatural knowledge. Baillie endorses Tillich's view of revelation as "the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately", which is "the ground of our being", but he cannot agree with Tillich when he ties it up with the experience of ecstasy. "In what is given," writes Baillie, "there can be no imperfection of any kind, but there is always imperfection in what we may call the 'receiving apparatus'."[2] As in all Baillie's writings, there is a tendency to give priority to knowledge and will, with a corresponding blight on all things emotional. In his Gifford Lectures that "sense of the presence of God" is devoid largely of emotional tone. He connects faith with the cognitive element and makes the emotional and volitional elements depend on the cognitive,[3] and later on he refers to faith as only cognitive and volitional, without mentioning any emotional element.[4] As a true Kantian, he distrusts the emotions, and this may be why he cannot accept Tillich's ecstasy, (although Tillich was not referring to pure emotion.) Religious awareness or faith may concern "the bottom of the heart" as well as "the top of the mind", but are there not emotions residing in those

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1. In Kittel's Theological Word Book of the New Testament, p.28
2. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, p.43
3. The Sense of the Presence of God, p.65
4. ibid., p.90

depths - or anywhere significant?[1] His basic position can be best stated by the following quotation:-

> "What is true in any religious system is from God; what is false is of our own imagining. Man can know nothing of God except as God reveals himself to him. No man can by searching find out God, except as God himself takes the initiative both in prompting the searching and directing the finding."[2]

We would now pass to the consideration of the work of two scholars whose position displays considerably more "hardening" than the above: this we would attribute to the influence of Karl Barth. The first is George S. Hendry[3]

> "The proper subject of revelation is God, God himself in his being and works. God reveals himself, and we are dependent on his revelation of himself for all our knowledge of God."[4]

In other words, whilst other religions claim to have ideas of revelation, we only find revelation in the strict and absolute sense in the Bible. "Here God himself is at once the subject and object of it." His article contains many texts from the Bible to illustrate his view-point, but in many of them the word revelation or the idea of it does not occur; he has read it into them. (E.g., Amos 2.10; Hos.11.1; Ps.81.10, all of which can be understood without the word "revelation".) Hendry states that the purpose and end of revelation is the establishment of personal relations between God and man, and that Jesus Christ

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1. Baillie's position is little altered in this matter since he wrote in 1926 The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul.
2. The Sense of the Presence of God, p.187-8
3. Article on Revelation in A Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. Alan Richardson.
4. ibid., p.196, col.1.

is the key to the understanding of the revelation of God.[1] A naive, unquestioning acceptance is the most appropriate response to revelation, and that there is no criterion of revelation apart from revelation itself.[2]

Perhaps the strongest claim made for revelation by a British theologian is to be found in Alan Richardson.[3]

> "Theology as a science stands or falls with the category of revelation; if there is no distinctively Christian revelation in history, the special categories of theology will not be needed, and in place of theology the scientific study of religion could be more competently undertaken by the psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists."

In fairness, it must be pointed out that Richardson does not object to the work of various disciplines having relations one with another, and that insights from one discipline are able to illuminate another. He is also willing to admit that theology, like other scientific pursuits, is conditioned by the categories which the investigators adopt. But as other disciplines have their special categories for their work, so has theology, and its category is revelation, and he is averse to any dilution of the concept of revelation.[4]

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1. ibid., p.198, col. 1.
2. ibid.,
3. Christian Apologetics, p.57
4. Similarly, David Cairns in A Gospel without Myth speaks of the supreme loyalty and only one loyalty to the revelation of God in Christ (p.19) and that theology is a subsidiary norm, itself under revelation (p.19), and that theological concepts can never cut themselves adrift from the event of revelation, since they have this event as their object. (p.62)

Finally, the most popularized radical theologian of today has reiterated Richardson's words, albeit unacknowledged, "Christianity stands or falls by revelation..."[1]

The reason for the distinctive place given to revelation in most theologians may in part be due to the prominence it has been given in the writing of continental dogmatic theologians, and their great influence over all theology today. Karl Barth gives it the central place in his dogmatic, and, as we shall see, his doctrine of the Trinity is largely held together by this concept and is dominated throughout by it. His concept of revelation has percolated through to Biblical studies, and has influenced very many scholars; therefore it will be best to consider it at this point.

Barth's position begins with the fundamental separation between God and man.[2] On the one side is the wholly other sovereign transcendent God, who would not be known unless He revealed Himself.

> "G O D reveals Himself. He reveals Himself T H R O U G H H I M S E L F. He reveals H I M S E L F. If we wish really to regard revelation from the side of its subject, God, then over and above all we must understand that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation, identical also with its effect."[3]

In revelation God becomes God a second time, his alter-ego,

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1. John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God, p.128
2. A good statement of it can be found in John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, p.17-27
3. Church Dogmatics, I/1, p.340

his own double, distinguishing himself from Himself. God cannot be known by man because of his sinfulness and because He is qualitatively different from man who is fallen creaturely.

> "Acknowledgement of the Word of God by man is thus, of course, approval of the Word of God by man, but not such approval as is based upon persuasion between equals, but such as is based upon obedience, upon submission as between the utterly unequal. To have experience of the Word of God is to give way before its superiority."[1]

> "...He cannot be known by the powers of human knowledge, but is apprehensible and apprehended solely because of His freedom, decision and action."[2]

Knowledge of God, therefore, can only come from God as He reveals Himself, otherwise He would be unknown.

> "Revelation in the Bible means the s e l f - u n v e i l i n g, imparted to man, of the God who according to His nature cannot be unveiled to men. The element of self-unveiling in this definition may be described not as the logical material, but as the historic centre of the Biblical concept of language."3

Barth goes on to speak of this God "who according to His nature cannot be unveiled to man" as, nevertheless, One who "unveils Himself there". This is done by a sheer miracle of grace coming down vertically from above, as between God and man a great gulf is fixed, there being nothing common to God and man.

> "Without revelation man is unaware that there is a Lord, that he, man, has a Lord, and that God is this Lord. He is aware of it through revelation."[4]

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1. ibid., I/1, p.235
2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.23
3. Church Dogmatics, I/1, p.362
4. ibid., I/1, p.352

Therefore we are wholly dependent upon God's giving us that knowledge of Himself; for revelation does not mean creation by man, but something imparted to man.[1] Nowhere in the Bible do we find that man can produce revelation for himself.

God has provided us with this revelation who is His Word in Jesus Christ, of whom the scriptures testify. "God's Word is identical with God Himself."[2] Revelation, however, is "not real or true from the standpoint of anything else, either in itself or for us."[3] and we have to stand or move within its closed circle or stay out.

However, the closed circle is not that of the Gospel account of Jesus, for Barth regards Jesus of Nazareth as rather "commonplace alongside more than one other founder of a religion and even alongside many later representatives of His own "religion".[4] The closed circle in which knowledge comes to us is in personal encounter in and through the Word which He has addressed to us in Jesus Christ. Truth can only be known by God's revelation of Himself in Christ, therefore dogmatics is largely a study of Christology.

Barth regards religion as man's attempt to reach God, and that it is discontinuous with faith in the revelation which comes to us from God's side wholly and completely as an act of grace.

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1. ibid., I/1, p.376
2. ibid., I/1, p.349
3. ibid., I/1, p.350
4. ibid., I/1, p.188

"Religion" to Barth represents man's unbelief, his faith in himself. He therefore has no basic disagreement with writers like Feuerbach (or Freud, for that matter) who claimed that religion was a projection of man's ideas of God.[1] The psychology of religion can investigate religious experience, but it cannot tell us anything about the God who chooses from his own freedom and sovereignty to reveal himself, for the simple reason that, as we have seen, fallen man has no point of contact with God at all. How then can man receive the revelation? The answer lies in the Divine Revelation of the Word of God creating the capacity, which we by our fallen nature lack: God himself has to awaken the faith and this has no relation with religious experience at all. God's action in giving us his Word in Christ is the sole basis of our knowledge of God; anything which is derived from human efforts, human thought for example, cannot be God at all; no human concepts can possibly "hold" the idea ofGod, for He can be fitted into nothing which man by himself devises.

One such devising is the doctrine of analogy in relation to God. Barth rules out the whole method of analogy in the knowing of God; the extension of human models cannot reach God. Therefor the title "Father" as applied to God is not a human model which man has used out of his experience of human relationships to understand the Divine - on the contrary, it is divine

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1. Yet, he also says in true dialectical fashion that Christianity is a true religion!

personality which helps us to understand human personality. The analogy comes in when we speak of our human progenitor as father.[1]

Speaking of Kant's idea of religion within the limits of reason alone as a human function, Barth claims that theology should resign itself

> "...to stand on its own feet in relation to philosophy, in theology recognizing its point of departure in revelation, just as philosophy sees its point of departure in reason, and in theology conducting, therefore, a dialogue with philosophy, and not, wrapping itself up in the mantle of philosophy, a quasi-philosophical method."[2]

It is from such thoughts concerning revelation that we can see the source of the ideas about the subject in Hendry and Richardson, as well as in some of the Old Testament scholars whom we have considered. But we can also see affinities with other theologians; for example, the assertion that revelation is not creation by man, is similar to Farmer's and Dodd's distinction between revelation and discovery; also the fact that psychological investigation of religious experience can tell us nothing about God's nature, is similar to Dodd's contention that religious experience elucidates the knowledge of the mechanism operating but not the content.

Barth's claims for revelation, however, are much more forcibly put than by any other of the theologians we have

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1. See John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p.118f.
2. Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, p.190 (my italics)

considered. It is natural that they have met with much criticism, some of which we will consider.

1. The first criticism lies in Barth's "retreat into revelation,"[1] his making theology's point of departure in this concept, which involves the dismissal of reason and philosophy from the courts of theology. Some of Barth's critics go along with Barth so far as to admit that God not only gives revelation of himself, but also the capacity to receive it in a Buberian "I-Thou" encounter; nevertheless, they claim that the moment we begin to write about it, discuss it, question it and scrutinize it, we are employing philosophical methods, so that philosophy inevitably enters into theologizing. The encounter itself is not theology; but once we begin to describe it and talk about it, we are doing theology with the inevitable aid of philosophy. McIntyre points out that Barth himself spoke of dogmatics in much the same way, as "a laborious advance from one partial insight to another;"[2] and this could mean that he allows a place for creative imagination; but he is speaking here of dogmatics, and not of revelation. Buri's comment is perhaps the most apt here:-

> "Despite their continual emphasis on the humanity of all our utterances, some theologians talk as if they were lecturing to us from heaven on high - "[3]

It is claimed that it is not for us to question the Divine Revelation, rather it questions us! Our duty is to accept it and

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1. Basil Moss, The New Theologians.
2. Barth I/1, p.14
3. Buri, Christian Faith in Our Time, p.59-60

act on obedience.[1]

Is it natural for man to accept everything without questioning? John Macquarrie who himself uses the term "revelation" almost non-dogmatically in the sense that nothing can be known unless in some way it reveals or manifests itself to us,[2] has asked the question: How do we know that "Thus saith the Lord" may not be a veiled way of saying "I'm telling you!"?[3] Perhaps a psychotherapist might say that it was due to an over-determined super-ego! The point is that we can only find out by testing what is alleged to be revelation, using what techniques the human mind has available, using the faculty of reason which the Barthian tends to despise. It is natural for us to test revelation, and not regard it as its own validity or standing in a unique way under the sole control of God. Dodd's test, that if that which we think we have received from God in revelation, acts creatively in human life, then we can conclude that we are not deceived, is practical; if it enables men, says Dodd, to deal with an ever larger area of reality, then it cannot be dismissed. There is nothing unquestioning about this attitude; it involves

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1. It is this side of Barth's teaching which has caused dismay to more liberal-minded theologians, like H.D. Lewis, who in Philosophy of Religion, p.234 discerns in it similar reactionary trends of political dictatorship and authoritarianism to those of the totalitarian states of Central Europe. There is always a danger when God is made "utterely transcendent" that arguments like Paul's "potter and clay" of Romans 9.21 come to the fore. But as C.H. Dodd has reminded us, we are not pots, but persons. ("Romans", p.159)
2. The Honest to God Debate, p.190
3. Twentieth CenturyReligious Thought, p.334

also all the human faculties. One therefore agrees with Hepburn,[1] that it is an enormous and costly illusion that philosophy has to be kept outwith the charmed circles of revealed religion, where Biblical ideas and images, and the Biblical notion of truth have, as is claimed, unchallengable authority.[2] We would wish to extend these criticisms, with which we are in full sympathy, from the realm of philosophy to psychology; for an encounter surely involves not only the God who is being encountered, but the person whom he is encountering. We have quoted Dodd as saying that psychology only deals with the mechanism of the experience, and not its content, and Baillie as relegating all imperfections to what he calls "the receiving apparatus", by which he means the one to whom the revelation is imparted. But one cannot remain satisfied with either of these contentions. We hope to show that psychodynamics can say more than is allowed by any of these theologians, and that a psychological evaluation of the experience itself, in a way, precedes the philosophical theologizing.

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1. Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2. Barth would argue that revelation is a particularly distinctive concept within the realm of faith. William Nicholls in Revelation in Christ, follows in this line and claims that by revelation we have true knowledge of God. (p.15f.) Kraemer in The Christian Message to the Non-Christian World holds that revelation is not a specifically Christian concept, but is a universal religious concept. (p.69 - quoted by Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation?, p.242.) Downing says that Christians have no inside knowledge which distinguishes them from the crowds. Downing, like Hepburn and Macquarrie, argues from outside the "charmed circle"; Nicholls, following Barth, argues from within it.

2. A second criticism levelled against Barth is along the lines of his anthropology. Wingren[1] has claimed that Barth's anthropology determines his hermeneutics, and draws the logical conclusion that man is the centre ofBarth's theology - not the man of faith in the Bible, however, but modern atheistic man of the twentieth century, whom Barth takes over quite uncritically, as a being for whom God does not exist. Because of this assumption, Barth, like Kierkegaard, can only see man and God as distanced from each other. Here again we meet the denigration of man.[2] This extreme distancing of man and God, owing to the view Barth takes of man, has been modified by Barth in his The Humanity of God,[3] in which he posits a manward side to God when he relates to man. This means that the extreme wholly otherness of God is reduced.[4] Barth's essential

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1. Theology in Conflict.
2. "It is impossible...to remain content theologically and philosophically with the divorce which obedience allows - glories in! - between the logical character of human theological discourse and the 'meaning' and 'truth' which is allegedly 'breathed into' it miraculously and independent of its nature.... The value of the human is minimized, denied and deplored ostensibly to glory in the miraculous inspiration of the divine; but such a policy can never lead to a genuine theory of incarnation, only to violation of the debased human by the divine which, instead of 'inspiring' the human, assaults and replaces him." Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and God, p.89. For a truer theory of inspiration, which does not denigrate man, see Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, which we will consider presently.
3. Fontana paperback.
4. Cf. Wheeler Robinson's, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, p.189

anthropology, however, remains.[1]

The dynamics of revelation are claimed to work miraculously and independently of man; yet how should we know anything about them if they did not happen to man; and as such, they should be amenable to psychodynamic investigation; however, the known workings of the mind reveal no such a "take-over" of man as Barth's idea of the workings of revelation seem to suggest. The strength of Barth's position lies in the satisfaction it offers as an intellectual theory; but it can stand up to no empirical tests of any kind; such tests if applied at all could only draw an agnostic conclusion. A word of Jaspers in this connection is relevant:-

> "...whatever is said and done in the name of revelation, is said and done in worldly form, in worldly language, in human acts and human perceptions."[2]

3. What we have just said leads to another charge made against Barth by Wingren, namely, that his whole idea of revelation is over-intellectual. Man's trouble is that he lacks knowledge of God; the answer is given through revelation.

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1. Wingren adds other criticisms and comments, e.g., he states that the Bible's anthropology is determined by the death and resurrection of Christ, and that man's needs are salvation, justification and forgiveness of sins, and a righteousness which is not his own: but Barth regards evil as nothingness, and so underestimates guilt and emnity; also for Barth no account is taken of Law as a preparation for the Gospel, which means that he had to allow a place for law within the Gospel itself, and that rules and regulations are derived from revelation, which is inappropriate. Psychologically speaking, Wingren in this criticism is desiring to present Christian Faith as contained within the "depressive position."
2. Kerygam and Myth, Vol.II, p.167

Wingren also shows that Easter is displaced in the Christian year by Christmas, the idea of the Incarnation takes over from redemption and salvation. Gerald Downing also points out that the intellect is unduly stressed above other faculties and endowments.[1] Downing states that revelation only became important "when Christians began unduly to emphasise the role of the intellect in the service of God." He quotes Gustav Aulen,"The word 'revelation' is heavily burdened with intellectualism."[2] Downing appeals to Freud in support, that only the conscious part of man's mind is affected by this argument from revelation, and he regards it as having no apologetic value for the non-Christian.[3]

So paradoxically, Barth, who is disparaging about man's intellect in his knowing of God, is accused of having the intellect as the determinative factor in his theological schema! Wingren writes:

> "As a gospel of incarnation or 'revelation' the gospel is from the beginning to end conceived intellectually.... Barth has the ability to a very large degree of being able to employ the language of scripture in a system that is totally foreign to the Bible."[4]

4. Fritz Buri[5] sees a tie between atheism and revelational theology. They are "united", claims Buri, "in that they cannot

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1. Has Christiantiy a Revelation?, p.137-9
2. Revelation, p.275, quoted Downing p.249
3. ibid., p.249-253
4. Wingren, p.126
5. Christian Faith in Our Time, p.42

apprehend the God-man, in that they offer no understanding of God apart from a special form of supernatural revelation in the Christ which atheism denies and revelational theology cannot vindicate." He makes the point that the "all or nothing" approach of Barth with revelation as a central concept refuses to face the apologetic concern of preaching the Word of God to unbelievers.[1]

5. One other point must be made before we leave Barth; this is his inversion of human models, so as to make their place of origin in God and not in man, e.g., his idea that when we speak of the Fatherhood of God we are not using a human model, but that we understand human fatherhood from the idea of the Fatherhood of God. Now it is quite true that Clement Webb in his 1918 Gifford Lectures wrote as follows:-

> "Thus what we call the philosophical use of <u>person</u> in the modern European languages has been determined by the use in the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity."[2]

This may be true, but the concept "Father" has always been known by humans from their having had earthly progenitors. One must agree with Macquarrie that although divine fatherhood may be <u>ontologically</u> primary and human analogies are derivative from it, nevertheless, the human analogies are the first

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1. ibid., p.58. Without using the phrase, Buri clearly regards Barthianism as a "defence system", a dogmatism conspicuous for its hostility to reason, which resists such examination because of a number of hidden undisclosed first premisses.
2. <u>God and Personality</u>, p.46

epistemologically.[1] The psychological aspects of this type of inversion will be considered later in this enquiry.

That such a large part of this chapter should have been devoted to the position of Karl Barth is inevitable, as his thinking on this subject has dominated so much contemporary theological writing.

We would now turn to those who are critical of the concept of Revelation, beginning with Downing, to whom we have already made reference; we do so, not because his work is earliest in time, but because it is the fullest and most comprehensive treatment of the subject. His book, Is there a Christian Revelation?, is a shattering treatment of the subject. But it is a most scholarly work.

After a very careful study of those Old Testament passages which have been used by dogmatic scholars as the basis for their concept of revelation, Downing concludes that he cannot find anything to justify the contention that God has revealed himself.[2] He has little sympathy for the oft-made statements of dialectical theologians that even when God does reveal himself or disclose Himself, He remains a hidden God.[3] This kind of statement is

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1. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.324. There is also a discussion of models as used in the Old Testament by Ramsey in Talking about God: Models Ancient and Modern, p.76 of Myth and Symbol (ed. Dillestone). See also R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p.67
2. Is there a Christian Revelation?, p.47
3. E.g. Hendry in The Theological Word Book of the Bible; Barth, Dogmatics, I/1, p.192; Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.73

regarded by Downing as pure nonsense. In the Old Testament knowledge is related to obedience, as in Jer. 22.16, "He judged the cause of the poor and the needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? says the Lord." (R.S.V.) One knows God when one obeys his will and purpose, so there can be no question of such knowledge being revealed.[1] Downing finds the same notion of knowledge being equated with obedience in St Paul.[2] When St Paul said that God had acted decisively to reconcile the world to himself, he did not say that God had revealed himself to the world.[3] In the Synoptic Gospels Jesus reveals the demand of God,[4] and in St John seeing and revealing refer to the physical visibility of Jesus the man; but John also insists that there is no relationship without obedience.[5]

Downing concludes that revelation, as used today by theologians, as a major term for conveying the purport of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, does not occur in the New Testament,[6] so he sets "a very heavy question mark" against contemporary theology which attempts to find "revelation of God" in the Bible, or in the Bible and tradition.[7] Then come the strong words: that if God had intended to reveal himself in Jesus Christ,

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1. Downing ibid., p.205, p.43
2. ibid., p.71-2
3. ibid., p.86-7
4. ibid., p.89
5. ibid., p.100-1
6. ibid., p.123
7. ibid., p.161

he failed. Moreover, a revelation of what cannot be seen is not a revelation.[1] The term revelation should be kept for the fulfilment of some future eschatological hope: to regard it as a present fact is "pernicious nonsense". The result of this enquiry, Downing argues, is that the great dogmatic structures based on the concept rest on shaky foundations. Other terms should therefore be used in place of revelation, e.g., salvation is a better term to understand the Biblical message; salvation would lead to commitment in dependence and obedience to God.[2]

Such a "root and branch" criticism of this popular concept has not passed without comment. John A.T. Robinson gives Downing a rather cool reception in his review of the book.[3] He argues that for the layman to be told that Christianity has "salvation" rather than a "revelation" does not get him very much further or leave him with many fewer unanswered questions. He claims that Downing's view of the Gospels is not a balanced one. However, in fairness, it should be pointed out that Downing was not writing for the layman but for theologians.

However, other writers have taken the same line as Downing. James Barr[4] too says that the Biblical word is considerably less comprehensive than its modern usage. He points out amongst other matters that there is no reference to revelation in either Exodus

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1. ibid., p.238
2. ibid., p.283,289
3. Prism, No. 92, p.64
4. 'Revelation' in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible, 1963.

or the account of Mount Sinai. The word is not very frequently employed in the Bible and its distribution is unequal.

> "The now common theological use of 'revelation' for divine self-communication in general needs to be criticised wherever it has grown too far away from Biblical usage."

and

> "It is doubtful whether the common theological use of 'revelation' for divine self-communication is appropriate in the light of Biblical usage."[1]

John McIntyre can be counted as one in this tradition. He speaks of the "Revelation Model", which implies that it is a construct of the mind of man classing it as a second or third-order model, and, no doubt, following on from Downing, he says:

> "It has always seemed to me to be a strange anomaly that the concept of revelation which has become such a popular term in modern theology should have so little biblical basis for its employment."[2]

Now we turn to psychological objections to the concept of revelation as outlined by Barth. The term of Philip Rieff, which he applied to Freud's concept of the Unconscious-"God-term"-naturally suggests itself. However, the use of such a term might please some Revelational theologians, for this is what they are claiming! "God-term" would be descriptive rather than critical! What one wishes to say is that the way the concept "Revelation"

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1. ibid., p.849
2. The Shape of Christology, p.153. The criticisms of Jaspers and Buri, have been referred to earlier. It is significant that Bultmann still holds to the concept. He refers to the term as meaning not communication of teachings, or philosophy or theological understandings, but God speaking directly to me summoning me in my own humanity, which is null without God. (Kerygma and Myth, II p.192.)

has been used has provided men with an Absolute, an infallibility, which in turn permits an opportunity for the exercising of and capitalizing on omnipotent thought, the undying omnipotent wishes of man. To this we will return. We may take up the earlier criticism made, that the concept over-values the intellect which it consciously despises, at the expense of the other parts of the human psyche, as both Downing and Wingren point out. The intellect is seated in the ego, therefore revelation makes its appeal to the ego; but one would argue even more to the super-ego! For the more authoritarian revelation becomes, the more God and man are distanced, the more it appeals to the super-ego-orientated character, based on the "depressive position"; the natural consequence is unquestioning obedience to the authority behind the revelation, as the only hope for the person who receives it, for he is assumed to be fallen and his mind corrupted. In Barth particularly, the psychological side is ruled out, as playing no part in the revelation. It is our contention, however, that the human side needs to be stressed quite as much in theology as it now is in scientific studies; for it is by personal participation that we can learn anything at all. Without the personal, subjective side of man it is doubtful whether revelation could ever take place. One is reminded of words heard once at a conference:

> "The denial of the subjective is the greatest repression of all; repression against subjectivity

> is as much a defence against reality as is phantasy."[1]

If we are to continue to employ this concept in a fully significant way a place for the personal participation of man, his subjective part must be found. Without it, there could be nothing which could be called revelation, or, shall we say, knowledge of God.

We would therefore turn to two scholars who have taken this aspect into account. The first is Wheeler Robinson, and the second, Paul Tillich.

In his book, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, Wheeler Robinson considers revelation always along with the subjective aspects. Admitting that we cannot move directly from the Biblical material and witness to the outlook of the modern world, without some form of explication, adjustment or prior criticism, he also sees difficulty involved in making this kind of judgement.

> "It is useless to enquire exactly what happened at Carmel, and what might have been seen by a cold, dispassionate spectator of scientific temper; there were no such people there."[2]

The psychology of the Hebrews no more satisfies us today than does their mythological account of creation as scientific historical fact, or their moralistic way of writing history. The Hebrews understood all activity as the activity of God; much,

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1. Dr. Kenneth Soddy at the Congress of The Institute of Religion and Medicine at Birmingham, 1966, quoting a Dutch psychiatrist.
2. Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, p.45

therefore, that is subsumed under direct divine activity would be understood by us under other concepts such as natural law, (and we may add psychodynamics!). Many of their beliefs are impossible to us.

> "Just because the Hebrew was not aware of many mental processes familiar to ourselves, he could more easily ascribe their products to the direct revelation of God. But there is no reason why we should not think of God as working through such activities, physical or psychical. They do not necessarily offer an alternative explanation of the event; they can equally well be a fuller and more adequate account of it than the Hebrew was able to give. Scientific knowledge can never invalidate religious faith, however much it may lead to the re-statement of the ways and means of God.... A change of emphasis in the manner of proof does not discredit the validity of the message."[1]

Wheeler Robinson claims that the unit of revelation is not the event, but the interpreted event. It is in the interpretation of the event that we find the revelation; but that interpretation is naturally private and personal for it necessarily involves an interpreter. For Wheeler Robinson the revelation is not "nothing else than" interpretation, for he believes that it comes from a transcendent source, but it:-

> "can be studied only from the point at which it makes contact with our experience. From that point its activities do submit themselves to our analysis. The theology of revelation has for its counterpart or rather its necessary constituent, the psychology of inspiration."[2]

Now this was written before Downing and Barr did their

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1. ibid., p.184
2. ibid., p.173

iconoclastic work on the concept of revelation, and Wheeler Robinson uses the word therefore in its broad sense. One would ask what this transcendent source is? Is it the supernatural, to which some theologians would give the name of God?[1] For the moment, however, I would leave this and consider the "necessary counterpart", whilst expressing my whole-hearted agreement with this emphasis on the psychology of inspiration.

It is interesting in this respect to see what Knight wrote about Moses, and how far, in spite of his very different theological standpoint, he illustrated Wheeler Robinson's point.[2] (The following illustrations are italicized by myself.)

> "The all-important matter is that Moses <u>was clearly convinced</u> that he had met, at the Burning Bush, with nothing less than a revelation of the Word of God...."
>
> "...Moses must have <u>discovered</u> that the physical phenomenon before his material eye was the objective sign of <u>his own subjective experience</u> of the Word of God forming within <u>his inner consciousness</u>."
>
> "...Moses had <u>sufficient insight</u> to regard each and every incident in the Exodus nexus of events as <u>meaningful</u> in the sight of God."[2]

Leaving aside Knight's acceptance of revelation in the story, his acceptance too of the Moses saga as history, and the Barthian language concerning the Word of God forming within Moses' inner consciousness, we have in this description some very highly personal, subjective terms - convinced... discovered... his own subjective experience... his inner consciousness... sufficient

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1. E.g., Porteous in New Peake, p.155
2. <u>A Christian Theology of the Old Testament</u>, p.44f.

insight... meaningful. He describes for us precisely what Wheeler Robinson is claiming, for he makes revelation depend on the necessary counterpart, or the subjectivity of Moses, on the value-judgement which Moses makes of the Burning Bush incident, and on his relating it to the future events. Unfortunately, Knight does not carry through the inherent logic of what he says, for he goes on to speak of God being known by His Name in His Self-Revelation.

Wheeler Robinson sees the intuitional value-judgement playing a great part in the actual process of revelation.[1] He has little sympathy with those who wish to find in the authority of revelation some form of external guarantor, like the Bible or the Church. To them he asks the further question: "Who guarantees the guarantor?"[2] The process of revelation inevitably brings us back to some form of intuition; the presence of a value-judgement is inescapable.

> "The intuition of a value-judgement, therefore, is exactly what we ought to expect when personal Reality reveals itself to persons. Tradition and reason will more or less co-operate, either to introduce or to conform, but the ultimate basis of the conviction will have come in this way, involving all the faculties of the personality."[3]

> "In the law and in the prophets, the revelation is usually described as 'spoken' by God to man. This externalization of the process was inevitable, with the given psychological limitations, in order to express the authority of the revelation. But the

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1. ibid., p.194-6
2. ibid., p.273
3. ibid., p.274

> historic form of the event, the actual way in which it came about, must have been much more intimate than an external voice in order to secure the necessary nucleus of conviction."[1]

So, Wheeler Robinson asserts that the psychological analysis of the experience cannot be dispensed with, and it always brings us back to some point of an unconscious intuition. "...the authority of revelation was secured by a personal conviction."

The second theologian who is willing to admit that there is a subjective participation within revelation is Paul Tillich. Not only does revelation have a subjective reference; God also is subjectively involved, as he is spoken of as that which unconditionally and ultimately concerns <u>us</u>, as the Ground of <u>our</u> Being.[2]

With Tillich we return to the terminology similar to that which we met in our consideration of the Existentialist Analysts in Part One (Chapter V). Like them, Tillich makes use of Husserl's phenomenological method as competent to deal with logical meanings, but it is only partially competent to deal with matters in the realm of the spirit, like religion. He therefore adopts what he calls "critical phenomenology" which unites two separate elements: (a) an intuitive-descriptive element, which provides the technique by means of which the meaning which is manifest in the example is portrayed; and (b) an existential-critical element, which provides the criterion by which each example of

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1. ibid., p.274
2. <u>Systematic Theology</u>, Vol.I, p.14

revelation is selected. This approach with these two qualifiers involves much more than a pure phenomenological, presuppositionless approach. Pure phenomenology would run the danger of making experience itself/the sole source of systematic theology, and this would open the door to all kinds of heresies.[1] The existentialist-critical element acts as a safeguard, together with Tillich's positing revelation in Christ as final.

Tillich gives various definitions of revelation. It is the manifestation of something hidden which cannot be approached through the ordinary ways of gaining knowledge; revelation, however, does not dissolve the mystery into knowledge.[2] It is also the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately, for mystery which is revealed is of ultimate concern to us, because it is the ground of our being. Tillich would exclude everything, however, that is not of ultimate concern to us and that which is not of essential mystery.[3] As well as being the manifestation of the ground of being, it is also the depth of vision, pointing to the mystery of existence,[4] for the cognitive function of human reason.

> "Knowledge of revelation cannot be separated from the situation of the revelation; knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the revelation of the mystery of being to us, not information about the nature of beings and their relation to one another."[5]

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1. J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p.28
2. Tillich, I/1, p.120
3. ibid., p.123
4. ibid., p.130-1
5. ibid., p.143

He adds later that knowledge of revelation is knowledge of God, of what ultimately concerns us, grasps us and manifests itself to us, and it is always bound up with the cognitive function of reason.

Tillich admits, however, that every revelation is conditioned by the medium in and through which it appears; it only has revelatory power for those who participate in it; it has in the first place to be revelation for someone, who has received it as his ultimate concern. When this takes place we have "original revelation". If, however, others make it their own, then it becomes "dependent revelation". Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi is an example of original revelation; our confession of Jesus as Christ is a dependent one. Tillich claims that there are no revealed doctrines, but only revelatory events and situations which can be described in doctrinal terms. Ecclesiastic doctrines are meaningless if separated from the revelatory situations out of which they have grown.[1]

Tillich also ties up revelation with what he calls "ecstasy", a term which Baillie could not accept. He admits that the word had difficulties, but "a word which expresses a genuine experience can only be dropped if a substitute is at hand, and it does not seem that a substitute has been found."[2] He prefers "ecstasy" to "enthusiasm" which has even more unfortunate connotations.

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1. ibid., p.139
2. ibid., p.118

The original meaning of the word means "standing outside oneself", and no negation or destruction of reason is implied by it; it means that the reason goes beyond its normal uses in the overcoming of the subject-object structure.[1] Reason is raised to a more creative level in which the breach between theoretical detachment and affective union is overcome. The vehicle of revelation is an experience which has become charged with a sense of the depth and mystery of existence.[2] Therefore revelation consists, as J. Heywood Thomas puts it, in a whole constellation of sign events grasped by ecstatic reason, conveying a sense of ultimate concern.[3]

Tillich also speaks of the ground of revelation, and here he links up what he has to say with Otto's Idea of the Holy. The ground is the threat of non-being, of ontological shock, the mysterium tremendum, the annihilating power of the divine presence, over against the mysterium fascinosum, its elevating power. But in revelation the power of non-being is conquered.

Should the question be raised as to where psychological investigation can enter into Tillich's system of revelation, one receives an ambivalent answer. On the one hand, Tillich welcomes all scientific investigation as it protects revelation by detecting the false; science, psychology and history are all alike,

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1. Dorothy Emmet in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p.211 (ed. Kegley and Bretall)
2. ibid., p.211
3. J.H. Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p.50-1

allies of theology. But on the other hand, psychology is unable to interfere with the knowledge of revelation. There appears to be some confusion here; psychology can detect "bad" revelation, but must say nothing about "good" revelation.

Finally, Tillich posits the Christian Church's claim of Jesus Christ as the final unsurpassable, decisive fulfilling revelation as "the bones of all Christian theology", which is universally valid as it contains the criterion of every revelation.[1] The history of revelation and the history of salvation are one and the same thing, for salvation can only occur with a correlation of revelation.[2]

Regarding Tillich's statement about revelation, we have already noticed the use of the existentialist vocabulary, and many of the criticisms made in considering the existential analysts are applicable, particularly the criticism that this whole language of being is a return of metaphysics. In this connection, David Jenkins has found the same tie in Tillich's work which is to be found in Hegel, that link between reason and the pure spirit of the cosmos, now being re-baptised under the name of Being, which likewise appeals to reason; in this aspect he regards Tillich as philosophically old-fashioned.[3]
There is also the criticism from the standpoint of linguistic philosophy made by A.C. Garnett who regards Tillich's views on

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1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, p.148
2. ibid., p.160
3. Guide to the Debate about God, p.89

"being" as sheer error, springing from an elementary failure to understand the logical function of the verb "to be". The verb has a logical function, and even when used existentially refers to nothing particular.[1] One can also discern in Tillich a tautology of "Being's beingness", as much as in Barth of "God's godness".

There are other characteristics of Being which convey themselves to us. Tillich's world of being is an almost static world which has lost motion, and not the dynamic world of action as in the Bible. Although he employs the word "ecstasy", there is a lack of the real emotional disturbance which one finds in the paradigmatic Biblical stories concerned with "original revelation". The whole vocabulary of being is loaded with nebulous ubiquity. Being, Ultimate Concern, Revelation, Ground of Being, God, Essential Mystery, Depth of Vision, Mystery of Existence make one glorious "liquidized mishmash",[2] and they all cohere into a glutinous symbiosis. In fact, we have suggested already that to get behind the subject-object structure one must, in terms of psychological growth, return to the mother-infant cocoon, the symbiosis of the nursing dyad, where the feeling is "oceanic", undifferentiated and almost womb-like. The metaphors which Tillich employs all seem to point in this direction. Now the argument from origins is not an argument against religious

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1. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp.367 & 275
2. The phrase is not original; it comes from Eric Heaton.

experience by any means, as we hope to show in the next section, but this aspect of the employment of maternal symbols must be noted. One value of Tillich's approach lies in his not making revelation something apart from the participator in the actual experience.

Conclusions

This long digression on revelation has been regarded as necessary at this stage of the enquiry because we have seen that the word has been used so much in modern theological writing, that if some of the claims made for it were taken as absolute, then there would be no place for a psychodynamic enquiry such as this. This position occupied by Barth, for example, who posits a transcendent God as not only outside the categories of our thought, but also outside our experience, so that nothing significant can be said about Him unless it were communicated to us by Revelation, would rule this work out of court. I have already shown why I cannot accept this contention.

Tillich, on the other hand, would claim that there are no revealed doctrines such as Barth asserts, but only "revelatory events and situations" which can evidently be described in doctrinal terms: he stresses that doctrines are meaningless if separated from the revelatory situations out of which they have grown. I regard, however, the term "revelatory situations" as one which is already loaded. I much prefer the position of H.D. Lewis. He too rejects the contentions of the dogmatic

theologians, describing their theology as "a set of doctrines abstracted from the context which first gave them significance and presented as if they were meaningful in this way and final in themselves."[1] Of these theologies he says, "There is little attempt at imaginative reconstruction of the situations and experiences which prompted the pronoucements on which the doctrines are based."[2] Dogma, declares Lewis, is derivative.[3] But, derivative of what, we may ask?

The answer would no doubt be the experience within the situation or context. But when we come to the word "experience" we encounter the same difficulties we met in Part One, Chapter VII, when we looked at the idea of metaphysical thought as in Professor Emmet's writings. She regarded the world "experience" as essential and inescapable, but considered also that it presented difficulties, e.g., that we cannot have "raw" experience, devoid of interpretative categories for which we have used the term "metaphysics from below".[4] If we start from this experience which already includes its "metaphysics from below" we may find it necessary to interpret its full meaning and impact of the experience by inferring the idea of God, as a necessary explanatory construct. But God cannot be regarded as a mere construct, a part of our metaphysics from below; once he is posited, he becomes

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1. Philosophy of Religion, p.234
2. Ibid., p.235
3. ibid., p.236
4. After Colin Williams, Faith in a Secular Age, p.42 footnote

a part of a "metaphysics from above", for to posit God means that we are faced with someone, something qualitatively different from us, transcendent, existing in its own right, whose autonomy and absolute character we have to acknowledge. This is what "God" traditionally means.

I would maintain that for this to happen, some interpretation or inference is required, so as to transform "experience" into a "revelatory situation". Inferences and models are still needed, are in fact indispensible for translating the significance of this transcendent being, its relation to us and its intrinsic nature. We are here in a situation like that described by Ian T. Ramsey as "disclosures"[1], and that revelation is given in terms of the language which the man of faith himself feeds into the encounter or experience. In this way religion is no different from science; neither is objective, but both depend on intuitions of the human mind. Value-judgement is as necessary in one as in the other. The mystery confronting us is extrapolated by means of the models applied in order to understand it. But even then, the man of faith realizes that "the other side" is not static, to be explored without response; this "other side" is responding and responsive.

What we have been trying to do is to spell out what Wheeler Robinson was inferring when he spoke of the theology of revelation

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1. Religion and Science, p.24

having for its counterpart or rather its necessary constituent, the psychology of inspiration.[1] He presented this as like two sides of a coin; we have telescoped it outwards and filled in what we regard as its essential meaning.

But if we saw that revelation depends on an intuitive value-judgement, are we not opening the door to every kind of heresy, which would have happened if Tillich had stuck to the phenomenological approach of the Existentialists, and not changed it to a critical phenomenology, including not only the intuitive-descriptive element, but also the existential critical one?[2] Some safeguard to Wheeler Robinson's theory seems to be required; For example, does it square with the consensus of opinion as held? Can it be fitted into an already existing and meaningful tradition? Or can it satisfy Dodd's test that the thing received by revelation works creatively in human life? Or by what Ramsey calls "empirical fit"?[3] But even then, if the other side of revelation is an intuitive evaluation by the recipient, would this not reduce theology to the status of value-judgements, which men have found meaningful in the past, thereby founding a tradition which has eventually been given an objective status? This was Ritschl's contention in the last century. Even if we admit this, we again encounter the further question, as to where

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1. Revelation and Inspiration in the Old Testament, p.173
2. J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p.28
3. Models and Mystery, p.17

psychodynamic evaluations can enter into this matter. I believe that the evaluations must enter in between the experience from which the revelation has been inferred and the theologizing which begins about it, as the psychodynamics themselves were present in the experience. I do not believe that we can ever move straight from experience to theology. "All religious situations may be said to be a matter for psychology since they are obviously owned by and experienced by religious men."[1] As indicated in the Introduction, this is the position to which we wish to adhere throughout this whole enquiry.

The moment, however, we admit psychodyanmics as an ingredient in revelation, we are up against the fact that part of the mystery which confronts man may lie in himself, in the large unconscious, unrecognized parts of himself with which the self-he-knows (his ego) has to deal. Is what he has regarded as wholly-other, God in his majesty transcending man? Or, is it only his own super-ego, who, like Don Giovanni's statue of The Commandatore, is rising up against him? Should we, like Freud, regard Kant's moral law and the starry heavens as nothing else than his over-large super-ego? Here we have two models dealing with similar experiences, both of which are significant to some people.

In this whole discussion I have employed the term "revelation", largely disregarding the strictures of Downing that it is an inappropriate term. However, I would emphasise again a

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1. Ramsey, Religious Language, p.24

fundamental psychological objection to the use of the concept, in that in providing men with an Absolute, it grants an infallibility which can then afford the opportunity to exercise omnipotent thought, through an alliance on this infallible revelation, and an identification with it. No doubt this is the result of that condition described by Buri that revelational theology "manifests an all too human confidence in itself."[1] That revelation is its own criterion is an independent claim which is unsupported by other arguments from outside theology, but it certainly supports the many who wish to identify with it! Those whose writings appeal throughout to infallibilities attract certain personalities; but they also lay themselves open to the criticisms of Freudianism. To speak of any closed system, and to defend it by regarding criticism as invalid and inappropriate, is again to the psychodynamically trained an indication of a defence system, having very likely an origin in anxiety. Is not Barthianism an answer to Kierkegaardian "Angst"? One may be able to prove the position philosophically and justify it; but to place oneself beyond normal criticism again demonstrates the defensive and brittle nature of this concept.

One could accept that revelation as a concept could be valid if it were based on an experience in which one evaluated that God was present, and gave good reasons for it, which were acceptable to others, even if the experience itself were not

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1. Christian Faith in Our Time, p.52

communicable. But once the idea of infallibility enters in, neurosis slides in with it; for it is as a candlelight to all the insecure, who, like moths, fly to its alluring flame. I believe that theology must return to the position stated by John Oman, in which he claimed that we cannot argue any more from an a priori of infallibility, for "there is no more any infallible authority left on which to build, at least in openness of mind and with a sense of reality."[1]

Modern man will choose to use from many models to interpret his own experiences and to reinterpret the older experiences in order that they may have fresh meaning for him in his present day. Which is the appropriate model to use? This will depend on no infallible outside authority, but on the "empirical fit" and on the authority people are willing to give to it, always bearing in mind that "truth can only rest securely on the witness of the reality to itself."[2] To abandon infallibilities is the only honest position this enquiry can adopt, even though it may offer for a time no resting place.

We conclude therefore that we are unable to regard Revelation as autonomous; it is a derived concept, derived from situations and experiences to which psychodynamic models could equally well be applied. We must note that it is unfortunate therefore that so many Old Testament scholars should employ this term, which we

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1. Grace and Personality, p.8
2. ibid., p.viii

regard as neither necessary nor justified.

Revelation, therefore, need not stand in the way of our enquiry.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTION AND ITS ORIGINS

In our consideration of Freudian criticisms of monotheism in Chapter I of this section, we noted that most of the writers were unacquainted with Biblical (in this case, with Old Testament) studies, and we sought to remedy this deficiency by presenting a summary of them ourselves. This is turn led us to consider the concept of Revelation which appeared to play a large part in these studies, and being an autonomous concept, appeared also to stand in the way of further enquiry. In the last chapter we sought to show why we could consider this evaluation of Revelation as unfounded, and that the enquiry could proceed.

However, there was a second factor to be noted in the writings of the Freudian school in relation to religion, namely that their arguments always contrived to lead to a reductionist conclusion. In the Introduction to this whole enquiry, we stated that reduction was not our prime purpose. However, we have now arrived at the place where this assertion must be spelled out in greater detail; we must therefore deal with the problem of reduction in as radical a way as we dealt with the problem of Revelation. It is impossible to proceed with the general line of enquiry without making our position clear on this vital matter.

1. THE RELEVANCE OF FEUERBACH

The type of argument which Freud used in his writings on religion was by no means original; it had been previously deployed with great skill by Ludwig Feuerbach who is regarded as the principal "reductionist" of all time. His contributions and particularly his book, The Essence of Christianity, are often quoted by theological writers, but are usually dismissed in a short paragraph or sentence; seldom are they dealt with at any great length. Interest in Feuerbach has increased of late by the writings of Barth on this thinker,[1] and by a recent paper-back edition of The Essence of Christianity, to which Barth writes an introduction.[2]

Feuerbach claimed that religion is the dream of the human mind; the super-human and objective God is nothing else than a product and reflex of the human mind, and is the expression of the subjective nature of feeling made objective, purified and freed from conditions and limitations of human nature.

> "The yearning of man after something above himself is nothing else than the longing after the perfect type of his nature, the yearning to be free from himself, i.e., from the limits and defects of his individuality."[3]

In the first part of his book, Feuerbach is concerned to

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1. From Rousseau to Ritschl, p.255f.
2. The following quotations will be taken from this edition. Prior to securing it, I referred to a copy printed in the last century, from a well known theological library. I had to cut the pages to read it!
3. ibid., p.281, Appendix.

prove directly that theology is nothing less than anthropology. Man can never get beyond his true nature, and can never get loose from his species; the "positive final predicates" as Feuerbach calls them, are always qualities drawn from his own nature and projected. But in religion what we find is that consciousness of the object and self-consciousness coincide. He cites St Augustine to support his contention:-

> "God is nearer, more related to us, and therefore more easily known by us, than sensible, corporeal things." (De Genesi ad litteram. l.v.c. 16)[1]

Feuerbach himself writes:-

> "Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and soul; and conversely, God is the manifested inward nature, the expressed self of a man."[2]

Religion therefore is man's earliest and also indirect form of self knowledge; the attributes of the divine nature inform us of the attributes of human nature. Feuerbach argues that when man denies goodness in himself, it is not lost; it is projected on to the deity. This process makes for disunity of man, because the supposed "opposites" of himself are to be found in the deity, abstracted from himself. Everything is placed in God "excepting that alone which it despises."[3] "What man praises and approves, that is God to him; what he blames, condemns, is the non-divine."[4]

It is interesting to note that this point has been taken up in recent times by Erich Fromm, who writes: "The more perfect God

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1. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p.12
2. ibid., p.12-13
3. ibid., p.55
4. ibid., p.97

becomes, the more imperfect becomes man. He projects the best he has on to God, and thus impoverishes himself."[1] Fromm argues, as does Feuerbach, that by thus projecting his most valuable powers on to God, man has become alienated from himself. Everything he has now of value is in God and there is nothing of value in him. Hence in worshipping God, man is trying to get in touch with a part of himself which he has lost through projection.

Feuerbach describes the building up of God's nature by man as follows:-

> "Man - this is the mystery of religion - projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject: he thinks of himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself."[2]

He compares this to the systole and diastole in the action of the blood through the arteries and veins.

> "In the religious systole man propels his own nature from himself, he throws himself outward: in the religious diastole he receives the rejected nature into his heart again."[3]

Feuerbach returns again and again to the disuniting of man from himself which is accomplished when he sets God in antithesis to himself. God is infinite, man finite, God perfect and eternal, man imperfect and temporal: God almighty and holy, man weak and

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1. Psychoanalysis and Religion, p.50
2. ibid., p.29-30
3. ibid., p.31. This process is very similar to projection and introjection as described by Klein.

sinful. All this differencing of man and God with which religion begins is a differencing of man with his own nature.

> "What man praises and approves, that is God to him; what he blames and condemns is the non-divine."[1]

God as a metaphysical being is nothing else than these good attributes made absolute. It is natural, therefore, that he should resolve metaphysics into psychology.[2]

The idea of God as an absolutely perfect moral being, whose nature is made so difference from ours, is, of course, nothing else than the moral nature of man posited as an absolute being, but also because he is thereby distanced from us, the chasm between ourselves and his being is disspiriting. Again, we can see how Feuerbach foreshadows present-day teachings, in the Flugel interpretation of ego-superego relations in terms of "distancing".[3]

Feuerbach would reduce all theology to pathology, anthropology and psychology. In certain aspects Feuerbach comes very near to Freud on the idea of omnipotent thought. Feuerbach says that in the personality of God, man concentrates the supernaturalness, immortality, independence, unlimitedness of his own personality; whereas Freud would have said that by postulating the idea of God, a means was found whereby omnipotent thought could continue, which makes religion an illusion. Feuerbach defines omnipotence as "subjectivity exempting itself from all objective conditions and

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1. Feuerbach, ibid., p.97
2. ibid., p.40 footnote
3. See Flugel in the previous discussion. Man, Morals and Society, pp.67-8, 220, 282.

limitations, and concentrating this exemption as their highest power and reality."[1] "Providence" is also likewise "reduced" to the projection by man of the infinite value of his own existence; belief in a providential God is nothing else than the belief in human dignity.

He accuses religious dogma of inverting the natural order of things, for man unconsciously and involuntarily creates God in his own image, and after this God consciously and voluntarily creates man in his own image. Prayer, Love, Heaven, The Trinity, all are likewise subjected to this reductionist process of the "nothing-else-than" argument. He concludes Part One of the book with these words:-

> "Our most essential task is now fulfilled. We have now reduced the supermundane, supernatural and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our process of analysis has brought us again to the position with which we set out. The beginning, middle and end of religion is MAN."[2]

The second part of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity which forms the indirect proof that theology is anthropology, contains many repetitions of his former arguments. However, there is a short chapter on Revelation[3] which he describes as the concept regarded by many as the culminating point of religious objectivism. It is naturally "reduced" to the self-determination of man, "only that between himself the determined, and himself

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1. Feuerbach, ibid., p.101-2
2. ibid., p.184
3. ibid., p.204-212

the determiner, he interposes an object - God, a distinct being. God is the medium by which man brings about the reconciliation of himself with his own nature."[1] Therefore in revelation, "man goes out of himself in order, by a circuitous path, to return to himself."[2] To Feuerbach, this is a striking confirmation of the position that the secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology. When he says that man "must separate from himself that which gives him moral laws, and place it in opposition to himself, as a distinct personal being,"[3] he comes very near to the Freudian contention that God is nothing but a projected super-ego. Again, when he says that the being of God is man's own being, and he adds that "what presents itself before thy consciousness is simply what lies behind it", he is coming very close to Freud's unconscious imputation for belief in God.

We could continue quoting from Feuerbach's theory and discussing it, but one final quotation must suffice:-

> "The essence of religion, its latent nature, is the identity of the divine being with the human; but the form of religion, or its apparent conscious nature, is the distinction between them."[4]

Karl Barth is one who recommends his students to know their Feuerbach, but one gathers that it is only for the negative value it provides. Feuerbach, Barth admits, is a great thinker, yet paradoxically he states that his work is "nauseatingly trivial"

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1. ibid., p.206
2. ibid., p.207
3. ibid., p.208
4. ibid., p.247

and his theory a "platitude"! Barth claims that he practised anti-theology, which does not touch faith, and pays too little attention to man's wickedness - "we are all evil head to foot" - and to the fact that we must die.[1] Barth gives the warning that Feuerbach demonstrates the logical outcome of any theology which begins with man's subjective states, whatever form they may take. However, we must assert that there is all the difference between beginning with subjective states and Barth's procedure of completely disregarding them, at least as far as his early writing is concerned.[2]

2. "NOTHING ELSE THAN" ?

What then can we say of the Freud-Feuerbach ideas of God being "nothing else than" aspects of man which are "projected"?

In the first place, we cannot retreat into that defensive position in which each discipline has its own models standing in their own right. In theology, it is argued that as the object concerning the study is God, theological categories are appropriate and psychological ones are inappropriate. Vice versa in psychology, psychological models are appropriate and theological ones are inappropriate. This attitude was ruled out in advance by the very nature of this enquiry.

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1. From Rousseau to Ritschl, p.360. Also Introductory Essay to Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p.x-xxx.
2. Barth does, however, speak of "The-anthropology" in a later writing, claiming that the abstract doctrine of God has no place in the Christian realm, only a doctrine of commerce and communion between God and man. See The Humanity of God, p.9

We can, however, accept the guarded position of Jung, to which in practice he does not always strictly adhere. It is that psychology cannot make any statement about the absolute existence or non-existence of God, nor about the reality of God's being or about theological conceptions based on faith, as these realities lie outside the realm of pscyhology; to say anything about them would be overstepping the boundaries. However, we can study and consider man's ideas and conceptions of God, as these form the proper study of psychology.[1]

This means that Feuerbach and Freud with their "nothing else than" projectionist arguments claiming to give a complete reduction of the God of faith without remainder, which amounts to a virtual debunking of theological assertions, are claiming for themselves that which is logically impossible. The transcendent God can exist independently of such arguments and is not touched by any of them.

If then we confine ourselves to man's ideas of God, we would need to admit that theological models hold complete sway in the Old Testament, as all the descriptions appear in terms of them. Now many of the phenomena described under such models could equally well be investigated by psychodynamic models, which we now possess, and can be understood in terms of them. To do this would mean that we would have two sets of models relating to the same phenomena, and that each would render some insights.

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1. We shall discuss this fully in Part Three.

Alston[1] admits that between the two systems of religion and psychology there are certain surface similarities, but that this is not evidence of a causal connection, but at best "furnishes a clue". We are not, however, seeking to establish causal connections; we are claiming that two kinds of models can be applied to the same phenomena, and that we will choose the one which is the most significant to us. The very fact of choosing, however, means that the autonomy of the theological model is broken by the fact that whenever the use of a model other than the theological one is preferred, certain concessions have to be made from the area of theological description.

One can foresee objections to this procedure on the grounds that the choice is subjective. Theologians, however, have become accustomed to changes in outlook, because they have been subjectively convinced of the validity of the operation of other models in spheres traditionally regarded as the exclusive province of theology. We are now adjusted to the impact of nineteenth century scientific thought on Biblical views. The Bible knew nothing of the concept of natural law, of cause and effect, without which we find it impossible to understand much phenomena. We do not think that God, by independent action, makes his sun to rise and to set each day, as did the men of the Bible.[2] Likewise, the Church has had to adjust its thinking regarding the doctrine

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1. Faith and the Philosphers, p.72
2. I follow Wheeler Robinson in this.

of creation, owing to the impact of the teaching of evolution on Genesis. Faith in a Creator is still held, but understood no longer in the old way. For some the doctrine is all the more enriched and to be wondered at, because of the concessions made on the one hand, and the incorporation of scientific thinking on the other. A similar adjustment in our times comes through the demythologizing work of Bultmann. Even if the total concept is not accepted, no doubt his views on the cosmology of the Bible are. And to anticipate a matter which will be detailed later in this chapter, a further adjustment may be required in relation to the projectionist attitude of the scripture writers and the introjectionist attitude of our times.

Adjustments to traditional positions are always resisted by those more orthodox and fundamentalist thinkers who tend to be prohibitionist. Some theologians who strongly object to a psychological enquiry being made into the sphere of religion, and in particular that of Freud who equated the super-ego and God, are nevertheless perfectly capable of going on to speak of God employing super-ego terms, as if he were "nothing else than" super-ego.[1] It is our contention that these adjustments must continue to be made, for it is in the nature of modern man to view the Biblical material in terms of the models with which he is acquainted, and which he habitually uses as significant for

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1. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, Cf. pp.223 & 125. Further examples will be given in Part Three.

understanding other phenomena in life. Theology cannot ask that this practice be abandoned. The conclusion is therefore that we can no longer proceed straight from what the Bible says to theologizing, without making some prior adjustments; any theology which short-circuits these other enquiries does so at its peril.

In writing of the theology of the Old Testament we have already referred to Norman Porteous' quotation: "the nature of that supernatural power which theology identifies by using the name of God."[1] However, not only was "the supernatural" identified in this manner; many aspects of life were embraced within this concept, both the known and the unknown, both those aspects of life which were understood and those which appeared mysterious. One such phenomenon would be that mental function or pattern to which Freud gave the name of super-ego; even although it is part of man's mind, it possesses that quality of standing over against and outside of man, as objective to him. One can ask therefore where else could the ancient Hebrews with their limited categories of thought find a place for this function except within the concept of God? This means that the Biblical conception of God could contain the super-ego; however, this is very different from saying that the super-ego could take over the total concept of God and explain it without remainder.

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1. New Peake Commentary, p.151, col.ii

3. ORIGINS AND EXPLAINING-AWAY

The argument from origins need not be an argument of "explaining-away". For example, we have seen that when Tillich and the Existentialists speak of being and ground-of-being, they are using a maternal or even a womb symbol. When Romain Rolland questioned Freud about the basic religious experience of "oceanic" feeling, as genuine mystical experience, Freud was quite right to answer that it was a survival of ego feeling from infancy, when the mother-child symbiotic "cocoon" was the prime mode of human awareness.[1] It would be wrong to follow Freud and to assume that knowledge of the origin of such an experience destroys its validity. All that this tells us is that this earlier experience is being utilized in the service of religious faith. Similarly Schleiermacher's "Feeling of Absolute Dependence" is an obvious example of a relationship which had its origins in the dependent state of childhood. H.H. Farmer's "Absolute Demand" and "Final Succour" are models whose psychodynamic origins lie in the early relations of the child to the parents - usually the father and mother respectively; these models being extended by the qualifiers "absolute" and "final". I think therefore that Farmer is wrong when in his Gifford Lectures[2] he makes the claim that there are objective factors in religion which he names "substantival" which are distinctive in that they have to do with God's active

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1. Civilization and its Discontents, p.7-9
2. Reason and Revelation, p.166f.

self-disclosure and are sui generis religious, over against "adjectival" factors which deal with man's needs and can be satisfied apart from the religious consciousness, but which, nevertheless, can be taken up and used by religion, so that fulfilment is provided by religion. We hope to have shown that this distinction is false, and that all types of religious experience have their origin in partly non-religious sources in early childhood. Religion re-captures, retrieves as well as utilizes and employs these earlier experiences, which originally had different objects from those which the individual now encounters. Man has religious experiences, but they are not exclusively religious. Saying this may involve some necessary concession to Freudian theory, e.g., acknowledging value in his idea of the "return of the repressed", but this is not the same as making the experiences invalid. To claim that these expressions concerning God and the experiences behind them have psychological origins and are not distinctively religious in origin, is not necessarily an argument against religion, but can be one for it, in the sense that religious faith deals with the very stuff of our human nature. The earlier experiences are preparatory for the later experiences which are associated with religion. If religion did not use these fundamental experiences, it would cease to be the force it is.

We have seen that Freud was quite wrong to assert that knowledge of the origin of an experience, in fact explains it away.

We agree with Alston, who said that even if theistic belief can be shown to be causally determined, this does not furnish any evidence against theistic belief.[1] Causal origin is one thing and epistemological status is another.[2] We could be perverse and quote Freudian theory which postulates that intellectual pursuits have their origin in the sexual inquisitiveness and curiosity of children towards their parents, and we could go on to draw the logical conclusion that these pursuits are thereby invalidated because of their early emotional origin. But Freud himself regarded the intellect as the means of man's salvation. His concept of maturity was such that the intellect would be in control and that one would then be able to appreciate reality without suffering from the disturbing distortions of emotion; but this is in fact giving primacy to one fundamental experience which had its origin in childhood activity. Freud never applies his "nothing else than" argument against intellectual activity as he does against religion. Rieff regarded these latter arguments as Freud's own animus sanctified as science, the reductive weapon of psychoanalysis being employed with open hostility.[3] Religion for some may be the satisfaction of infantile wishes, but could not the same be said of some intellectual pursuits?

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1. Faith and the Philosphers, p.85
2. ibid., p.89
3. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of the Moralist, p.268. Cf. Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.64."An obsession of humanity or not, religion was certainly an obsession with Freud."

John Macmurray says something similar; having conceded the point to Freud that religion could be a projection of a child's experience of family life he adds:-

> "There is plenty of illusory religion; but that does not prove that religion is illusory, but simply that he (Freud) believes in science but not in religion."[1]

The indiscriminate use of the "nothing-else-than" and "nothing but" arguments if pursued to their conclusion would land us in a situation in which even the arguments employed would themselves become invalidated.

4. A NOTE ON PROJECTION

A further word is needed regarding the wide and indiscriminate use of the term "projection" in the writings of Feuerbach and Freud.

Melanie Klein has taught us that projection along with introjection are two basic mechanisms for the upbuilding of the ego, and are the means whereby the child discovers the world, so projection has a "respectable" use! The two processes go hand in hand. Our age is one in which man has recalled some of his former projections; and there is an emphasis on introjection. For example, we do not speak of demon possession, but of mental illness. We are introspective, inner-directed people; our inhibition on metaphysics on a grand scale and the reluctant permitting of a limited "metaphysics-from-below" all testify to the general

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1. Persons in Relation, p.155

orientation. By contrast the Bible comes from a world where projection was emphasised to the extent of its being an accepted model of expression. Our empirical, scientific approach has destroyed the "screen" on to which man formerly projected his innermost thoughts. Keeping the same metaphor, we are forced to examine the slides in the limited space of the disused, unlit, projector. As indicated in the Introduction to this whole enquiry, we must apply the various critiques and bear the risk of transforming the Biblical ways of speaking of God. However, we must also assert that even although this happens to be necessary, owing to our introspecting and introjecting all the time, the fact of a transcendent God existing in his own right is, epistemologically, not imperilled by such arguments.

5. PSYCHODYNAMICS AND THE FINDINGS OF OLD TESTAMENT SCHOLARSHIP

I wish now to take up the findings of present day Old Testament scholarship as outlined in Chapter II of this section, and to apply to them the criticisms which psychoanalysis suggests, excluding, however, Freud's myth from Totem and Taboo.

We begin with a consideration of The Covenant Relationship which Eichrodt regarded as the fundamental concept of the whole Old Testament. In this relationship between unequals, the greater partner imposes the conditions, and the lesser partner has to obey them. Only the lesser partner can be in the wrong, and by his disobedience he is guilty; the greater partner can never be

in the wrong. The psychodynamics underlying this relationship would be explained by those of the depressive position (as described by Klein). The small child is set over against the parent; when things frustrate the child, he, due to omnipotence of thought, feels that he is responsible for the state of anxiety with which he has to cope. He cannot regard the parents as "bad", for they are his providers and he cannot do without them, as he depends completely upon them for his welfare. Wrong must reside within himself, and he must do something about the matter to put it right. The child can accomplish the reduction of anxiety by various means - acts of restitution or reparation, confession of his own faults, or the bearing of the infliction of some punishment. The ideal state for the child is that of oneness with the parent, but in the depressive position, it is not achieved by a symbiosis, but by the child, who does what he regards as the will of the parent, so that he is not disobedient. Some of these methods were ritualized in the Old Testament by the sacrificial cultus which coped with the anxieties generated in such situations; also explained by this position, is the interpretation of the disasters of life as a form of divine punishment;[1] and the idea expressed in Jeremiah 22.16, that of knowing God means carrying out His will. Whenever the parental injunctions are internalized in super-ego form, obedience can effect a union between ego and super-ego, which enables the

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1. Flugel's Polycrates Complex.

anxiety engendered by the super-ego to be mastered.

In this way The Covenant Relationship can be understood as the retention by ritualization or codification of a fundamental experience of childhood, which in later life permits the return of repressed material now being projected outwards by the individual on to "God". The parent, as seen by the child, has been introjected along with some of the child's aggression and then repressed, and so contributes to the formation of the super-ego; it is later projected on to God as a return of the repressed. The Covenant in the Old Testament therefore was a means of maintaining the depressive position as the fundamental one; as the child's link with its parent lies in obedience to the parent's will (which later becomes to be at one with what the super-ego desires of the ego) a sense of guilt comes about through disobedience. The child thinks that as only parents can annul the relationship between them - for the child is too weak and dependent to act freely in this manner - similarly only God can annul the Covenant. "If you do not obey His will, God will withdraw His love and you will have to face his judgement and punishment in the disasters of life" would be regarded by psychoanalytical critique as "nothing else than" the return in adulthood of the repressed basic feelings of the depressive position in childhood, and the maintenance of that position as basic and fundamental.

We also saw in the relationship between Israel and Yahweh that both worshipper and Deity can partake of very different

qualities; whether the Deity happened to be near or distanced - pleasantly near, unpleasantly distanced. The notion of God in the Old Testament is by no means consistent; it oscillates from the closeness of the loving-kindness of God to the distanced jealous God who visits his people with disasters and plagues. At times it can be so close that man's relations with God can be expressed best by a personal model, in circumstances where the Covenant notion can be dropped; at other times, the relationship can be with one who is a Legislator of the Law of Israel, but who is a Wholly-Other, Utterly Transcendent Being. When Eichrodt speaks of God as "The Guardian of Justice and the Keeper of Laws"[1], who shows his anger towards human sinfulness, we are in a less intimate relationship. Psychoanalysis would describe these oscillations as being due to a projection of the empirical "distance" between the ego and the super-ego, and the quality of relationship they enjoy with one another, as explained by Flugel's distancing theory.

The concept of hesedh would likewise be explained as the recreation and capitalization in experience of the closest possible relation of mother and child after their separation from the symbiosis at the beginning of life, as the benign influence of the mother on super-ego formation.[2]

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1. Eichrodt, p.259
2. Freud spoke much of the influence of fathers, but made less reference to that of mothers. Bowlby in Child Care and the Growth of Love shifted the emphasis to the mother as the fundamental influence on children's characters and personalities. A recent study on the role of fathers is that of R.G. Andry who in, Delinquency and Parental Pathology, demonstrated that paternal deprivation was a fundamental one in the production of delinquents, although the supremacy of the man's role was a questionable one.

On the other hand, the wrath of God would be explained not merely as the internalized anger of parents, but as due to the quality of the super-ego being affected by the innate aggression of the child, projected outwards towards the parent and then re-introjected. Holiness and separateness would be seen as the child's feelings towards his father, who both over-awes and fascinates the child, whom the child, nevertheless, wishes to emulate and be like, which would explain the ethical quality of Israel's conception of holiness.[1] The other attributes of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, providential care, etc., would be explained as an analogy of the small child's view of his parents and of his feelings towards them.[2] When Eichrodt attempts to hold together the diverse and disparate views of God, this would be regarded as "nothing but" the achievements of the depressive position. In the quotation from Archbishop Søderblom about the abyss of despair, we would have left the depressive position in which most of the Old Testament is orientated for the schizoid position, with its basic feelings of Angst, which has been ably described by both Fairbairn and R.D. Laing in psychology, and by Søren Kierkegaard in philosophy. Here the gulf between man and God has become so great that personal relations

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1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.127; Your Growing Child and Religion, p.58; Ernest Jones,'The God Complex' in Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, p.211 suggests a repressed death-wish as the origin, but this we do not accept.
2. Alston, p.72

cease to operate at all, and the individual is isolated with his fears and anxieties, so as to be in a state of "non-being".[1]

We have not yet considered the achievements of the Covenant Religion. The imposition of a common law, whenever this was done, which led to national unity, is not a specifically religious concept; it belongs properly to sociology or social psychology, and parallels can be found in our own times of this taking place without religion. (For example, in the countries which have had Communism imposed upon them, and have developed a pattern of life and form of civilization as a result of common allegiance to a universal set of codes.) Universal codes and laws appeal to the super-ego structure of man's mind, and as Freud pointed out, they help him to make the necessary instinctual renunciations for the sake of order and coherence.[2] All man's achievements are, however, double-edged, and if the super-ego is used to excess, it can be as damaging to psychic health as the very forces it was brought into being to control. A menacing super-ego is as detrimental to man as instinctual domination; in a similar way, a jealous, punishing, controlling God or a stern set of

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1. We need existentialist language to describe this state; Freudian language describes the depressive position adequately; this is why we tend to rely more on Freud for the elucidation of the psychodynamics behind the Old Testament. There is a decided affinity between Freud the Jew and the faith of his fathers. In some way, Freudianism is almost a secular Judaism!

2. Moses and Monotheism, p.166f.

Laws of God are as damaging to full religious faith as spiritual anarchy.[1]

The other great achievement is that which was used by von Rad as his central concept, namely "Saving History". The Hebrews certainly did have this "remarkable interior attitude to history." Psychoanalysis would perhaps explain this phenomenon as due to the passing-down of the super-ego from generation to generation; or by the extension of it in time whereby a tradition came to be established in which the projected internal super-ego was a constant factor under the name of Yahweh, the Lord of history.

The above suggests how arguments used by psychoanalysis, in its reduction of the Old Testament religion as being "nothing else than" psychology, could be pursued. However, we are not committed to this viewpoint; reductionism is not our aim, our ends are not prescribed. Nevertheless, the above discussion demonstrates how far the parent faith of Christianity deployed the super-ego in its belief and practices, and how great was the investment of the super-ego in that faith. This, however, is not saying that faith in Yahweh could be reduced to "nothing else than" super-ego. The Hebrew concept of deity was an omnibus one, in the sense that it embraced all that was mysterious as much that was not, and this would involve much more than super-ego. The super-ego, however, was one of its most vital components.

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1. The Torah, however, was much more than merely controlling laws; Deuteronomy excels in humanitarianism and concern for the weak; yet the exercise of such high ethics involves a renunciation of instincts, as mentioned by Freud.

To demonstrate our own position, we would now turn to examine certain key passages in the Old Testament for the elucidation of the employment of super-ego characteristics.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES APPLIED TO THE OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES

PARADIGMATIC PASSAGES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

In the last chapter we have seen how the psychodynamic critique can be applied to the Old Testament, and how the super-ego emerges as playing a significant role in the religious practices and the beliefs held. We have seen how many aspects of Old Testament theology, far from being only comprehensible in the terms of a theological model, can also be understood in a non-theological manner, through the employment of a psychodynamic model.

Our purpose, however, is neither to prove nor disprove reductionist theories and so arrive eventually at a reductionist conclusion, or its opposite, but to ascertain what part psychodynamics, and in particular the super-ego, have played in the concept of monotheism. To demonstrate our own point of view, we would now turn to certain paradigmatic passages or incidents in the Old Testament.

Our approach to the Old Testament will be different from that of most of the scholars we have considered. In his criticisms of their approach, James Barr, we have seen, felt that the Biblical dogmatic scholars depended far too much on individual words and their meaning, and did not look at the larger units of scripture; also they neglected the subjective, psychological

factors involved. H.D. Lewis also contended that there was little attempt to reconstruct imaginatively the situations and experiences. To the Old Testament scholars all that seemed to matter was the theological content, with a corresponding tendency which suggested that psychology is of no import in the Biblical stories.

We wish to emphasise the subjective, psychological aspects of the larger units and will risk the use of imagination and intuition in the reconstruction of background to the stories and passages. We regard the following selected incidents as paradigmatic, in the sense that they possess a large frame of reference, and in the hope that they can be understood in the light of psychodynamics as well as of theology.

1. ADAM AND EVE

We have already remarked that Christian theologians have used this story in much the same way as Freud used his myth in Totem and Taboo, as a causal explanation of man's condition, and not as a mythical description of it. Another way to interpret the story is in the light of Christ, where the lost perfection of the first Adam is defined over against the perfection of the second Adam.[1] This involves some reading back into the story to make it available for Christian use, so that the story does not stand in its own right.

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1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol.II, p.82

If, however, the story is looked at as a mythological descriptive account of the present condition of man, it can then be seen as the source of the richest of psychological truths. Most psychodynamic writers regard the story as a description of the normal process of the infant's growth to self-awareness; the state of innocence refers either to the period of the womb, with birth being represented by the driving out of the Garden; or by extending the first period to include early infancy to the symbioses of the early idyllic condition of being free from anxiety and guilt, having no ethical reponsibility at all; and the driving from the Garden being the birth of self-consciousness with its accompanying anxiety and guilt. "Work" in the story represents the facing of reality.[1]

R.S. Lee, however, draws attention to the inversion in the story of the actual facts, for knowledge of good and evil is the result of being born (others would say of maturing to self-consciousness) and not the cause of it. Lee attributes this to the fact that the many strands from the unconscious which lie together in the myth have been worked over afterwards by conscious minds to present logical coherence. Von Rad might support such a contention. "The Fall", says Lee, "is not something subsequent to the acquisition of a moral sense; it is a precondition of it."[2] To Lee, as a Freudian, this acquisition of moral sense goes hand

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1. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.102f.;Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself, p.180-191
2. Lee, ibid., p.161

in hand with the formation of the super-ego and resolution of the Oedipus Complex.

Rollo May raises the same question as to why ethical responsibility is depicted in the myth as happening against the will and commandment of God, and gives as the reason that the God in question is a jealous God. Similarly, Erich Fromm would agree, God is jealous of man's becoming equal with him, for he is concerned all the time with his own superior role.[1] Neither of these writers accepts the Fall as a fall. Fromm, who divides religion into authoritarian and humanistic types, cannot regard unwillingness to submit to a higher power, thereby to know right from wrong, as a sin; the true fall is man's "alienation from himself, his submission to power, his turning against himself, even although under the guise of his worship of God."[2] May, on the other hand, would agree with Hegel that it was a Fall upwards, a necessary prerequisite for virtue and morality.[3]

It is clear that this element of man's being blamed for knowledge of right from wrong is an obstacle to the understanding of the myth. I do not think that R.S. Lee's contention solves the problem. One thinker who is able to work from the myth as it is, is John Wren-Lewis as in his Gunning Lectures at New College Edinburgh in 1963.[4] He looked on this aspect of the myth, not as

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1. Psychoanalysis and Religion, p.42
2. ibid., p.52
3. Rollo May, ibid., p.180
4. See also Psychoanalysis Observed, p.103f

an acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil, but as a misapplication of that knowledge, which was a means of breaking the integrity of the moral life. Due to the natural impulses being cut off from love and becoming dominated by anxiety, the two involved, Adam and Eve, put up defences of a moralistic kind and began to recriminate one another in a "blame-game". This leads to their expulsion from love and interrelatedness to a life of unrestrained aggression, which Wren-Lewis finds symbolized in the angel with the flaming sword. "Moralizing is the one absolutely certain way for human spontaneity and creativity to destroy itself."[1]

However, the change in man's subjective condition, i.e., of how Adam viewed Eve and vice-versa, leads to a change in their perception of the divinity. God's nature changed simultaneously by what they did, and in the way they regarded one another. At the beginning of the story God is near, centred, according to Wren-Lewis, in the ground of being, and walks in the Garden as a friend; but when they are governed by anxiety and relying on moral defences, God is no longer near, but like the angel of the flaming sword is made in man's image and projected "out there"; he is more powerful and more moral than they themselves have tried to be; he has become for them the awful father. God therefore is the implicate of human relationships.[2] In the

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1. Psychoanalysis Observed, p.103
2. ibid., p.110

lectures referred to, Wren-Lewis quoted Canon Edward Carpenter: "He who has truly met another and in the other found himself, has found a third who is a Creator."

The conception of God as an implicate of human relationships, will not be readily accepted by dogmatic theologians, although it follows much of the thinking of John Macmurray.[1] God as the awful father, is to Wren-Lewis the projected super-ego, concerned with moralizing and at the same time inhibiting spontaneity over against which man is guilty and self-consciously anxious.

This story thus becomes a perfect example of the "distancing", and alteration of the nature of God, which we have already discussed.[2]

2. ABRAHAM AND ISAAC

This is one of the most moving stories in the whole of the Bible. It is told with an economy of words, and a minimum of description, so that we are left to imagine for ourselves the pathos of the situation, making thereby a more powerful impact. This may be one of those stories which have been used for different meanings in various ages, such as an "example" story

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1. The Structure of Religious Experience, p.53f, where Macmurray speaks of the idea of God arising from transcendence involved in reflection which starts from the actual facts of personal relationships and is then carried beyond the limits of the actual given and universalized. He would always keep religion tied to the empirical facts of personal relationships.
2. Other aspects of Wren-Lewis' interpretation of the myth will be dealt with later.

against child-sacrifices. Calvin interpreted the story as God's struggle with himself. He makes a promise, re-iterates it again and again, and then acts as though he were going to destroy it, says von Rad, for Isaac is the sole means of bringing the promise to fulfilment.[1] God must come before his promise; men must learn to trust in him rather than in his gifts. Von Rad speaks of faith's extremest experience, where God himself rises up as an enemy of his own work, and hides himself so that Abraham the recipient of the promise had to experience the sense of utter forsakenness, such as Israel suffered in her history when God seemed unbearably to contradict himself as a means of testing Israel's faith.

Kierkegaard's brilliant panegyric on this story in Fear and Trembling, also regards Ambraham's act as one of supreme faith in God, whereby Abraham who loved himself and loved others, loved God even greater than all. If someone else were to do what he did, it would be sin,[2] but this was not the case with Abraham, who believed in virtue of the absurd, "for all human reckoning had long ceased to function." The paradox of faith[3] is able to transform a murder into an act well pleasing to God, argues Søren Kierkegaard, because faith begins precisely where

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1. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I, p.174
2. Fear and Trembling, p.39
3. H.D. Lewis, The Philosophy of Religion, p.235, speaks of contradiction which could be dispelled by clear thinking being given the more dignified name of paradox.

thinking leaves off, and this sort of action involves a teleological suspension of ethics. The ethical is suspended in opposition to the universal; Abraham is no tragic hero who renounces himself in order to express the universal; the knight of faith renounces the universal to become the individual. Hence he is isolated, alone, misunderstood, which condition is required of those who place absolute duty to God highest of all.

This hardly does justice to Kierkegaard's most powerful and penetrating work, which has no doubt influenced von Rad. It was part of Kierkegaard's "dogmatic" to regard anxiety as inevitable because of man's separation from God, and of his strivings for free ethical action. May we not see, however, Kierkegaard's own psychological state being read into the Abraham saga? Man and God are distanced; God has disappeared; hence man is filled with a sense of isolation, being misunderstood and going against the universal, which statements reflect only too clearly Kierkegaard's own psyche, with his schizoid character projected in an overdetermined psychological identification with Abraham. The panegyric concentrates almost exclusively on Abraham and scant attention is paid to Isaac's feelings. Kierkegaard almost forgets that Isaac is a son with equal rights to develop his own faith in God as well as the father. So Kierkegaard regards Isaac as an "It" and not a "Thou"; the only "Thou" that counts is the overriding and demanding "Thou" of the deity, who demands that Isaac be treated as an "It", so that Abraham could be in right status with God. Kierkegaard does not question the demands of the deity,

demands which are of an irrational primitive quality. But God is looked upon as a matter wholly separate from duty to one's neighbour. In fact, one is detached from the other.[1]

It is natural for psychodynamic studies to link this story with the Oedipus myth. This is what is done by E. Wellisch in his Isaac and Oedipus. Each man stands at a focal point with innumerable ancestry behind him, and a potential similar posterity before him, and this tension around procreation, in the relations between child and parent and parent to child is the "central ganglion of all complexes." Although at first sign the relationships in the Akedah (the name Wellisch gives to this story) and the Oedipal myth are inverted, the latter telling of the son rising against the father, yet in this story Laius first all tries to do away with his son, exposing him with a stake through his feet; he is subsequently discovered and reared and given the name "Oedipus" (swollen feet). Psychoanalytical thought has contributed much to our understanding of the

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1. We can contrast Kierkegaard's identification with Abraham and his forgetting Isaac with this war poem of Wilfred Owen.

> Then Abram bound the youth with belts and straps
> And builded parapets and trenches there,
> And stretched forth the knife to slay his son.
> When lo! an angel called him out of heav'n,
> Saying, Lay not they hand upon the lad,
> Neither do anything to him. Behold,
> A ram, caught in a thicket by its horns;
> Offer the ram of pride instead of him.
> But the old man would not so, but slew his son -
> And half the seed of Europe, one by one....

From the text of War Requiem, by Benjamin Britten.

respective threats of sons to fathers and vice-versa. A son can be a threat to a father, as well as the father to the son. Man's failure to love and co-operate with the next generation leads to strife between parents and children. Even if the story were an inverted Oedipus myth it would not worry a psychoanalyst, as the story in this form could well be child's phantasy, imputing to the father what the child himself would like to do to the father. As it stands the story has for its motive the feeling of the father who believes himself threatened by the son's virility, and this is rationalized and transformed from attempted murder into holy sacrifice.[1]

Wellisch ties up the soul's image of God with the super-ego; but this not only is a parental image, but the call of a transcendental God; self-love mixed with the love of God would account for the rationalization. For Wellisch, these emotional complications do not invalidate the story as revelation. The revelation is that the dark Gods of the past who demanded the sacrifice of the sons, were purged from the father's soul, Isaac's perfect obedience contributing to the new insight. The Akedah marks the turning point; before it, the father's authority was based on fear; the fear that the son might threaten the father. After Abraham, it has been based on love, and his achievement was the uniting of authority with love, and because of this singular synthesis

1. Groddeck regards Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as castration. The Book of the It, p.163. See also Jacobson, The Self and the Object World, p.120f.

Abraham became the Creator of Israel.[1]

The psychological feature which this story embodies is the threat which fathers feel from their sons, and which, because of strong super-ego feelings a reaction to it can be rationalized as a will to be obeyed at all costs, regardless of considerations towards the son himself. One finds it difficult to regard the command of Abraham as a higher call of duty and of faith; one feels that it is in fact the result of a primitive, unethical, over-determined super-ego, which would assert "talion" desires of the most primitive kind.[2]

This kind of irrational, unethical super-ego is not, as Kierkegaard asserted "higher than the universal" requiring a teleological suspension of ethics (like Hamlet's "cruel to be kind"); at best it resembles the morality of duty which permits nothing to come between one's sense of duty and its fulfilment, not even persons, so admirably described by T.E. Jessop[3] and by Harry Guntrip.[4] One feels that Kierkegaard's arguments were

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1. Philip Mairet,'The Love and the Wrath', in Christian News Letter, April 1955, p.64-68, reviewing Wellisch's book, would put the deception of God's supposed misleading of Abraham to Abraham himself. Mairet accepts Tillich's idea of revelation being received through the medium of experience and regulated by the "norm". He also accepts the notion of the father feeling the threat of the sons.
2. The American, John Brown, is famous for the song about his body and his soul which goes marching on, but it is not generally known that he sacrificed his own sons "for the cause" he had close at heart, even in situations where he could have spared them, and against the entreaties of his wife. See Menninger, Man against Himself, p.111-2
3. Law and Love, p.38-53
4. Psychology for Ministers and Social Workers, p.267-76

contrivances to hold contradictory notions of God together, of a God whom one must not question, and who cannot be discerned when one is bent on doing a desperate act at the command of primitive talion super-ego. There is soundness in Jeremiah's precept - to obey (in that case, to care for the needy) is to know God; knowledge of him is an implicate of good ethical behaviour.[1]

3. SAMUEL

This Biblical character is perhaps the most straightforward example of a super-ego orientated character in the whole of Scripture. It is strange therefore that the text I. Sam. 15.22: "Hath the Lord delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord: behold to obey is better than sacrifice and to hearken than the fact of rams." is often quoted as an example of true religion, regardless of the context from which it came. W.A.L. Elmslie[2] regards Samuel's contributions to Hebrew religious development as those of reason and conscience; in savage circumstances Samuel asserts the paramount authority of conscience. Elmslie admitted the inadequacy of conscience, since blind obedience to it is the stuff whereof fanatics and not saints are made.[3]

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1. Hepburn, Christianity & Paradox, p.132, writes: "...the divine imperative is binding only if it corresponds with the moral imperative. To exhort people on moral grounds to renounce the moral in favour of the divine imperative is a logically absurd request."
2. How came our Faith, p.224-244
3. ibid., p.229-233

However, the story of Samuel affords us with the most illuminating account of how the super-ego is formed and how it can be projected on to God. By itself, it almost bears out the suggestion of Winnicott on the parallels between the two systems.[1]

Samuel was born as a late child to Hannah, who was one of the two wives of Elkanah, the other wife having children. Feeling the reproach of her barrenness, and passionately wanting a male child, she visited the shrine of Eli, who seeing her fervently at prayer, assured her that her wish would be fulfilled. After the birth and weaning of Samuel, Hannah returned to Eli's shrine and left the child there, having "lent him to the Lord."[2] Whether Hannah was a very religious woman, or whether she entertained mixed, ambivalent feelings towards the child depends on whether one applies a theological or a psychodynamic critique!

The effects of being deprived of his mother's company and care became apparent. The boy is isolated with no one to turn to, and far from being the good wise old man Hannah had thought, Eli turned out to be careless, foolish and judgemental in his attitude; his own family had not turned out a success. During the day the child Samuel, we are told, was "good", obedient and dutiful. This precocious morality had another side to it; it was grounded in anxiety. At night the child Samuel lay awake and had strange dreams; he imagined that he heard voices which awakened him;

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1. Chapter I of this section.
2. I Sam. 1.28.

he dreamt of judgement descending on the house of Eli. And this is precisely what we should expect to happen to a child exposed to such a loveless and anxiety-provoking situation. His life by day was so frustrating that he entertained all kinds of aggressive and punitive phantasies against the one whom he regarded as the cause of his trouble, namely Eli. The child was at the mercy of his own anxieties, and when he went to Eli for help about the voices that were keeping him awake at night, the old man, too lazy to be bothered, told him that they came from "The Lord", and Samuel believed him, then and for the rest of his life. Having no adequate parent figures with whom he could identify, no one to lessen his anxieties, he had to build up his own defences against anxiety in the erection of a punitive, scrupulous super-ego, formed largely of aggression turned against himself. His God was one whom one fears, who "is always watching to catch out the offenders and give dire punishment, a God who takes the joy and pleasure out of living and exacts unswerving obedience."[1] This paranoid conscience eventually came to be called "God"; it was formed largely out of all the aggression which Samuel had turned back against himself to cope with his basic anxiety.

Now in later years, Samuel was able to capitalize on these experiences, proving himself to be a great leader, a strong judge,

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1. R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p158. cf Flugel's Polycrates Complex.

one capable of bringing back order into the place of chaos. The task to which he was dedicated was the obliteration of evil - this was the will of God for him! His scrupulous conscience comes to the fore in his struggles over the appointment of a king. He selected Saul and feted him like a son, no doubt because his own sons, like those of Eli, were not a success. But Samuel and Saul were too similar to live together in agreement, for both were highly suspicious and suffered in different degrees from paranoid fears and anxieties. Samuel could almost be called the destroyer of Saul, e.g., his treatment of Saul at Gilgal, where Samuel came late for the sacrifice, having kept Saul waiting for him. Saul was too good a general to allow military advantage to slip through his fingers; he was also too religious to permit his forces to go into battle without sacrifice, so he offers the sacrifice without Samuel. When Samuel arrives late and without any apology, he derides Saul for not keeping "the commandment of the Lord which he commanded you."[1] In the incident in which Saul spares Agag, Samuel again derides him, this time using the well-known text, and ending by hewing Agag in pieces. It is no wonder that Saul could not take all the direction which Samuel had not only offered but forced on him, and this must, in no small way, have contributed to his mental disintegration.

Samuel therefore stands for one whose super-ego, primitive and merciless, was God for him. Psychodynamics would endorse that

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1. I Sam. 13.13. I owe this last suggestion to the Rev. Roy Hogg of Dundee.

this kind of character is perfectly capable of being produced in a childhood situation like that of Samuel, where the child, deprived of a mother's love and the care and affection of a good home, had to face great odds unaided, feeling that everyone and everything was against him. A scrupulous, punitive and primitive conscience is the only defence against such persecutory and self-destroying phantasies.

In this Biblical character we have the clearest example of one whose idea of God was almost completely identified with his super-ego. God was never close to Samuel, because in the formative years, closeness and intimacy had been denied him. God was distanced and menacing; it is difficult to see how "He" could have been otherwise.

4. HOSEA - AND HESEDH

Hosea affords a clear example of one who used his own personal experience as a model for understanding the relations of God with Israel, and in his application of this model, we have a clear example of projection at work. Moreover, it is with this prophet that the distinctive word hesedh is associated, as we have seen already,[1] its meaning being "steadfast, devoted love"akin to the New Testament agape.

The story of Hosea is too well know to need recounting. His call to marry a woman who was a harlot is very likely written up

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1. Chapter II of this section.

after the events, and need not be taken as an example of the absurd, with a teleological suspension of ethics, such as Kierkegaard contrived for explaining the story of Abraham and Isaac. In oriental thought, consequences are confused with motives and are read back into the original event as a motive.

It has often been pointed out that Hosea's love for Gomer is the most remarkable feature of the story, and that in his projecting this into the relationship between Yahweh and Israel, a breakthrough in religion was achieved, as he was the first to teach that God loved his people. The difficulty, however, is to ascertain how far the parallel actually works, and whether all he says of Israel is true also of Gomer.

Israel is regarded as responsible and guilty for whoring after other Gods; is Gomer likewise blameworthy because of infidelity? If "Israel may not be restored without repentance, and cannot repent without disillusion and chastisement", and a "full recognition of the ethical requirements of the case" must be made,[1] does the same apply to "the Prodigal Wife"?[2] To speak in such terms, is in fact to reveal a very superficial moralizing attitude towards the relationship between Gomer and Hosea. Anyone with a smattering of psychodynamic understanding would know that no marriage breaks down as the result of one party being "good" and the other "bad", but of incompatibility between

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1. George Adam Smith, The Book of the Twelve Prophets, Vol.I, Hosea, p.245
2. ibid.

the two persons, whose unrecognized traits and immature needs conflict and cause the rupture.[1]

One would ask whether this grave, thoughtful, constant, dull man did not need a wife who was the opposite to him, one who was gay, erratic, inconstant, and one would suggest that his love of her was indeed based on the need of her being so different and opposite to him. Did not she, in a strange way complete his life, representing and articulating the unacknowledged and unexpressed aspects of his own character, and by her expression of them, did not Hosea find some vicarious satisfaction? In this attraction of opposites, Hosea's love of Gomer was based on his need of her.

A second factor is that we understand the hysterical personality better now than in past ages, and we know that people like Gomer are not what they are by conscious choice. Our present times have seen honest attempts by creative artists to understand those whose characters lack super-ego in the normal sense.[2] Spending their lives in what appears to be wrecking other people's, is not a conscious design, but a seeking-after a love which they

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1. One Old Testament scholar, W.A.L. Elmslie, How came our Faith, p.271, does understand the basic dynamics of the relationship, and suggests "incompatibility of temperament", and that it is no easy thing to be married to a genius, even a theological genius, who confronted Gomer with extraordinary religion.
2. For example, Alban Berg's two operas, Wozzeck and Lulu; Shostakovitsch's Katerina Ismailova, and Britten's Peter Grimes, to mention work in only one field.

feel they have never yet found. They have not only been denied the basic love of childhood, but also the environment to develop a super-ego of the kind that is useful and valuable.

The contemporary understanding of relationships between two partners, and of structure of Gomer's personality, should remove the super-ego moralizations from the domestic tragedy, and at the same time show us how Hosea's love of Gomer was based on need, as is almost all love.[1] We have seen that a component of aggression is required for love to be fulfilled; we now see the component of need. Can one sustain a personal relationship in which there is no need? But can one project this on to God and conclude that he needs his people to feel complete?

5. THE PUNISHING DEITY.

> "You only have I known of all the families of the earth;
> Therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities."
> (Amos 3.2)

A Biblical theologian might interpret the above as a definite proof that election does not entail favouritism, but rather a high sense of moral responsibility.[2] A psychoanalyst, on the other hand, would interpret the passage as an example of moral sadism on the part of the deity or moral masochism on the part of the worshipper. (i.e., a projection of the Polycrates Complex.)

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1. See Anna Freud's brilliant discussion of altruism in The Ego and Mechanisms of Defence, Chapter X, p.135ff.
2. See C.H. Dodd, The Bible Today, p.40

> "He (Yahweh) was in fact a Jealous God, and inspired guilt in his worshippers..."[1]

But this is very little different from the statement of Eichrodt[2] previously quoted, who speaks of "trembling prostration before the jealous God, who will admit no degradation from his majesty", and who will "turn his weapons of leprosy, serpent and plague... even against his own people."

Christians often find such Old Testament thought thoroughly revolting; however, let the words of Harry Williams banish any self-righteous superiority:-

> "Much of the dynamic behind the animosity felt by many for the Old Testament Jehovah is, I suspect, that He reminds them of their self-destroying desire for punishment."[3]

There is a decided link between the psychodynamics involved in a punishing God and that of Flugel's Polycrates Complex, which speaks of the removal of guilt by submitting to punishment, which in turn renders an experience of relief. Williams is concerned with the denial of this in the form of reaction formation.

He is also quite correct in asserting that a desire for punishment is self-destroying, and that these aspects of the Old Testament must be regarded as the least satisfying from a creative point of view. Whilst Amos and the prophets introduced a sense of order into the historic situation in which Israel found herself, this had mixed blessings. It imparted a philosophy of history,

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1. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p.331
2. ibid., p.45
3. The God I want, p.169

but it also enthroned the depressive position as fundamental, which in its most extreme form, encourages not creative living, but moral masochism.[1]

6. ISAIAH AND THE NUMINOUS

Of all the various "calls" in the Old Testament, this call of Isaiah is the most majestic and perhaps the most authentic.[2] Rudolf Otto regards this as the supreme expression of the numinous in the whole of the Old Testament.[3] Theologians regard this passage as fundamental for the knowledge of God, a wholly other God, whose holiness produces in man a sense of sin and inadequacy, yet pardons and enables man to do his work, whilst remaining distanced and separate (holy). Knight, for example, speaks of God's being "utterly other", not merely in transcendence, but in the sense of being separated from his world by the sin with which it is diffused.[4] A wholly "Barthian" doctrine of God could be produced from the theological implications of this chapter, but not the doctrine of a wholly Barthian man, for Isaiah, whilst remaining largely passive throughout, had after all gone into the Temple, presumably to worship.

Although this chapter speaks of an objective God, subjective

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1. See Chapter IV of Barker, Psychology's Impact on the Christian Faith.
2. One could mention the call of Moses, which contains the same characteristics; regarding a pattern in these "Call" experiences see H.D.A. Major, The Mission and Message of Jesus, p.113-5, commenting on the Transfiguration.
3. The Idea of the Holy, p.63, 78
4. A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.87

factors are present, and, as we have seen, a wholly objective statement about God may nevertheless be an indicator of a certain subjective predisposition.

I would regard the statement - "In the year that King Uzziah died" (Is. 6.1) - not as the time or dating, but as the occasion of the young Isaiah being in the Temple. The King who had been a great ruler had died, and great changes were coming in the world political scene, with two great empires on either side of little Judah. The chapter suggests that worship is proceeding, the choirs singing antiphonally, "Holy, Holy, Holy..." The altar fire burns, with the great doors on either side with their carved seraphim each having six wings. The praise is so tremendous that the very door-posts shake with the vibration of the sound. All this is of the stuff of reality. Isaiah himself, however, is filled with grief, guilt and remorse, a natural response by a young courtier to the death of a good king, perhaps revered as a father-figure. Isaiah feels weak and ineffectual.

It seems that the prophet went into a trance, in which the distinctions between the subjective and objective were blurred, fact and fantasy merged. Above the altar fire God is enthroned; the inanimate carvings on the doors seem to come alive, one of them flying to Isaiah with a live coal and touching his lips as a symbol of cleansing. Then he hears the voice of God calling for fellow-workers; Isaiah answers the commission, and is told the strange mission he has to perform of proclaiming God's word again

and again, but it will not be understood. The period of strain is at an end, for the vision has resolved the subjective tensions; he is no longer undecided, for he knows what he has to do.

Should one accept the interpretation which concentrates only upon the theological content of this passage, or should one accept completely the subjective psychological factors, which can only be brought out by imaginative reconstruction, is a matter of choice. One accepts the psychological components, yet one would not wish to "reduce" such a noble passage into a few maxims of Freudian psychology. If, however, a sense of the Numinous is to be interpreted as a return of the feelings which the male child has had of the father as wholly other, one is able to see why they should be present in this experience. One could almost go further and say that Oedipal anxiety was present, reactivated by the death of a father-figure. Mourning and melancholia were already mixed before Isaiah entered the Temple, so that he was already overwhelmed by the loss of a loved object; moreover, is there any mourning which is free from guilt? He himself felt that he fell short of the high ideals of Josiah and this would be a further factor in his feelings of being unworthy and of God being "distanced".

One does not mention these factors to explain away this vision and its authenticity, but to show how subjective factors must be included in such a situation in order to draw out a fuller meaning. The life of Isaiah following the vision passes

any tests we wish to make regarding its validity.

7. JEREMIAH

Jeremiah, like Amos, Hosea and Isaiah before him, proclaimed the righteousness and justice of God, interpreting impending military disasters as the consequence of the nation's godlessness and moral degeneracy. Yahweh was the Lord of history and controlled the events of the nation's life in accordance with his will and purpose. Injustice and infidelity would therefore result in the nation's doom. By relating coming disasters to present apostasy, the prophets gave meaning to people's lives and the nation's destiny, even though few would listen to their stern message. Isaiah's "Ah, Assyria, the rod of my anger, the staff of my fury" (Isa. 10.5) is matched by Jeremiah's "Behold, I am bringing upon you a nation from afar, O house of Israel, says the Lord." (Jer. 5.15)

This line of interpretation found in most of the prophets could be regarded by psychoanalysis as being related to the super-ego, with its sense of order and control. Freud's words about Kant's dictum, already quoted, could well apply. One does not speak of the super-ego in any derogatory fashion, but wishes to testify to the sense of law and orderliness which is part of any realistic super-ego.

That Jeremiah entered fully into this prophetic tradition is likely judging by his support of the Deuteronomic Reforms under Josiah. I accept Skinner's contention that although his name

is not among the active promoters of the Reformation, nevertheless, he supported it.[1] However, he soon found out that "you cannot make people good by Act of Parliament."[2] An external code was of little use; what was needed was an inward, personal response. Good laws must not only be written in statute books, but in the heart of man, for God is concerned with the whole of man, not merely his external conduct. Yahweh is not merely one who gives laws, but one who "triest the righteous, who seest the heart and the mind." (Jer. 20.12, cf. 11.20)

It is clear that Jeremiah was a most sensitive person, who found his prophetic role a very great burden. He witnessed men trusting in infallibles like the Law (8.8) and the Temple (7.4). It was Jeremiah who first called it a "den of robbers" (7.11, see Mark 11.17). In these outbursts, he met with great opposition and found out that "the prophets prophecy falsely, and the priests rule at their direction, and my people love it so." (5.31) Knowledge of God lies in obedience, which means, as we have already noted, caring for the needy. (22.16)

Jeremiah contrasts the migratory birds who know by instinct when to return to their nests at the right season, with Israel; the birds act as God had meant them to act, but Israel does not know the ordinance of God (8.7). This almost anticipates Augustine's well-know dictum (Confessions, I.1.i). The full flowering

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1. Prophecy and Religion, p.96f.
2. Dodd, The Bible Today, p.46

of Jeremiah's teaching, however, only came after he had undergone intense mental and spiritual anguish. He had to descend into the abyss of doubt and disillusionment. He records for us his experiences in the passages which Skinner has named 'The Confessions of Jeremiah'[1]. Almost every human mood is articulated in his personal colloquy with God; these sections afford one of the clearest examples that religion is concerned with and utilizes the most fundamental features of mental life.

The prophet struggles as he endeavours to hold on to his faith in God's righteousness over against his personal misfortunes. At times, his faith is strained to the limits; cries of rectitude and self-pity emerge, but through his complete openness to the whole of his being, the prophet receives a "revelation" of God's nature. The outcome of this intense struggle is to be seen in various ways:

(i) His concept of "The New Covenant" (31.31f.) in which the external, objective commands of the former Covenant would be replaced by internal, subjective ones. The "Law in the inward parts" could be regarded by psychoanalytical thought as a reinforcing of the super-ego, or perhaps rather a rationalizing and enlightening of it, so that the will of God could be done through inner direction. But there is more implied in this concept than mere super-ego reinforcing.

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1. Prophecy and Religion, p.201-230

(ii) One of the charges which the prophet brings against the people is that they have committed two evils, "they have forsaken me the fountain of living waters, and hewed out cisterns for themselves, broken cisterns which can hold not water." (2.13) The implication is that God acts as the spontaneous flow of a spring. No doubt for Jeremiah, the broken cisterns are the syncretistic religions and the moral debaucheries which the people have pursued. But the implications of spontaneity, tempt one to translate his words into direct psychological terms. A Jungian may be tempted to transform the prophet's metaphor completely into psychological statements. Was the prophet speaking about the self which we know and trust and can manipulate, as against the unconscious part of man with its greater resources which we can neither manipulate nor control.[1] One would not, and indeed cannot, equate the broken cisterns with man's ego, but the implications of Jeremiah's whole approach suggest that he was in touch with inner forces which would now be considered under the concept of the Unconscious. However, one must not make a too hasty equation, as Jeremiah regarded the heart of man as "deceitful above all things and desperately corrupt." (17.10) One could argue that Jeremiah was using projectionist language, seeing all good residing outside himself and all evil residing in himself; therefore God, not man, is the source of living waters. One must

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1. Cf. Harry Williams in Soundings, p.83f.

ask how the idea of God as a fountain of living waters could be known by anyone unless he had experienced in himself creative and spontaneous urges. I think that Skinner is right when he says that the prophet came to achieve a sense of being able to do the will of God "from a spontaneous impulse of a renewed heart."[1] This would be a result after the conscience has been illuminated - the law written in the heart - as in the concept of the New Covenant. (31.33)

(iii) There is a further consequence of the experience of Jeremiah as outlined in the Confessions. He worked through his anxieties and melancholias, no doubt having endured the grief of losing loved objects, the loss of his home, the loss of self-esteem in himself and in his loss of the presence of God; but he comes through all this to the strengthening of his personality, and finds that he does have defences to cope with all opposition. "And I will make you to this people a fortified wall of bronze; they will fight against you, but they shall not prevail over you, for I am with you to save and deliver you, says the Lord." (15.20) He naturally attributes this strengthening to God. A man of faith today may do the same, but he would be willing to recognize certain psychological factors operating in the experience. Emerging from his descent into the depths, as a greatly strengthened character, chastened and liberated, the

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1. Prophecy and Religion, p.329-330

"grief-work" having resulted in an increase in ego strength, the individual could also thank God for such an increase in his powers.

In these three distinctive ways, we see Jeremiah as one who was so open in every aspect of his personality, in the illumination of conscience (super-ego), the strengthening of his ego, and in the outflow of spontaneity (id), that we would claim that in this prophet, rather than in the speculations of dogmatic Biblican theologians regarding the pluralistic nature of the deity that we find in the Old Testament the real kernel of what was eventually to become Trinitarian faith. God for Jeremiah was one who touched man at every point in his life.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

We now come to draw the conclusions from this section of our enquiry, which may seem like a number of disconnected studies. We hope now to draw together the extended argument and to show why we have travelled by a roundabout and devious route.

Beginning with the suggestion of Winnicott that there were parallels between the development of the super-ego in the child and that of monotheism in Hebrew religion, we were led to examine Freud's argument in Moses and Monotheism. We found that these depended in large measure upon the myth in Totem and Taboo which Freud had constructed out of selections from prehistory and anthropological speculations and which we could not accept. We saw, however, that Freud was able to pursue his essential argument without recourse to the myth, in his study, for example, of Kant, and that a close parallel could be observed between the super-ego and the Kantian conception of the deity which had distinct similarities with that of the deity. This, however, was different from observing similarities in development.

We then summarized the component parts of the super-ego taken from Part One and to this we added the contribution of Flugel, who had previously worked out the relationships between the super-ego and the concept of God, also without recourse to

the myth from Totem and Taboo. Two aspects of Flugel's teachings were emphasised: his Polycrates Complex which denoted moral sadism, and a development which Flugel had made from an idea of Freud relating to the respective distance between the ego and super-ego in mania and depression, to which we gave the name of "distancing".

Whilst it was now possible to admit a distinct parallel between the two systems, we indicated certain weaknesses in the arguments of the psychoanalytical writers, namely: (i) that they were unacquainted with the results of Old Testament scholarships, Freud himself having selected scholars whose ideas fitted into his own theories, and (ii) that the arguments employed usually resulted in a reductionist conclusion.

In order to deal with the first difficulty, there followed a summary of contemporary Old Testament scholarship. First of all we considered two studies on the idea of plurality in the Old Testament deity which was claimed by the writers to be a forerunner of Trinitarian thought; we did not accept their arguments. Secondly, a general review of Old Testament theology followed, from which two further factors emerged. The first of these was that there was a lack of certainty about the precise dating of the material of the Old Testament, which again made it impossible to demonstrate the parallel in the developments of the super-ego and monotheism side by side. We could only proceed therefore by examining the content of the Biblical material as it was presented,

without taking historical development into account. The second difficulty was more fundamental. With few exceptions, the emphasis of the findings of the Old Testament scholars was presented in the form of Revelation, after the manner of the Biblical dogmatic theologians. This key concept is virtually regarded by these scholars as autonomous, and should this be accepted we could not proceed with our enquiry.

To get round this difficulty, an extended chapter which considered the whole idea of Revelation in contemporary theology followed, in which we gave reasons for dismissing the autonomous claim; we accepted, however, the idea as interpreted by Wheeler Robinson (and by Tillich) who permitted human participation within the revelatory acts. Revelation itself, we concluded, was a specific interpretation of phenomena, which could also be examined and interrogated by means of psychodynamic models as well as theological ones.

When we turned to the second difficulty arising from the psychoanalytical writers, namely that of reduction, we examined the history of the idea going back to Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, with its "nothing-else-than" arguments and the reliance placed on projection. By taking the findings of present day Old Testament scholarship, which are usually understood under the concept of Revelation, we demonstrated how they could be understood and interpreted under psychodynamic terms. However, this interpretation does not necessarily imply reduction, as it

could also be considered to mean that religion employed the most basic and most fundamental experiences in life, namely those which had their origin in early childhood.

We can therefore argue that psychodynamics need not be regarded as a mere reductionist technique which threatens Christian theology, but that it can be an additional critical tool which should take its place along with other critical tools used by scholars, and that when it is used in that way, it can elucidate the Biblical material and so render insights and understandings which would be unobtainable without its application.

The conclusions resulting from psychodynamic critiques need to be taken into account before any theologizing and philosophizing about Biblical material has begun. One also has to note that the Biblical material is orientated in a projectionist manner, which means that while a doctrine of a transcendent God could be produced from a direct reading of the Biblical text, this wholly-otherness could be produced by the projected nature in which the material is presented, or by a selection of "distanced" material, which has strong super-ego emphasis. Unless these factors are taken into account, the end result cannot fail to lead to an "utterly transcendent" deity.

We felt, therefore, that in view of all the difficulties stated, a fresh start was required, therefore we took what we considered to be certain paradigmatic Old Testament passages, demonstrating how psychodynamic factors had played their part.

In these studies we noted in particular certain Oedipal factors, and "distancing" of the deity, corresponding to man's condition, both of which led us to conclude that super-ego factors were very much involved. In fact, the distinct super-ego features pointed to a parallel between Hebrew monotheism and this psychic institution.

By and large, the central faith of the Old Testament resided in a God, who as Legislator, demands obedience and lays down a set of commandments. The superimposition of an external authority, however, demands also a form of instinctual renunciation from his subjects, and this is achieved by the dominance of the super-ego, called into service of the ego, to deal with the instinctual demands of the id (to use Freudian language). In this sense Freud was substantially correct; the super-ego had a substantial investment in the idea of monotheism which Christianity inherited from its parent faith. Within Hebrew monotheism lies the record of the achievement of the super-ego. It hardly matters whether it was Moses who led the tribes out of Egypt, giving the Hebrew clans the inspiration necessary to over throw their servile bonds and take to nomadic life,[1] following which he induced them to accept the rudiments of a legal code and religious system, or whether it was accomplished much later and the achievements were read back into the time of Moses. The achievement was related to the super-ego, and resulted in a unified society blessed with the benefits

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1. C.H. Dodd, The Bible Today, p.55

of law and order, the Law being an expression of faith in Yahweh, Legislator, Creator and Sustainer of Life.

Yet in spite of the super-ego orientation of much of the material of the Old Testament we found it impossible to state that Yahweh in the Old Testament is "nothing else than" super-ego. It would not be possible to explain the concept of God in the Old Testament without remainder by this single term. Even if we regarded the ideas of Yahweh as Lord of History, Lord of Nature, and Lord of the Nations as speculative extensions of the prophets' personal experiences, which we could perhaps claim were strongly orientated on super-ego lines, much would still remain to be explicated. The Old Testament conception of God contains all that the ancient Hebrews did not understand, all that was mysterious and much else besides. Their idea of God therefore included many notions which we have now separated out through the application of other disciplines, and the super-ego is one of these, but only one. "God" in the Old Testament contained the super-ego: but not vice-versa.

A further feature which leads us to see a strong relationship between the two systems lies in the fact that the nature of God's being in the Old Testament is by no means consistent; Yahweh can be near or "distanced", and the quality of his character changes according to his distance from man. We found that related to the respective distances are the varying conditions and states of man, and that the nature of God fluctuates and oscillates according to man's relationship with himself and his personal

relationships with others. Closeness and intimacy involving obedience in doing God's will implies knowledge of God: "distancing" from God involves sin, disobedience or lack of knowledge, and, in extreme cases where the abyss is infinite, schizoid non-being. The nature of God is intimately related to man's subjective states and may, in some sense, be considered as an implicate of them.

Writing of the continental theologians, John Macquarrie says near the conclusion of his argument:-

> "It seems to be all a question of hitting the right balance, of recognizing the distance between man and God without exaggerating it by degrading man too far. For if this happens, God himself is degraded. He ceases to be the Saviour of souls and becomes a salvager of chattels."[1]

How does one hit the right balance? It is clear that revelation does not do it for us, as the "revealed" God is posited at various distances from man. We would, therefore, suggest that behind this phenomenon lies the "empirical distancing" implied in psychoanalysis between the ego and super-ego and that this is what regulates the distance whether it be far or near. Consciously and intellectually we may posit God where we think he ought to be; but experientially, "hitting the right balance" seems to depend on unrecognized or unconscious psychodynamic factors of which the super-ego is a decisive one.

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1. Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.338

We think therefore that by our own devious paths we have once again arrived at a conclusion which others have already reached, namely the close connection between the God of the Old Testament and the super-ego. However, we have not found it necessary to reduce monotheism to psychology without remainder.

One further fact, however, has emerged from this section of the enquiry. It is that in our study of the prophet Jeremiah, we believe to have found the nearest approach to Trinitarian experience out of which the doctrine of the Trinity could eventually emerge. This prophet presented a concept of God who was intimately related to all aspects of the psyche. We, therefore, regard his teaching rather than the speculations of Old Testament dogmatic theologians about the plurality of God, as the real Old Testament ground of Trinitarian dogma.